Responding to the Smoke that Calls:
Principles of community-level interventions for the prevention of collective violence

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Introduction

The use of violence has become part of the fabric of South African life. South Africa has a long history of using violence as a tool of oppression and in the pursuit of freedom. The way in which violence displays itself has morphed over time, to adapt to new realities and/or threats. During apartheid, violence was used overtly and covertly (through, for example, torture), to ensure the dominance of a minority government over the majority. The liberation movement, initially a non-violent one, increased the use of violence as, over time, non-violent methods did not seem to be moving the country towards change. The increase in both violent and non-violent anti-apartheid actions resulted in an escalation in violence by the State. The transition into democracy, although heralded as a great achievement, was not immune to violence. The high levels of crime in the country continue to highlight how violence continues to be the daily reality of many South Africans. The violent xenophobic attacks that took place in 2008, the cases of vigilante attacks on suspected criminals by community members, and the violent service delivery protests represent emerging forms of violence in South Africa. These highlight, with concern, how South Africans continue to turn to violence to resolve personal, interpersonal, and community problems. More importantly, these different forms of violence seem to be emerging in response to the failure of democracy. The various forms of violence present in South Africa are inter-related and have common causes. Violence, in its many forms, represents a fault-line to democracy and efforts to understand, address and prevent it are required as a way to protect democracy.

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the Society, Work and Development Institute (of the University of the Witwatersrand), recently published a report exploring community protests and xenophobic violence in South Africa. The report[i], "The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South Africa", provides an analysis of eight case studies in an attempt to "probe and understand the repertoires of and meanings of collective violence with a wide-ranging analysis of local associational life, local politics, and class formation" (p. 2). This report, builds on the above-mentioned report[i] to look at ways of intervening at a community-level in order to prevent collective violence.

Methodology

In order to explore ways of intervening at a community-level to prevent collective violence, each case study was analysed in terms of root, proximate, and immediate (accelerating and decelerating) causes of collective violence. Common themes across the different case studies were extracted. These causes were then explored further to identify appropriate principles for community-level interventions. These principles are informed by theory and/or practice from other contexts. In addition, the report[ii], "Voices of Anger: Protest and conflict in two municipalities" and a draft report[iii] on a visit to Ficksburg after the death of Andries Tatane during service delivery protests were consulted.

Although some sites may have had specific, localised factors that may have triggered or contributed to collective violence, the common ones across case studies are the focus here. This should not discount the fact that any intervention, will need to take into consideration localised factors that may contribute and influence collective processes.

The names of all the case study sites except Bokfontein were changed in the original report as a way to protect members of the community that were interviewed by the researchers. As such, the names used in that report are used in this one as well. This report focussed on the seven case studies that were detailed in the report as well as the Ficksburg report. The table below is extracted from the original report and describes the different sites. A brief description of the collective violence in each site will follow.

Research Sites			
Site	**Type**	**Primary Violence**	**Secondary Violence**
Voortrekker	Rural town	Community protest	Xenophobic attacks
Kungcatsha	Rural town	Community protest	Xenophobic attacks
Azania	Rural town	Community protest	Xenophobic attacks
Slovoview	Urban/RDP/Informal	Community protest & xenophobic attacks	Community protest
Gladysville	Urban/RDP/Informal	Community protest & xenophobic attacks	
Trouble	Urban/RDP/Informal	Community protest & xenophobic attacks	
Bokfontein	Rural informal	Xenophobic violence prevented	Local development, no protest
Ficksburg		Community protest	

The case study communities

A brief description of events in each case study community (these are extracted directly from the report[i]).

Voortrekker

In June 2008, Voortrekker became the first site of violent protest since the election of President Jacob Zuma. The violence in Voortrekker was short-lived but caused serious damage to both persons and property. In a span of 48 hours there were three deaths, the burning of tyres, the erection of barricades across all access roads to the township, the burning of private cars and municipal buildings such as the library and clinic as well as municipal trucks, the destruction and looting (especially of maize meal, bread and air time for cell phones) of shops owned by Indians, the burning of some councillors homes and the mayor's home. These repertoires of violence were preceded by non-violent protest actions in the form of marches, mass meetings, the presentation of a petition to authorities and the call for a 'strike' or stay-away. Specific activities in Voortrekker involved organising a mass meeting of about 2,000 residents, drawing up a memorandum listing grievances (mostly about corruption, inadequate service delivery, nepotism, and poor management in local government) and organising a march on 15 June from the township to the municipal offices from where the memorandum of grievances was faxed to senior officials. There were five important sequential events in the process of mobilisation, which led up to the collective violence: 1. Anger over a disorganised sports event in April 2009; 2. the public launch of the Concerned Group (CG) at a mass meeting in 2009; 3. From this meeting a memorandum was compiled and faxed to various officials' offices on 15 June; 4. This was done at the culmination of a march of thousands from the township to the municipal offices; 5. The non-arrival of the Premier at a mass meeting on 28 June 2009 to hear the community's complaints about corruption and poor service delivery in the area.
Several informants maintained that the immediate trigger of the protest action (termed 'strike' by residents) was a debacle over the Mayoral Cup.

The aftermath to this collective violence followed the frequent response from the government to service delivery protests, namely, to suspend the local administration. For example, in February 2010 the provincial ANC fired six mayors and appointed seven new ones in what it said was a bid to boost service delivery. Other councillors were redeployed, including a speaker and a chief whip. No consensus emerged from the research on whether the violence was successful. To the extent that the violence

resulted in the overthrow of the municipal council, we may say it succeeded. However, it is not clear that the administrator running the town is going to deal with the service delivery problems and community grievances that gave what may have been an elite spat within the ANC succour and legitimacy.

Kungcatsha

Kungcatsha was rocked by two weeks of violent community protests in the second half of 2009. The protests started on a Sunday, when a mass meeting of residents in the local stadium decided to call for a stay-away in protest against the town council's failure to explain to the community what had happened to a missing sum of R30 million. Violence flared up when the police were called in and attempted to disperse protesters with teargas and rubber bullets. Barricades of burning tyres were set up. During the protests a councillor's house, a community hall and a library were torched, and the council offices and a new community centre were partially destroyed.

A week into the protests, 11,000 residents of the township marched to the town to present a memorandum to the council. They carried placards with all kinds of messages (for example, the mayor must go; a hungry man is an angry man and so on) and chanting, ululating and singing songs, including umshiniwamiumshiniwami (the infamous song associated with President Zuma). Some protesters started to break the windows of municipality offices and tried to set cars belonging to the council alight. The police started to fire at the crowd with rubber bullets and all hell broke loose. The protesters started to run amok, looting street vendors' goods, throwing stones and missiles at the police and barricading roads with stones and dustbins. Some protesters carried sticks and knobkerries. Passing motorists were stopped and others were not so lucky when their cars were broken into. The police arrested scores of protesters, some of whom alleged police harassment. The protests ended when a team of senior, ANC leaders arrived in the town and announced that the mayor and her mayoral committee had been 'recalled'.

