

Chapter 6

Context of Community Reconciliation: Two Case Studies

1. Introduction

In order to understand the meaning of community reconciliation in South Africa, it is necessary to discern the various dynamics of the national political context that impinge on local community politics, but also to develop an awareness of the particular local characteristics that make each community different and unique. This chapter focuses on the formal political divisions rather than the multiple intra-party divisions and the complex social milieu of communities wracked by violence. These local intricacies are revealed in much greater detail in a separate chapter where the interview data is presented.

The chapter attempts to provide an overview of the formal political divisions and sketch the main conflict dynamics that characterized the two communities studied in this dissertation: Duduza and Katorus. It concludes with an overview of the most obvious lines of division that would have to be addressed by reconciliation initiatives that attempt to overcome the divisions that the conflict produced in these two communities.

The national political conflict in South Africa is often presented in simplistic racial terms. While not engaging with the question of causes of the political conflict, this chapter outlines some of the complexities of the dynamics of the conflict. This brief overview of the dynamics of community-level conflict in South Africa (which was, for most people, the most direct experience of the conflict) provides some sense of the different local dynamics that characterized different communities. While these dynamics, to some extent, mirrored the broader national patterns of conflict and victimization, they were also each unique in various ways.

2. Political Conflict at the Local Level in South Africa

Political conflict in local communities in South Africa was largely shaped by the national political tensions between political parties. This chapter highlights these formal divisions and broad patterns of conflict, rather than the local intricacies of intra-community conflict dynamics. The specific conflict histories of the two communities studied are briefly reviewed.

In Gauteng¹ the two main divisions were the conflicts between the state and ANC aligned organizations, and between ANC and IFP supporters. A thorough overview of these conflicts is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The following is a very brief outline of these conflicts and the way they affected the local context of the two

¹ Gauteng is the province that contains both Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is one of nine provinces in South Africa.

communities: Duduza and Katorus. The organizations and events that are mentioned when looking at these communities are briefly contextualized below.

a) The Apartheid Government and the National Party

South Africa effectively became a unified state in 1910 when the Union of South Africa was formed. The political structure established by the United Kingdom (the colonial power) was a racially based one. The government was elected by the white minority. The ideology and policy of apartheid was introduced in 1948 when the National Party won the national elections. Policies of racial discrimination were, however, widespread in South Africa throughout colonial times and in the period leading up to 1948.

The National Party was originally supported mainly by Afrikaners (Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans who presently make up about 60% of the white population), but increasingly also received the votes of English-speaking whites.

In 1989 the National Party opened its membership to all races, but in the democratic elections in 1994, its main support base was still white (along with a significant proportion of “coloured” voters). It does not appear to have made any significant progress in recruiting African members since then.

When the National Party initiated its constitutional reforms in the early 1980s, the more conservative members split away to form the Conservative Party (in Afrikaans the “Konservatiewe Party” or KP) that had the goal of maintaining (or returning to) traditional apartheid policies. In subsequent elections at national level the KP won a significant number of seats (and became the official opposition) and at local level it gained control of numerous local councils in white areas. In the democratic elections of

1994 (and the subsequent local elections in 1995), the KP decided against participating in the elections.

b) ANC and ANC-Aligned Organizations

The ANC was a national liberation movement that was formed in 1912 to campaign for a democratic government with universal franchise. It followed a policy of non-violent resistance until it was banned in 1960. It then went underground and set up bases in neighboring countries, but it also maintained links with other legal organizations that were subsequently established within the country (unions, student organizations, civic structures, etc.). The ANC's military wing MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe) utilized mainly soldiers who were trained outside South Africa, but later also trained underground members inside the country.

The ANC maintained a presence within the country through underground structures that were involved in sabotage and guerrilla activities and local covert members provided them with some influence within legal political structures. Its main military support came from the Soviet Union, but many western countries (particularly Scandinavian countries) provided other forms of assistance. The ANC also had a close alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) to which many of its senior leaders belonged. This alliance is still maintained despite the market-economy policies to which the ANC government presently subscribes.

Its armed struggle was not very significant in military terms, with only a few incidents involving damage to serious military or strategic targets. In the 1980s the ANC started targeting security personnel (including police, military, and those assisting the

police - informers, farmers on the countries borders). The ANC also became less circumspect with regard to soft targets. While regretting the deaths of innocent bystanders, these were seen as inevitable casualties of the conflict.