Azania

Many participants mentioned that the protest in Azania did not start in 2009 and gave a long history of the protests dating back to 1996. One of the major issues was the need for the area to be incorporated into Gauteng. People in Azania want to be incorporated into Gauteng for two reasons: the town historically has always been part of Gauteng, and second, because of access to essential services such as hospitals and home affairs. The Pro-Gauteng Forum Committee lost its momentum between 1998 and 2004, but all their protests to be incorporated into Gauteng were peaceful and non-violent. The Pro-Gauteng Forum Committee was revived again in 2006. During this period, the Forum started to work closely with other community groups and political organisations. A number of peaceful protests took place, but nothing was done to address community members' concerns. Following a lack of response to all their memos/letters, they decided to call a mass meeting at the stadium on 10 June 2007. In the meeting, they resolved to go and march to the municipality offices. The march was organised and a memo was submitted to the mayor. The Zenzele Landless Community Forum also organised another peaceful protest on 24 September 2007 to submit a memo of demands to the municipality, which included the immediate allocation of residential sites to all the residents who had been living in mikhukhus (squatter camps), RDP houses, electricity, toilets and water, and completion of all unfinished houses in certain wards. Lack of housing has been raised as one of the major concerns by the participants in the present research project.

On 19 July 2009, a mass meeting was held at the local stadium. It was agreed in the meeting that they would march the following day on Monday to submit their memo to the municipality offices. Community members say they were surprised to see so many police cars after their mass meeting late in the evening at six. It is not clear who called the police, but many leaders suspect people close to the mayor called the police. It is

unclear exactly what happened, but it is alleged that police fired rubber bullets at the crowd and many people were shot as they were running away. It is reported that the protestors then started to vandalise public facilities, including the burning of the library and one municipality office. Some argued that what made things get out of control was the heavy presence of the police. It seems the burning of the library happened spontaneously as another group of the protestors started to push the main gate of the library until it fell. They were later joined by other protestors who broke windows and an attempt to burn the library was made, but the library as a whole did not burn. Only the entrance and a few books were burnt and the Fire Department in town was called to come and stop the fire. It was reported, late in the evening, that some protestors returned and burnt the whole library down, and computers and other valuable items were stolen.

Following the protest in July 2009, President Zuma and a host of cabinet ministers visited Azania Township to talk to community members about their service delivery concerns. Surprisingly, another violent protest happened in February 2010 because community members felt nothing had happened since Zuma's surprise visit in August. Following the second wave of violence on 10 February 2010, a high-powered delegation from parliament led by the Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, SiceloSchiceka, went to Azania. In his address, he mentioned that significant progress has been made to address grievances raised in the first service delivery protest. The Minister also made an announcement that the decision would be made on the incorporation of Azania into Gauteng by the end of March 2010. One community leader argued that 'ministers incite violence by making false promises'. Following the second protest in Azania, one ANC councillor resigned. What emerged during by-elections is that the ANC in Azania is divided into two camps. In mid May 2010, President Zuma visited Azania, the second time in less than six months. The reception that Zuma got at the municipal offices was more welcoming than the hostile reception that he got later at the stadium. The crowd was very rowdy as they disrupted the proceedings. The researchers impression was that the residents of Azania had high hopes that Zuma's second visit would look into the issue of incorporation into Gauteng, but were very disappointed when Zuma announced that the issue of cross-border towns is being dealt with by the Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs.

Slovoview

The outbreak of the 2008 xenophobic violence in Slovoview was informed by the general catalogue of events that were happening in the Gauteng province at the time. This catalogue of events concerned attacks against persons perceived as foreign nationals and sought to drive them out of South Africa. Although different versions exist of how the crowd first emerged, it is clear that a crowd blocked the roads leading to a section of Slovoview. In doing so, they effectively ensured that access routes allowing the police entry was blocked. Once the place was sealed from police intervention the crowds, guided by those who identified persons believed to be foreign nationals, began the task of chasing these people out of their shacks. As the victims vacated their shacks some among the crowds began to loot their belongings. Darkness had come down upon Slovoview as this incident took place. Those who were being driven from their homes went in different directions in search of safety. Those who were chased out included men, women and children. The killing of these nationals does not seem to have been on the agenda of these crowds. While one part of the crowd was chasing out those believed to be foreign nationals, another part of this crowd headed straight to the shops owned by foreign nationals. They broke into these shops, which are mainly owned by Pakistanis, and looted whatever they could lay their hands on. This breaking and looting took place throughout that night. In this case, informants say that the looters were mainly young men and they argue that this was so because this section of Slovoview has an army of young men who are unemployed. It needs to be understood that it is not all shops in Slovoview that are owned by Pakistanis that were looted.

With the violence finally clamped down, a process of reconciliation aimed at building bridges between the victims of violence (mainly foreign nationals) and the perpetrators of this violence (local South Africans) got under way. Some of the local leaders of the ANC (at Ward 96) appear to have been instrumental in initiating this process and in ensuring that those who had been driven out from their homes returned in safety.

The outbreak of the xenophobic violence of May 2008 was later followed in July 2009 by another incident that led to collective violence. This incident was sparked by a proposal within the local council of Ward 95 to relocate a section of the community of Number 1 to Ward 96. This section of the community had built their shacks on a water supply pipe that needed to be fixed. In the new place, they were to be given stands, which would relieve them of the congestion characteristic of life at Number 1. However, before the local councillor could convene a meeting in order to make his plans known to the concerned group, the plan was leaked and fell into the hands of people who misrepresented it. They gave the plan a new spin in which allegedly the councillor was planning to remove the residents of Number 1 to a new place in Brits. In this new version information about problems with the water pipe were apparently deliberately left out. Once the leaders of SANCO were in possession of this information they convened a public meeting at Number 1 in which a decision to march to Council in protest was made. On the day of the protest crowds began to file in front of the local council offices. Young men constituted the majority of this crowd. The leaders of the crowd demanded that the local councillor come out and accept the memorandum of grievances.

While the people were still waiting for the councillor to come out and collect their petition the police arrived on the scene. Their attempt to remove the crowd from the Council property triggered a scuffle between the police and some among the crowds. As this happened, panic struck, and the crowd turned violent as it ran in different directions. Two of the police vehicles and an SABC van that was on the scene became casualties of this violent reaction by the people. They burned down these vehicles and threw stones at the police who dispersed the crowds with tear gas. This marked the end of what was supposed to be a peaceful protest march to the local council. In the aftermath of this protest march that turned violent the council gathered and took stock of the processes that had led to the outbreak of this violence. Among other things, poor communication was identified as one of the factors that led to the outbreak of this violence. In order to rectify this mistake the council adopted a door-to-door strategy in which they explained to each one of the affected households the reasons why the council intended to relocate them.

Gladysville

On the morning of 18 April 2008 South Africans rose up against foreign nationals in these informal settlements by attacking, looting and ransacking spaza shops owned by these foreigners. Later that day these attacks turned to foreign nationals in general. People were driven out of their shacks, their property was looted and, in some instances, their shacks were burned down.

The violence against foreign nationals at Matjhabeng is said to have been as a consequence of the removal of squatters from private land owned by a cement company operating in that area. It is said that this company was selective in how it went about this process; it wanted non-employees to demolish their shacks and vacate the land. According to the leader of the All Peoples' Convention women's league in Jacobshoek, 'the majority of these people who had to leave the land were South Africans because the company mainly employed foreign nationals'.

In addition meetings were held regarding service delivery problems and a march was called for. At the time of the march, the marshals and the organisers were on high alert. The crowds had gathered in large numbers, majority of who were young men and women. With chanting and singing of songs associated with the struggle, the march left

Jacobshoek for Gladysville police station. The march proceeded to the Gladysville police station because the organisers wanted a police escort. Unfortunately, members were told that the station commander was not at work so there was no one with authority to delegate a police escort. After failed negotiations, the organisers decided that the march could not proceed without police escort. Disappointed and angry that they could not proceed to the city, the crowds returned back to Jacobshoek. As they entered Jacobshoek hell broke out as some among the crowds began attacking shops owned by foreign nationals on the main road dividing Jacobshoek from the township of Gladysville. Others went to the shops that are within the informal settlements themselves and began to attack them. They ransacked these spaza shops and, in some instances, overpowered owners as they tried to lock their shops. Within a blink of an eye shops owned by foreign nationals in these informal settlements were ruined. With shops belonging to persons deemed as foreigners destroyed and pillaged in a matter of hours, the violence then turned to persons that mobs considered as foreigners. This violence is said to have happened in the latter part of the day as people returned from work. In some cases they evicted the occupants of these shacks and then looted what they could before setting these shacks alight. In one incident the occupant of the shack was not so lucky because he hid himself underneath his bed. A mob then broke into his shack and looted whatever they could. Once finished they set the shack alight without, apparently, noticing that someone was hiding underneath the bed. Tragically, he died cruelly underneath his bed. His death was to add up to the deaths of three other men who are said to have been foreign nationals. With businesses owned by foreign nationals destroyed and significant numbers of foreign nationals driven out of their shacks and their property looted or burned down, some people began to put in place a new order to take over the buildings in which foreign nationals ran their shops.

The looting and destruction of property as well as attacks on foreign nationals did compel the former minister of safety and security, Charles Ngqakula with political heavy weights from the area to come to Gladysville. Attacks on foreign nationals, however, became the primary focus of his visit in Gladysville. He wanted police in this area to 'identify those who were responsible and to have them arrested'.

Trouble

Trouble is situated in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan municipal area. It is a semiformal settlement of 70–80,000 people, consisting of RDP houses and shacks, which came into existence in the mid-1990s. The wave of xenophobic violence that rocked South Africa in May 2008 affected Trouble as well as the surrounding areas. In Trouble the protests resembled those in several of the other case studies in this research project. Mobilisation against the incumbent councillor appeared to involve wide layers of the community, but was led by the leadership of the ANC branch and particularly the ANC Youth League, and was marked by road barricades, violent clashes with the Metro police, and attempts to destroy public property.

In May 2008—the time of the xenophobic attacks in other parts of Gauteng—there were several incidents in which the spazas of foreign nationals in Trouble were attacked and looted. According to some respondents, this was one of the first incidents in the month-long spate of violence. From the various accounts we heard, it seems as if spaza shops and small supermarkets owned by foreigners were attacked in several different parts of Trouble that night, and that the foreigners rapidly responded by organising themselves and undertaking heavily armed patrols. They were said to be armed with very big and long machine guns, unlike anything any of the respondents had seen before.

South African locals participated in anti-xenophobic patrols with foreign nationals. The ANC branch, the CPF and SANCO mobilised against the informal groups that advocated arming and attacking foreign nationals, and mobilised the police to attend meetings and stress that attacking foreign nationals was a crime. Not all those who mobilised against xenophobic violence were necessarily free of xenophobic attitudes, nor did they

necessarily oppose the expulsion of undocumented foreign migrants from the community or the country; what they did oppose was the use of extra-legal force by citizens. They believed in the rule of law and the monopoly of the state over coercion. At the same time, there was a substantial constituency that saw foreign nationals as an asset to the community because of the low prices in their spaza shops, and regarded them as community members by virtue of their liaison or marriage with South Africans. This constituency supported the organisational leadership in their opposition to violence.

Trouble is clearly a fractured community where the rule of law remains fragile—crime, the ineffectiveness or corruption of the police, and vigilantism all undermine the authority of the law. Likewise, the illegal selling of land and houses constitutes a form of appropriation by local elites of government functions; members of the ANC allege that the ANC councillor and SANCO are party to this corruption, undermining the authority and credibility of the state. Residents do not feel very secure in their possession of their homes or in the face of criminal violence. The State is, in any case, a very remote presence in Trouble. Although violence did not escalate in Trouble, this could have been as a result of the foreigners arming themselves. This action served as a decelerator in collective violence.

Bokfontein

Bokfontein is an area, which includes various farm plots near Hartebeesfontein dam in the North West Province. The residents of this community were evicted from nearby farms in Hartebeespoort Dam in 2005 and taken to Bokfontein. Many of the participants described their eviction as reminiscent of forced removals under apartheid. Their homes were bulldozed. Their building materials and graveyards were also destroyed. In August 2006, another neighbouring community in Melodi was also forcefully removed by the municipality to Bokfontein for illegally occupying private land that was earmarked for low-costing housing. Again this group of people described their forced removal as humiliating and traumatic. These two communities were forced to live together and share a small piece of land in Bokfontein. So the community was divided into two sides (community one and two). It is reported that there was bloody violence between members of these two communities for a period of two years. In 2008/9 Organisational Workshops (OW) were organised and facilitated by Gavin Andersson and his team to help this community deal with all its challenges, including the effects of collective trauma. OW as a community-based healing initiative. OW has helped a great deal in helping residents of this community to reflect more about their pain, sufferings and mourn losses of their evictions, and start working together to rebuild and restore their sense of humanity and dignity. Many participants agree that development would not have been possible in Bokfontein if people had not been assisted as a group to deal with their anger and effects of the collective trauma.