In 1976 education became a focus of resistance when black students protested against the imposition of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction at schools. These protests that started in Soweto in June 1976 spread nationally in the subsequent months. While the initial spark was the issue of Afrikaans, the protests were, however, also against the discriminatory educational system in general. The schools remained a locus of resistance through the 1980s with students often being at the forefront of the struggle. In the 1980s COSAS (the Congress of South African Students), an ANC aligned body was the main structure that mobilized students around political concerns.

Another central arena of conflict was opposition to the political structures established by the apartheid government for blacks. Black Local Authorities were established in the early 1980s to give blacks (the pretense of) representation in local community affairs. Elections for these authorities were characterized by very low turnouts largely due to a strong boycott campaign. The local black councils were seen as an attempt at co-optation and an attempt to legitimize racial division of political structures and racial inequality of municipal services. Blacks who participated in these councils (and their families) were particularly targeted by the liberation movements, as were police who resided in black communities. A number of councilors and police were killed, and many were forced to flee their homes and move to other areas.

Local councils remained racially based with separate structures established for whites, “coloureds”, Indians and Africans. The fiscal resources to provide services to the different racially segregated neighborhoods were kept separate.

Civic organizations played a central role in these protests against local councils and in response to local issues (housing, rent, services, consumer concerns, etc.) Civics were locally organized structures that were (supposedly) not politically aligned (but generally were linked to the ANC). They focused on local bread and butter concerns rather than around national political campaigns. The better organized civics had local structures of representivity organized in terms of street, block and area committees. The civic structures around the country came to be represented at the national level by SANCO (South African National Civic Organisation).

In 1983 the United Democratic Front was formed which became a central unifying structure that brought together the various organizations that were broadly ANC-aligned. The initial focus of their campaigns was the opposition to the introduction of the tricameral parliament, but they managed to mobilize internal resistance to the apartheid government on a wide range of issues.

Political violence between ANC-aligned structures and the state peaked again in the 1985-1987 period. The violence was characterized by protest marches by UDF structures that were violently suppressed by the police and military. The 1985-1988 period was also marked by a very severe security clamp down on the liberation movement. Thousands of people were detained without trial and a large number of these were subjected to various forms of torture. Assassinations was also widespread, but

appeared quite targeted at more prominent political leaders and individuals who presented a particular threat to the government.² Some units of the police and military were, however, particularly notorious for the vicious (and at times quite arbitrary) manner in which they dealt with political opponents of the government.

In 1990 the ANC was unbanned and started setting up branches in local communities. Many of the ANC-aligned political structures chose to simply disband and channel their efforts through ANC structures, while others who had more specific constituencies (unions, students, etc.) continued working alongside the ANC. While deciding to continue as a separate organization, SANCO has struggled to redefine a role for itself in the new democracy.

The ANC is a party that is supported mainly by blacks. Only a small minority of whites voted for the ANC in the 1994 elections. A number of prominent ANC leaders are, however, white. The ANC have always espoused a philosophy of non-racialism.

c) The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Inkatha was formed in the early 1970s by Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi, initially as an ally of the ANC. In the late 1970s, however, increasing tension emerged between him and other liberation organizations. He was labeled a stooge for accepting a position as homeland leader. The Inkatha Freedom Party's³ (IFP) political base was the Zulu-speaking population that mainly resided in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (previously Natal). In the 1980s the conflict between the IFP and the UDF exploded into open

² The extent and patterns of the different forms of these human rights abuses were clearly documented by the TRC in its final report.

³ Inkatha officially changed its name to the Inkatha Freedom Party in 1990.

warfare, mainly in the rural areas of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. Perpetrators and victims on both sides were Zulus. The IFP received increasing support (including military training and supply of arms) from the apartheid government in its battle with the UDF.

In 1990 this conflict spread to the townships around Gauteng. Many Zulus lived in the townships in Gauteng where the different African ethnic groups had created very integrated urban communities (despite the attempts by the government to keep them separated). Many Zulus also lived as migrant workers in the single sex hostels in Gauteng. These residents maintained strong ties to their rural communities where their families resided and where they would return on holidays and upon retirement. The power of traditional authorities was also maintained in these hostels by indunas (leaders appointed by traditional chiefs to govern the affairs of their clan at the hostel).

These hostels had become integrated components of the communities where they were located, with extensive personal and commercial interaction between residents of the township and the hostel. This was maintained for some time despite the conflict that was raging in KwaZulu-Natal.

In 1990, however, the IFP-ANC tension erupted in Gauteng townships as well.