In 2008, the Community Work Programme (CWP) was first piloted in Bokfontein. The Community Work Programme (CWP) developed out of the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP), which was initiated by the South African government to alleviate poverty and unemployment through providing short-term work opportunities and training to unemployed individuals. CWP is based on the Organisational Development Model in which community participation is highly valued in identifying and prioritising 'work opportunities' in their respective communities. CWP provides a regular work of two days per week or eight days per month. People get paid R50 per day. In Bokfontein, it is reported that more than 800 people are employed in the CWP.

In 2008, South Africa witnessed violence against foreign nationals. It is reported many foreign nationals were attacked and their goods stolen and also destroyed. Surprisingly or interestingly, it is reported that there were no xenophobic attacks in Bokfontein. Many participants said the OW as an intervention has helped them to understand issues of identities and respect for diversity. Other reasons offered for the lack of xenophobic

violence included many people mentioned that xenophobic attacks would not be possible in their area because of the number ratio between South Africans and foreign nationals. It is reported that 50–60% of people living in Bokfontein are foreign nationals as compared to 40% or 50% of South Africans. Other participants went further to say it is not easy to differentiate who is a foreign national or not because many foreign nationals are fluent in local languages such as Zulu and Tswana. Lastly, in Bokfontein, other participants mentioned that xenophobic attacks would not happen in their community because their leaders are against it. Why were there no service delivery protests in Bokfontein? In Bokfontein, the two key community leaders were vehemently opposed to service delivery protest saying that they created a culture of violence. They also asserted that service delivery protests do not help, except to destroy the public property. Both believed in negotiations to solve community problems.

Bokfontein is included in this analysis mostly contributing to the decelerator section discussed below as collective violence did not erupt there. It should, however be kept in mind that this community is in many ways different to other communities discussed in the report and as such although some lessons can be learnt, it may be difficult to achieve the same results in other (historically, politically, and socially more complex) communities.

Ficksburg

(T)he people in Ficksburg have explored non-violent methods to resolve their service delivery needs/demands. It is reported that on the 29 March 2011, a memo listing 29 demands was submitted to the municipality, but nothing was done until the second protest on the 13th April 2011. Andries Tatane led the first protest and there were no reported acts of violence…it is reported that they were only two local police officers who were monitoring the march and everything was done peacefully.

(During the second protest, Andries Tatane was assaulted by 8 police officers and shot. He died at the scene and the attack was captured on camera, and later repeatedly shown on national television). Andries Tatane was a committed and dedicated community leader. He was involved in various community projects, including tutoring Grade 12 learners in Maths and English. Politically, Mr. Tatane left the ANC to join Cope in 2008. At the time of his death, he was a leader of MCC (Meqheleng Concerned Citizens), a non-political community movement that organized a march to the municipality against poor service delivery such lack of water supply and poor sewerage system. (Mr Tatane's death) sparked uproar from political parties, activists and trade union leaders.

(T)he protestors in Ficksburg were…singing popular anti-apartheid songs. One of the songs that the protestors sung was "S*enzenina, S*enzenina" (Translation: "What have we done? What have we done?"). Many participants narrated that the police exacerbated the situation because the protestors randomly started to attack public facilities, including shops owned by foreign nationals. In Ficksburg…, after Tatane's death, angry community members set alight two municipality buildings, including the library. Other community members started to throw stones at the police…one of the informants said, "They attacked shops owned by the Pakistanis because one of the police officers accused to have killed Mr. Tatane is Indian. So all the Pakistanis look like Indians". It is reported that more than 50 protestors were arrested and released on bail after two to three days.

(The report does not offer information on responses to the demands of the protestors in terms of service delivery as it focuses mostly on the death of Andries Tatane and the reaction to this.)

Analysis

The following table outlines the different causes extracted from the report on each case study. It makes evident which causes were found to be present across the different communities. Case studies are by their very nature subjective, with different aspects of the situation being emphasized by different role-players. Due to this, the absence of some causes in the different case studies may be due to the fact that this cause was not mentioned by those interviewed for the research, and not that they do not exist in those communities. It provides, however, a useful overview of what was found through the analysis process.

Table 1: Causes of collective violence across case studies

Level of Causes	Causes	Communities					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
Root Causes	High levels of unemployment	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Inequality	X	X	X	X		
	Poverty	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Use of apartheid era protest action		X	X		X	
	History of violence in the community		X				
Proximate Causes	Poor local governance (including):	X	X	X	X	X	X
	• Corruption	X	X		X	X	X
	• Internal conflict	X					
	• Politics of excess	X		X			
	• Lack of communication with communities	X	X	X	X	X	
	• Competition for access to resources	X	X		X	X	
	• Use of outsiders in official positions	X				X	
	• Indifference to the needs of the community	X	X	X		X	
	• Lack of accountability	X					
	• Poor treatment of community members by officials	X					
	• Use of sex in exchange of opportunities		X				
	• Nepotism	X					
	• Patronage networks	X	X			X	
	• Inadequate leadership					X	
	• Gender as an issue in local governance		X			X	
	• Conflict between officials and civic leaders					X	
	Problems with services delivery:	X	X	X	X	X	X
	• Water	X		X			
	• Electricity	X	X	X		X	
	• Sanitation	X	X				
	• Health	X	X	X			
	• Education	X	X		X	X	
	• Housing	X	X	X	X	X	X
	• Lack of recreational spaces		X		X		
	Political friction in the community						
	• Between different parties			X	X		X
	• Within the ANC	X	X		X		
	Failure of previous peaceful protest actions	X	X	X	X		
	High levels of crime			X	X		X
	Lack of judicial institutions such as a police station				X		X
	Low educational levels			X			
	High levels of substance abuse in community			X			

	Contested border			X			
	High density of population				X		
	High number of foreign nationals				X		X
	Civic organisations take over					X	X
	Workers protest action close to the community		X				
Accelerators	Political entrepreneurs	X	X		X	X	
	Youth involvement		X	X			
	Police:						
	• Inaction					X	
	• Use of aggression against protestors	X	X	X	X		
	• Use of outside units			X			
	• Confused, weak and incompetent	X					X
	• Use of torture			X			
	• Unable to access area				X		
	Collective violence occurs nearby					X	
	Economic entrepreneurs			X	X	X	

1-Voortrekker, 2-Kungcatsha, 3-Azania, 4-Slovoview, 5-Gladysville, 6-Trouble

Common root, proximate, accelerators and decelerators to collective violence

Collective Violence is the result of a particular set of events and or conditions that when combined set the stage for it to occur. There are many contexts in South Africa where the particular root causes, proximate causes, accelerators, and decelerators exist, which do not lead to collective violence. In order to make sense of how conditions and events are linked, the model developed by Schmid and Sirseloudi[iv] has been adapted. The model looks at factors at different levels (root, proximate, immediate) and how these lead to violence. Importantly, the model also allows for understanding the different levels of prevention. In our adaptation of the model, accelerators and decelerators are seen as Immediate Causes that can be targeted for short-term prevention.