Rupert Taylor (1991, p. 2) explains this escalation in relation to:

... the increasing politicisation of the Reef townships since February 1990, the result of rising expectations generated by the National Party's reforms moves. It was also tied to the ANC's attempts to marginalise Buthelezi by demanding the dismantling of KwaZulu (the Zulu 'homeland') and the attempt to make a national issue of the conflict in Natal On 2 July, the ANC call for a nationwide stay-away protest secured the support of three million workers. Additionally, with Inkatha's launch on 14 July as a national party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the

weeks preceding the conflict witnessed a strong recruitment campaign by Inkatha amongst Zulu-speakers and other hostel-dwellers. These developments played a crucial role in sharpening differences, creating a highly charged environment in which separate incidents together unleashed a spiral of violent retribution.

Much of the blame for this violence has been apportioned by certain analysts (Everat and Sadek, 1992 and Taylor and Shaw, 1994) to third force activities of the apartheid government. A lot of evidence points to state military involvement in instigating and fanning the violence between these two groups, particularly in the period of constitutional negotiations.

The violence in Gauteng was between IFP hostel residents⁴ and the township residents (mainly ANC supporters). As the conflict intensified it also took on an increasingly ethnic form. The IFP was almost exclusively supported by Zulu hostel residents, while the rest of the Gauteng community were composed of a fairly even mix of other ethnic groups (Tswana, Sotho, Xhosa, etc.). In some areas it was perceived by the IFP that Xhosas played a disproportionate role in ANC leadership and youth activism, and were thus particularly targeted by IFP combatants. In most areas, however, Xhosas were a minority of the black population.

While recognizing that the conflict increasingly took on a certain ethnic dimension as it escalated, a “tribal” explanation of the causes of the tension is highly problematic. On the one hand, the IFP had promoted a sectarian ethnic consciousness

⁴ There were also hostels that were not populated by Zulus and were thus not IFP hostels. Where there were mixed hostels, one group would normally, during this period, have taken over control of the hostel and forced out the other.

amongst its followers (in line with its policy of involvement in the homeland system)⁵, and thus identified themselves in political terms as Zulus and their opponents as Xhosas, Sothos, etc. Other township residents, however, rejected these ethnic labels, but because of the violence developed strong negative stereotypes about Zulus and hostel residents. Taylor (1991) points to the specific divisions that characterized the initial outbreaks of violence (hostel residents and squatter residents) as indicative of tensions that arise from the competition for scarce resources among the most marginalized sections of the townships. Their differential relations to the market (migrant laborers and unemployed) and competition for limited social services created fertile ground for conflict.

During this violence thousands of people were killed, thousands of houses destroyed and many hostels burned down or severely damaged. Communities subjected to repeated attacks by the IFP in the Gauteng townships decided (with the support of the ANC) to form Self Defense Units (SDUs) to protect the townships against attacks by the IFP and the police. These SDUs consisting of local youth (teenagers) who received minimal military training, but were expected to patrol the townships at night. The structures of control that regulated their actions were generally quite loose and ineffective.

Shortly after the formation of the SDUs, the IFP also formed similar structures called Self Protection Units (SPUs) that performed a similar function for the hostels and the sections of the townships controlled by the IFP.

⁵ See Taylor (1991) for a more detailed discussion of this mobilization of ethnicity.

Political negotiations produced a dramatic decrease in the ANC-IFP conflict shortly before the 1994 elections, both in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP decided to participate in the elections and won a small number of seats in the Gauteng Provincial Assembly. In the 1995 elections they also won a minority of votes in the local elections in the townships that contained IFP hostels.

Political violence between the IFP and the ANC further decreased in the months (and years) after the 1994 elections. In KwaZulu-Natal there have, however, been sporadic flare-ups in violence that have raised concerns that it could again spiral out of control.

3. Community Studies

This study focuses on the operation of the TRC in the Gauteng region. This region encapsulates political dynamics, parties and TRC intervention processes that are similar to those found in most other provinces. This could provide some basis for speculating on the generalizability of the findings/hypotheses generated. Two factors set it apart from other provinces, namely the level of organization among victims and the presence of numerous NGO and church initiatives aimed at providing reconciliation/conflict resolution intervention. Both factors make this province more suitable as a research location in terms of access to specific reconciliation dynamics.