Root causes are those that create the preconditions for collective violence to occur. These may be historic, political, and social, among others. They are typically linked to broader structural realities in which communities exist, but which affect them. These causes produce social and other tensions that may, along with other conflict behaviours result in collective violence.

Proximate causes or medium-term situational causes increase the concrete risk of collective violence occurring in communities. These are often linked to the behaviours of different actors, the relationships between these, and the nature of the conflict situation.

Triggers or accelerators of collective violence may not be causally related to the conflict, but intervene to accelerate the process. They are factors that influence whether or not existing conditions will lead to collective outbursts or not. On the other hand, decelerators are factors that when present, reduce the likelihood of violence occurring.

Table 2: A model for understanding collective violence[1]



[1] This has been adapted from the model developed by Schmid and Sirseloudi (2005)[iv]

Understanding the root causes of collective violence

Poverty, unemployment and inequality form the reality of all the case study communities that erupted in collective violence. These were often accompanied by factors such as limited educational opportunities and poor economic development. Environments of poverty, unemployment and inequality impact on the community in deep ways, creating the foundation for violence to erupt. This is supported by research whereby violent crime has been linked to relative deprivation, measured, for example, by the extent of income inequality[v]. In fact, Breetzke[vi] in his study on analyzing associations between various census measures of social disorganization and violent crime rates in the city of Tshwane, found that 'percent unemployed - as a proxy for socioeconomic deprivation - was found to be a strong predictor of violent crime' (p. 450). In addition, in a number of the cases, there was an unequal distribution of resources within close proximity which could also contribute towards increased frustration of community members.

These factors, especially affect the youth who were shown to be involved in the collective violence actions. Lack of opportunities for economic development has been linked to increased levels of frustration and anger which in turn creates the propensity towards violence. This is supported by the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which demonstrates how frustration is linked to aggressive behaviour[vii].

Historically embedded relationships between citizens and the State also seem to be common among the case studies. In many of the communities, references are made to how anti-apartheid songs and actions were replicated in the current collective violence actions. The use of similar songs and forms tells us that participants may equate their actions today with the actions of the anti-apartheid struggle. In order to understand how collective actions become violent it is important to understand the history of protest actions in these communities. Although democracy prevails, community members rely on the modes of interaction with government that they know. Within the contexts of these communities, this means a confrontational relationship which expects retaliation and is fuelled by a deep sense of injustice. Indeed, the emotions that accompany the protest actions need to be understood in line with the collective traumas communities carry, which Mogapi refers to in the "Smoke that Calls" report[i]. Although South Africa has adopted a human rights framework as its guiding principle (as embedded in the constitution), the reality on the ground remains embedded in the historic authoritative approach. This conflict must be acknowledged and addressed if we are to prevent future collective violence.

Understanding the proximate causes of collective violence

In the case studies examined, common proximate causes identified were poor local governance (including: corruption, nepotism, poor communication/engagement with community, internal conflict, nepotism, the use of "outsiders", and struggles for access to opportunities) and political friction at a local level (most commonly within the ANC).

All the case studies pointed to major problems with local governance. This included problems with local governance structures, individual representatives and the relationships between these and the community. Lack of transparency and the lack of provision of clear answers to community concerns were present in a number of the cases. In addition, many community members made reference to the poor communication between the community and officials. This included little to no contact or communication as well as lack of clear answers from them. In some instances, local government structures were seen as inaccessible to community members. This lack of or inadequate communication and of opportunities for engagement between the community and local governance bodies, occurred in most of the case studies. Internal conflict at a local governance level was also

evident in the case studies, with reports of conflictual relationships either within local offices or between councillors and/or community members or between elected officials and political entrepreneurs wanting their positions. Corruption was another theme throughout the case studies, with many questions raised regarding the allocation of tenders and jobs, with nepotism seemingly rife. In a number of the communities included in the report, the deployment of outsiders as officials within a community was raised as a concern. The fact that officials are not from the community and therefore are not in touch with community needs was seen as problematic. Finally, in line with the root causes of poverty and inequality, local governance structures were seen as access points to economic opportunities (either through tenders or jobs). Indeed, the fierce political competitiveness present in these communities supports this as local positions provide access to income and status, in communities where very few alternatives exist.

Political friction was a common theme across these communities. Of note was the conflict present within the ANC. The ANC clearly plays an important role at the community level and conflict within the organisation has a far-reaching impact. The nature of these internal conflicts are difficult to ascertain from the case studies, but could be linked to broader conflicts happening in the organisation at a national level or with the above-mentioned competition for access to economic opportunities. The inability to reconcile political conflicts constructively and proactively was also evident. Political entrepreneurship was present in most of these case studies, with individuals seeking political positioning and power playing a clear role in the processes that lead up to collective violence. In some cases this involved making use of legitimate community concerns to advance political positioning. Their support for community concerns seemed to be more linked to their political ambitions than to genuine interest in addressing the concerns of the community. The political entrepreneurs also seemed to make use of the protest actions to embarrass existing leadership, again as a way to advance their own political credibility.

All of the communities included in the report had experienced a history of service delivery problems. These ranged from lack of services to unequal distribution of services such as electricity, housing, water, health and education. The degree of poor service delivery differed between communities, but there was a common frustration regarding a history of this and an inadequate response from government to address it.

Understanding the triggers/accelerators of collective violence

In the case studies included in the report, the role of the police, economic entrepreneurs, and the youth as accelerators of collective violence is evident. Each of these groups played a role in moving an already tense situation towards violent action.

The police accelerated collective violence through action and inaction. In some cases, their absence allowed for the violence to escalate considerably as their absence provided a sense of a lack of justice and accountability. In most of the cases, however, it was police action that seemed problematic. Some of the problems identified through the case studies include reacting aggressively in tense situations; the use of outside units to respond to collective actions; and using apartheid-era tactics to collective actions. All these resulted in increased tensions in already volatile situations.

The role of subaltern crowds (crowds within the crowd) is highlighted in the report. How these manoeuvre and influence the collective action could be seen as an accelerator of collective violence. In the case studies, common subaltern crowds present included criminal opportunists and the youth. These subaltern crowds influence the larger collective violence in directions that benefit their own agendas.

The role of the youth in the violent protest was common in all cases. As discussed above, the youth are the most affected by poverty and unemployment and lack of access to opportunities and to local government. In addition, young men and women are often excluded from community processes. Their levels of energy and seemingly increased propensity towards violence seemed to accelerate collective actions into violent ones. The protest actions may have been a way of venting frustrations experienced in their daily lives.

Criminal opportunists also emerged within the crowds and used the protest action as an opportunity to commit crime. For criminal opportunists, this means looting shops and houses as part of the collective action. This undermined the community protest action and message as focus was placed on the crimes rather than the issues the community members were protesting about.

Economic entrepreneurs were also present in the protest actions. These are slightly different to criminal opportunists, in that they use the protest action to target stores owned by foreign nationals and then appropriate them for themselves after the conflict. Political entrepreneurs were also present, with their role having been encouraging the targeting of political opponents property.

Understanding some of the decelerators of collective violence

It should be recognized that some of the decelerators that can be extracted from the case studies where collective violence did not erupt are not ones that could be used to prevent collective violence (such as foreign nationals visibly arming themselves and threatening retaliation and a higher ratio of foreign nationals to South Africans). There are, however a number of examples of actions that took place that served as decelerators which diverted collective community action away from violence. These are important to highlight as they could be used in other similar situations as short-term prevention strategies.

The role of leaders in decelerating collective action was clearly present. In relation to this it seems that leaders who are opposed to the use of violent protest action (and in one case against protest action at all), may serve to reduce the likelihood of collective violence. This links to the important role leaders' play in these situations and their ability to influence community action. Leaders also became decelerators through organizing pre-emptive meetings in the community to ensure that community members did not engage in xenophobic violence and by organizing patrols by South Africans and foreigners. In at least one case study, the ability of community leaders and members to take this position may have been influenced by the presence of an organisation who worked with the community to address the impact of collective trauma.

In analysing the description of peaceful protests that had taken place in communities, something may be said about the role police can play as decelerators of collective violence. In situations where local police officers were involved in patrolling collective protest actions by community members seemed to be less likely to erupt in violence. This was linked to the fact that the police officers are known by the community members and are also affected by the issues community members are protesting about.

Support for the common themes extracted

These common themes are supported by those found by the Centre for Sociological Research (of the University of Johannesburg), in their report "Service Delivery Protests: Findings from Quick Response Research on four 'Hot-Spots' – Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, and Diepslot"[viii]. In the report, the following critical themes or conclusions:

1. High levels of poverty and unemployment are compounded by a lack of basic services;

2. Protests followed unsuccessful attempts of community members to engage with local authorities regarding failed service delivery;
3. The brutal response of the police in at least two of the communities played a role in the protests;
4. No evidence was found that xenophobia was the prime motivator behind the protests. The protests were mainly directed towards local government service delivery;
5. Political divisions and lack of communication and accountability of local government contributed towards the frustration and discontentment of community members; and,
6. Frustrations and protests will continue as long as people do not have access to basic services and effective channels through which to express their demands.

What can be done at a community level to prevent collective violence?

It is clear from the discussion above that the prevention of collective violence requires intervention at different levels and by different role-players. In order for collective violence to be prevented, government has a central role to play.

At a national and long-term level, this would include the creation of policies to address issues of poverty, unemployment, inequality, and poor service delivery. Until these underlying problems which characterize so much of South African society are visibly and effectively addressed, the government should expect increasing frustration and more frequent, better organized, determined and long-lasting protest action. At the same time, government needs to play a role in addressing the numerous problems occurring at local municipalities. Ultimately collective violence of this kind must be understood as a failure of democracy. As in the past, when other forms of protest are ignored or prove otherwise ineffective, violent confrontation is seen as/may be the only alternative. Reducing the level of corruption (which may be linked to lack of capacity, effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms) and improving service delivery is something that warrants close attention from provincial and national structures. In relation to accelerators, government structures play a central role in ensuring professional policing of protest actions. Many recommendations could be made to government structures regarding the role they could play to prevent collective violence, however, this falls beyond the scope of this document. Here, we will focus on what can be done at a community level. More specifically, what can communities and NGO's working in these communities do to prevent collective violence.

In relation to interventions in communities, various approaches and theories exist that could be useful. Each has a particular objective and way of intervening. The particular issue and context should influence the way in which interventions happen in communities. Before embarking on any community intervention, it is important that organisations clearly outline the theoretical models that inform their work. This will influence the content and process employed in the community. There should be a clear theory underpinning interventions that outline how activities lead to certain results. In addition, details on the specific context of each community, existing needs, and existing assets are important to collect.

The causes of collective violence outlined above clearly point to a need to build capacity in communities to ensure that their collective needs are known, heard, and addressed in non-violent effective ways. Violence has negative consequences for the community and diverts the attention of government away from the service delivery issues. It is important that community structures recognize that their protest action could become violent. In line with this it would be important for community structures to think more clearly about the real costs of violence to the community. Finally, community structures need to be able to identify effective alternatives to violent protest.

In order for this to occur, communities need to be able to mobilize in ways that guard against political and economic entrepreneurs and that ensure the inclusion of all. Organisations interested in preventing collective violence should focus their energies and resources in building the capacity and supporting independent community-led civil society movements in at risk communities. These movements should represent the collective needs of the community and should include the voices of all groups (with a special focus on the inclusion of the most vulnerable and silent). Organisations can also play an important role in developing these community movements' ability to connect with national partners in addressing specific needs. Organisations can further assist with the collation of information that could assist the community to further their goals. Building communities' capacity to gather and effectively use information would also be important. Communities should be able to effectively create pressure for action and connect to existing opportunities that may exist.

Principles of community-level interventions for the prevention of collective violence

Collective violence challenges some of the core principles of community intervention which are often not sufficiently interrogated. In the following section a number of principles of community intervention are outlined which need to be interrogated when intervening to prevent collective violence. Suggestions regarding how these could be addressed in terms of collective violence are also offered.

1. Understanding the notion of community
   Defining the notion of community is an important starting point for any intervention. Communities could be seen defined by geographical boundaries or by a group of people who share something in common but who may live in various geographical areas (for example: foreigners).