The TRC interventions that were examined were those of the Gauteng (Johannesburg) office. This office was responsible for TRC activities in the provinces of

Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West, and the Northern Province (four of the nine provinces). It thus represents a big share of the TRC's activities. It must, however, also be kept in mind that significant differences in procedures and approaches were observed among different TRC offices.⁶

The two communities chosen were Duduza/Nigel and Katorus. They had a number of factors in common that made them particularly suitable. They had both experienced severe conflict over the last twenty years. The TRC had held (public) human right violations hearings in both communities. They had both experienced relatively high levels of victim mobilization during the time of the public hearings. The conflict in both communities have effectively (in terms of overt physical violence) come to an end. The main (obvious) contrast between the communities were:

- (a) Town versus city: Duduza/Nigel is a town that is not part of the Johannesburg metropolis, while Katorus does form part of the metropolis, and
- (b) Nature of the division: the most intense aspect of the conflict experienced in Duduza was between ANC supporters (and aligned organizations) and the security forces, while in Katorus, the dominant conflict since 1990 was between ANC and IFP supporters.

These two communities thus provided a very suitable context within which to examine the conceptualizations of reconciliation and the role of the TRC. They allow a contrast in terms of how reconciliation is viewed in relation to quite different conflict dynamics involving very different types of parties and divisions among disputants.

⁶ See for example van der Merwe et al (1998)

a) Duduza (Nigel)

i) Background to the Conflict

Duduza is a black township that is part of the Greater Nigel Area. Nigel is a town on the East Rand (Gauteng) with neighbouring African, Indian and Coloured townships, the major ones being Duduza, MacKenzie Park and Alra Park, respectively. The total population of the town (and townships) is approximately 150 000 - 200 000. Over half of these people live in Duduza.

Duduza is a community that has experienced extensive political violence over the last 25 years. Duduza experienced some violence during the 1976 Soweto uprising, in which a number of youths were shot and killed by the police. After a period of relative political calm, the community mobilised in the early 1980s under the leadership of the Duduza Civic Association. In 1985 violence erupted after police fired on a march organised to protest against the bucket sewage system used by the Duduza Town Council. Ongoing violence occurred between members of the Duduza community and the police and council over the 1985-87 period. (Black) police and councillors living in the township were chased out of the area and the township was made "ungovernable" - state structures were effectively shut out of the township. Youth leaders emerged during this period and took a harder line.

Police responses to protest action also became more drastic and brutal. In one incident, the police attacked the house of one of the Duduza Civic Association leaders during which his two daughters were killed, both of whom were active in the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). In a revenge attack by Duduza youth, a white woman

from a nearby farm was killed when her car was ambushed.⁷ Police used detention and torture extensively, and in some cases, assassination in order to suppress political protests in the area. Police also infiltrated local political structures, particularly COSAS, and orchestrated the zero hand grenade incident⁸ in which a number of Duduza activists were killed. Linked to these deaths was the murder in 1985 of alleged police informant, Maki Skhosana. Rumours that she had had a relationship with one of the police operatives and had informed on the victims spread through the community. She was beaten and stoned to death by members of the community, and her body set alight and mutilated. According to some reports she was necklaced. A number of people were subsequently prosecuted and sentenced to jail for the murder.

Tension also arose around the presence of IFP supporters in Duduza hostels. In 1991 violence erupted in the hostels as IFP hostel residents from neighbouring township (where they had been chased out by ANC supporters) fled to the Duduza hostels. The conflict that emerged in Duduza hostels was both among hostel dwellers and between the hostel and community residents. During this conflict members of the community burned down and demolished the hostels. Some of the hostel residents were absorbed by the community, while others fled to other townships.

After the democratic transition of 1994, political tension in the community

⁷ This was the only report of a white civilian victim of political violence in the Greater Nigel Area.

⁸ The zero hand grenade incident was an incident in which two police operatives pretended to be Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members who had come to assist local activists with military training. They provided instructions to local youth on how to handle hand grenades, and then helped them plan simultaneous attacks in three neighboring townships (Duduza, KwaThema and Tsakane). When the attacks were launched, the hand grenades exploded prematurely in the hands of the youths. Some were killed and others severely maimed by the explosions.

continued in other forms. Tension emerged around the election of the Greater Nigel Council, the local government structure, in 1995. There were allegations of intimidation around internal nominations and elections for candidates to represent the ANC in the Council. The ANC candidates representing Duduza (six of the ten council seats), although opposed by National Party and independent candidates, won their seats by a wide margin. The three seats in the white neighbourhood of Nigel were won by the NP (previously held by the Conservative Party, and in 1995 contested by the Freedom Front), and the ANC narrowly won the seat in the coloured/Indian area against the NP. The ANC thus holds two-thirds of the Greater Nigel Council seats.