   In terms of addressing the issue of collective violence, the notion of community as defined in geographical terms seem more appropriate. In order to be effective, it is important that these geographical boundaries are clearly spelt out at the beginning of any intervention. Some of the case studies described how events in neighbouring areas affected communities. Understanding the boundaries of the particular community one is intervening with/in, will influence the scope of the intervention.

2. Understanding the complexities of communities
   Organisations wishing to intervene in communities should also acknowledge the complexities present in communities and not limit their understanding of communities to idealistic notions.

   The information gathered regarding the communities where collective violence occurred paints a picture of communities were complex conflicts between different groups, agendas and needs exist. Although these communities are places of strength, resourcefulness with an ability to mobilize, they are also places of exclusion, conflict, opportunism, corruption, violence, and abuse of power. Being aware of the complexities of communities will ensure better preparation of organisations wanting to intervene. It also highlights the need for longer-term engagement in communities as understanding the complex nature of each community will require time.

3. Defining the theoretical model of intervention
   Organisations need to be clear about the theoretical models that inform their interventions. In terms of community-based interventions, McLeroy et al[ix] refer to four concepts: community as setting; community as target; community as resource; and community as

agent. Defining the way in which community-based intervention is understood influences what the focus of activities is and how interventions are implemented.

In relation to interventions aimed towards the prevention of collective violence, community-based approaches that see communities as resource or as agent would be the most appropriate. In both of these, the focus is on making use of the existing resources/assets that exist in the community to address issues that affect them. In terms of addressing the issue of collective violence it seems clear that the communities own ability to create change and address needs is central. Approaching the community as resource or as agent allows them to build exactly that in a more sustainable way. Harnessing what exists in the community and assuming that the capacity does exist in the community would be important principles to follow in intervening on the issue of collective violence. Indeed, the case studies clearly show how communities are able to mobilise and raise concerns around their needs. The concerns, however, emerge around the underlying agendas present in the actions and how these are used and abused. Adopting an approach of community as resource or agent also places community participation and collaboration in the centre of any intervention. In relation to the prevention of collective violence ensuring community-led participation and collaboration would be central and should be present from the onset.

Various models for community intervention exist. The fields of public health, community psychology, social work, and anthropology, among others all offer a variety of community-based models for intervention. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline all of these, two particular models could be useful for organisations wanting to intervene at a community level to prevent collective violence. These are the Community Development Model[x] and the Social Action Model[xi]. Both of these models would view community as resource or agent as outlined above.

In relation to the prevention of collective violence, models that understand the source of problems within communities as linked to broader structural issues and linked to notions of power and inequality would be most appropriate. Some categories of these problems would include: conflict between consumers and municipalities; conflict between consumers and other service providers; conflict between local political branch and elected local officials; and conflicts between factions within local political leadership. In addition, models selected should also focus on an understanding of community as resource or agent, capable of solving problems that affect them from within the community. The Community Development Model and the Social Action Model would be two suitable options. Either of these models could be used as ways of working with communities in preventing collective violence. More information on each of these can be obtained in the references provided. Both these models also encourage a focus on the needs of the community, not of the NGO. The NGO works in a way that keeps the needs of the community as central, rather than its own agenda. The challenge is to assist the community to recognize that violence is a risk and analyse the extent to which violent protest is likely to address the community's needs. Organisations also have a role to play in finding ways to get government to address the structural inequalities that underlie collective violence. Finding ways to influence policies at a provincial and national level would be central. Creating opportunities for communities to influence these broader, structural issues would also be important. Once a model for community-based intervention is selected and has been clearly defined, this needs to be translated into activities. Each activity should align with the model chosen.

4. <u>Recognising the unique context of each community: community mapping</u>
   Although common causes of collective violence can and have been extracted from the case studies, it should be kept in mind that communities are unique and an in-depth

understanding of each community an organization wishes to intervene in is required. Community mapping should include a description of the physical characteristics of the community, the social characteristics of community life (including existing organisations and structures), the needs of the community (from the perspective of various groups in the community), and the existing assets/strengths in the community. Proactively mapping the community in this way ensures that interventions take the contextual nuances into account and increase the success of the interventions. In addition, the way in which the community mapping process is done can also be seen as an intervention in and of itself and should be guided by the theoretical approach chosen. Community mapping can be used to mobilize the community members to collect information which can be used to lobby government and other decision makers and/or to protect or promote service provision. Community mapping allows communities to combine their resources and knowledge and to identify opportunities and threats for engagement with organisations and local government structures. It also builds the community capacity to gather information and to find solutions for themselves[xii].

Following the principle of community as resource or agent, any community mapping exercise should actively involve community members. In fact, community members can be used to gather the information necessary to map the community. This process could be done initially through the identification of community leaders that could be involved, but also through the use of members from key groups within the community.

There are a variety of techniques that can be used for community mapping. In order to ensure the use of the most appropriate technique, it is useful to narrow the focus by clarifying what information is necessary to gather, why, how and who can obtain this information, as well as how it will be analysed and used[xiii].

In relation to collective violence the following would need to be kept in mind when community mapping is undertaken:

- Mapping the physical character of the community. Interventions to prevent collective violence require an understanding of what the community looks like physically. Involving community members to draw maps of the community that outline where services, safe and unsafe, gathering, and power spaces are would be important. Facilitating the process with the community can lead to communities becoming aware of needs (threats) and assets (opportunities) they may not have been aware of before. In relation to collective violence it would be important that community maps identify the location of the police, organisations, local government structures, youth gathering spaces, political gathering spaces, shops (including which are foreign owned), services (such as health and education), and service delivery problem areas (and how these are affected). Given the description of inequality in service delivery in close proximity to where collective violence occurred, a brief description of the surrounding communities would be important.

- Mapping the social character of the community. Here, the emphasis is in creating an understanding of the existing social relationships and dynamics present in the community. A focus on existing political structures, community organisations, citizen groups, and local governance structures would be central. Obtaining a clear description of the dynamics present in each of these (for example: conflicts, partnerships, problems, and divisions) could be a tool through which communities become aware of agendas that may be influencing actions. It also allows for the identification of opportunities and threats to independent community-led mobilization. A focus on the resources and/or strengths present in the community would also be central.

- Inclusion of the most vulnerable or less visible. Here it would be important to include the voices of various groups in the community that may not ordinarily be engaged in organized community structures (formal or informal). Here we emphasise amplifying the voices of people who are silenced in these discussions. Voices of people who might speak against violence. Some of these may include: shop keepers who's property gets destroyed/looted in violent protests, older people and young children who are scared when there is fighting in the streets, middle class people who have something to lose, silenced young man and women. The goal is to be as inclusive as possible and look beyond those at the forefront of community engagement. Through the inclusion of a variety of community members a comprehensive list of needs can be developed. Although some sectors of the community may have unique needs, common/shared needs can be identified through this process. An agreement on these would be an important output of the community mapping process and will provide direction for the way forward.