The picture painted here is of the broader visible dynamics of the conflict. A direct result of the conflict was that the internal cohesion amongst community members was also destroyed, as suspicions, allegations of complicity, retribution and competition for leadership led to violent internal struggles and suppression of dissent. This secondary aspect of the conflict is explored in more detail in the next chapter through the eyes of community residents.

ii) Lines of Division

Reconciliation is a concern in relation to various dimensions of the conflicts of the past/present. These divisions include black-white relations (and between the ANC and NP more specifically), police-community relations, relationships between different factions within the ANC, relations between victims and perpetrators (or those suspected

of being perpetrators), and relations between victims and political leaders. These tensions guided the selection of interviewees as outlined in the next chapter.

b) Katorus

i) Background to the Conflict

Katorus is the composite name of Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus, three neighboring townships that have experienced very similar (and interconnected) political turmoil over the last three decades. It is located within the metropolis of Johannesburg and neighbors a number of white suburbs. Socially and politically (with regard to the conflicts) the three townships are very interconnected, but in terms of local government structures they are each attached to a separate local council. The link with the various neighboring white residential communities is thus more of an artificial political construct (mainly to promote income equality among councils).

Katorus experienced similar ANC-state conflicts to that of Duduza in the period leading up to 1990 (1976 Soweto uprising and 1985-87 UDF-state conflict). These were, however, eclipsed in the 1990s by very intense fighting between supporters of the ANC and the IFP. While many observers point to the role of the security forces in fueling tensions and supporting one side (and some claim both sides) in numerous ways (including the supply of weapons), the community experienced a very clear internal division along political and (as the conflict progressed) also ethnic lines.

The ANC-IFP conflict erupted in 1990 when various incidents of violence between residents of a hostel and a squatter settlement in Thokoza (which was replicated in other Gauteng townships such as Soweto, Sebokeng and Kagiso). After increasingly

violent battles, the hostel residents were chased out and the hostel was destroyed. The conflict continued to spread throughout the Katorus area as political parties fought for control of the area. The violence again reached a peak between July 1993 and April 1994, when close to 1200 people died in the conflict (Star, 1995). In the four years of conflict, over 2000 people died in Katorus (Simunye News, 1997).

The conflict led to the community being divided into clearly delineated IFP and ANC sections. IFP supporters within the community were chased out (and some killed), and hostels became virtual forts that were under direct political control of IFP indunas (traditional leaders). Residents in the houses around the hostels were evicted, and replaced with hostel residents (or other IFP supporters). Dividing lines between IFP and ANC areas were no-go zones, often identifiable because the houses had been completely destroyed. A major effect of the conflict was that hundreds of houses were looted and destroyed and extensive damage was caused to many of the hostels.

Whereas before the conflict, residents of the community and the hostel mixed freely (socially, economically, etc.), the conflict made it impossible for any interaction (other than violence) to occur. Residents were sometimes killed simply for going into the wrong part of the township.

The conflict took on increasingly ethnic proportions as it intensified. Whereas Zulus were accepted in the community along with any other ethnic (or language) group before the violence, Zulu speakers were increasingly treated with suspicion as the violence got worse. People were sometimes killed either because they spoke Zulu in the wrong area, or because they could not speak Zulu (fluently or with the right accent) in

another area. In addition to language, style of dress also became markers of residents' political and cultural affiliation.

One impact of this division was that transport from Katorus to the rest of the metropolis was severely disrupted. During the early phase of the conflict a few minibuses were hijacked or diverted into the hostels where the occupants were killed. Minibuses owned by IFP members were also targeted and destroyed by ANC supporters. The normal bus routes (run by private minibus "taxis") were effectively cut off and diverted. Residents had to walk long distances to get to transport and the minibuses had to take new routes to avoid going through "enemy" territory. The train services to the township were also suspended after numerous attacks in which passengers were hacked to death and thrown from the moving train.

The continued violence led to the establishment of military style units being formed in the respective areas. In 1993 SDUs were established in the ANC areas, and subsequently SPUs were set up in IFP areas.

The role of the police and army in the conflict was a very controversial one. The ANC-aligned organizations had long been in a conflict with these structures. The IFP was known to have received assistance from the state, and in many instances it was reported that the police or army directly assisted the IFP in attacks on ANC areas. There have, however, also been many occasions during the conflict when hostel dwellers were killed or injured by security forces. The local police force was generally seen as completely ineffective in controlling the situation, and were often too scared to go into

certain areas of the township. A more forceful role was played by the Internal Stability Unit of the police, which had a reputation for extreme brutality and torture.

There have also been numerous reports of third force activities in fanning this conflict. While, on the one hand providing assistance to the IFP in its fight with the ANC, the state (through its various clandestine security apparatus) was also instigating conflict through targeted assassinations and incitement to both sides to step up the violence.

Extensive intervention by the Wits Vaal Peace Secretariat (set up through the National Peace Accord) was instrumental in helping to restore some level of peace in the area by 1994. A massive security operation by the military and police also assisted in enforcing a certain level of stability which allowed the peace process to begin to take root (Seiler, 1997). A major breakthrough in facilitating this return to “normality” was the agreement (at national level) by the IFP to participate in the elections of April 1994.

After the elections, various initiatives were started to rebuild the township and to re-integrate militarized youth back into the community. Many of these were funded through the new government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). One such project was the Community Constable RDP Project. It was aimed at integrating the former SDUs and SPUs into a community policing structure. About 800 members were recruited as Community Constables to work side-by-side with 800 formal police to monitor and combat violence in the townships (Seiler, 1997).

The problems experienced with the community constables program were numerous. The selection process was politically driven (illiterate people were recruited,

some had criminal records, etc.), the training of constables was minimal (4 weeks), many were still perceived by the community to be involved in criminal activities, many of them were severely traumatized by the conflict and had received no psychological treatment, their salaries were very low compared with their formal police partners, etc.

Another RDP initiative in the area was to rebuild the houses that had been destroyed in the conflict. A spin-off of this was the employment of ex-SDU and ex-SPU members as security guards to protect the construction sites from vandals and looters. A problem was, however, encountered in getting residents resettled in their houses (where the house was located within the territory of the opposition group). Many were fearful that their neighbors would again attack them at some point in the future. The same problem was experienced to a much greater extent when the city council started evicting illegal occupants from houses and assisting rightful owners to move back to their homes. Those who were evicted often resisted forcefully, requiring the intervention of the police to ensure re-occupation by owners.

The underlying causes of the conflict increasingly became obscured by the dynamics of violence and revenge. An SDU and an SPU commander give their respective reasons for involvement:

After my brother was shot (dead), and his girlfriend was raped and the friend of his girlfriend was also raped and shot, I decided that there was no reason for me to sit down and relax while people were dying.

If you're a Zulu, especially from Natal, even if you are a member of the ANC, its always suspected that you're an IFP, so I decided to stay with the Zulus. Most people who were dying here were Zulus from Natal, some were even my relatives. So I decided to stand and fight against the ANC.
(Simunye News, 1997)

Internal tensions within the broader camps, such as between the SDUs and sections of the ANC, between SDUs and the communities and between the Civics and the ANC also sometimes spilled over into violence.

ii) Lines of Division

Similarly to Duduza, the lines of tension arising from past conflict can be expected in terms of the relationships between blacks and whites, police and community, party affiliations (ANC-IFP), ethnic divisions (Zulu - other language groups), victims and perpetrators, victims and political leaders, and between ex-combatants and the community. These expected tensions guided the selection of interviewees as outlined in the next chapter.

4. Conclusion

This description of the local political context provides some insights into the intersection between national political developments and local community complexity. The conflict

that occurred in these communities were clearly part of broader national developments. These communities are clearly not autonomous entities. At the same time, local political groupings, alliances, individual leaders and symbolic events took on a particular form in these communities. They were not simply direct expressions of national conflict patterns. Similarly, local communities have specific local histories of peace and community. They remember a time before the conflict when things were different. The shape of the local conflict and the local peace (before the conflict) are, in some ways representative of South Africa as a whole, and in other ways very unique.

The TRC's intervention in these communities was a very brief episode in the evolution of their conflict, which, while broadly discussed in the community, only directly impacted on a small proportion of the residents. It is within this context that we now have to assess the TRC's involvement in addressing reconciliation within these communities. The development and early activities of the TRC had created extensive media profile. People were generally aware that something called the TRC was operating and may come to their community. People had seen brief images on television, had heard coverage of the hearings on the radio, and had seen some of the stories and revelations in the newspapers. The TRC's engagement with these communities was thus to some extent anticipated by community leaders at least. The way in which the TRC engaged with these particular communities is discussed in more detail in the next chapter where the community study approach is explained. The varying responses to the TRC's involvement and the concerns about how it should have gone about its work are

explored in the subsequent chapters (Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11) where the empirical findings are discussed in some detail.