In attempting to prevent collective violence it is important that an in-depth understanding of the community is obtained. This process can, in-and-of itself be an intervention that begins to make community members aware of the shared needs, the power dynamics at play, the threats and the opportunities to address the issues.

5. Relationship and credibility building

Many community interventions of the kind proposed above require some level of credibility or relationship building in order to be successful. Given the clear presence of underlying political and entrepreneurial agendas present in communities where collective violence occurs, the credibility of any organisation intervening in these communities and the relationships it builds within the community are important. If the organisation already exists within the community, it would be important for that organisation to clearly adopt a non-partisan agenda and approach and ensure that it engages with all sectors of the community, without showing the favouring of some.

An external organisation coming into a community should be transparent, clear and open about its agenda in the community as well as its organizational history and goals. It would be important for such organisations to be cautious of the gatekeepers it may initially use to make entry into the community. Although gatekeepers are important to gain access into communities, they will invariably have particular roles and alliances within the community. It would be important that the organisation quickly connects with other members in the community and behaves in a way that demonstrates independence.

6. Encouraging democratic participation and processes in communities

In all the case studies where collective violence occurred, it is clear that communities are able to mobilize and to articulate their needs. However, personal agendas in influencing the community actions play an important often negative role. From the way in which the needs of the communities are identified, to the way in which they attempt to have these addressed, the influence of political and/or entrepreneurial agendas are clear, with often negative consequences. Creating more democratic ways of outlining the shared needs in the community and identifying ways of addressing these free from political or entrepreneurial agendas would be central to the prevention of collective violence.

In practical terms this could be achieved through:

- Engaging with members of all sectors of the community (including the most vulnerable as discussed above) and allowing equal opportunity for all to participate

- Building community awareness regarding the dangers of allowing personal agendas to influence actions or, said differently, to recognize the power and benefits of independent social society movements
- Building community capacity to recognize and intervene appropriately when personal agendas begin to emerge
- Harness existing community mechanisms that encourage democratic non-violent behaviour

7. Long-term engagement required
   All of the principles above point towards the need for long-term engagement with communities in order to prevent collective violence. Even short- and medium-term prevention require time as a contextual understanding, relationship building, and credibility are required. Organisations wishing to prevent collective violence need to commit to long-term engagement with communities. This kind of community intervention should not be considered as a way of stopping violence once protest action has started. Rather it requires a strong working relationship already in existence when the community starts to organize around issues. It then becomes important to define ways of identifying communities where collective violence could erupt, far in advance. From the case studies a number of indicators could be used to identify "at risk" communities:
   - Communities with high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality and a history of engaging in protest action;
   - Communities experiencing continuous service delivery problems;
   - Communities which have made repeated representation to local, provincial and/or national government structures;
   - Communities which have made repeated representation to provincial or national political structures;
   - Communities where some kind of 'concerned group" has been formed;
   - Communities reporting high levels of problems regarding local governance structures;
   - Communities where fractions within local political parties exist;
   - Communities with low levels of engagement and communication between local governance structures and community members.

Addressing the root causes at a community level- long-term prevention

Without adequately addressing these root causes of collective violence, other interventions will equate to putting a plaster over a gaping wound. In order to address the issue of unemployment, poverty and inequality at a community level, several options exist.

- Community collective action can be used to support local, provincial, and national organisations and/or initiatives that advocating for policies that address the issues of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Ensuring that communities are linked to broader processes that seek to address root causes reduces their isolation and places more pressure on government to respond.

- Community collective action can be used to lobby for that community to be a recipient of economic development opportunities that may be available both from government and national and international organisations. Often economic development initiatives exist which could be accessed by communities. Communities should attempt to access these and use collective action to ensure that their communities are considered for them.

- Organisations wanting to work with communities to prevent collective violence can play an important role in identifying local, provincial, and national organisations and/or initiatives of these kinds and facilitating connections between these and the independent community-led movements established. Organisations can make use of their resources, knowledge and existing partnerships to not only identify these opportunities, but also to translate the sometimes bureaucratic jargon involved into more accessible information.

In addition to the issues of unemployment, inequality, and poverty, it would also be important to address the way in which current community collective actions are linked to apartheid-era notions, memories, and behaviours. Addressing this is linked to addressing the collective trauma experienced by communities which may be as important as dealing with the economic causes. It may be necessary to combine these approaches in order for either to be successful. These ideas are illustrated in the following examples.

Case example 1: Creating "Safe communities of opportunity", South Africa[xiv]

> ...The 'Safe communities of opportunity' model,...provides a consensus-building mechanism in which interventions can be verified at the outset through a shared vision and understanding of the systemic nature of the challenges faced. An appropriately systemic strategy for transformation is then developed, but nothing is done without anticipating the impact it will have – and the impact is then monitored with the community in an inclusive and transparent way. Experience has taught us that nobody can apply change to a community; it must come from within. The opportunity inherent in this systemic approach is grounded in the knowledge that the capacity, will and motivation to facilitate change for the better inevitably lies within communities. It is the role of government and other stakeholders to help unlock it.
>
> The 'Safe communities of opportunity' model is a methodology that incorporates:
>
> - Identifying elements of a safe community of opportunity, verified through research;
> - A shared current worldview which articulates the gap, if there is one, between 'what it looks like now' and 'what it will look like when it's fixed';
> - Suggested simple indicators that rely on local knowledge and experience rather than months of data gathering;
> - Indicators that relate directly to the impact of the programme;
> - Accessible information about the linkages between elements and their significance;
> - Visual representation of stakeholder mandates and functions, and the identification of useful collaborative partnerships;
> - A simple, practical action-planning process;
> - Longitudinal impact assessment and measurement; and
> - Diagnostic and remedial guidance.
>
> Success stories
>
> - The model is currently being implemented in Kenya as part of an intervention by UN Habitat Safer Cities as a tool for the transformation of a struggling slum school into a community asset.
> - The model has been adapted into a planning and management tool for application in urban management.
> - The model has been introduced by the government of Delhi in India to transform the city into an inclusive city for women.
> - In Hammanskraal in South Africa, Khulisa Social Solutions is employing the model as a community transformation tool.
> - Khulisa has also embedded the model in its Restorative Justice and Diversion programme.

> The 'Safe communities of opportunity' model is premised on the notion that each of us knows the difference between a dream and reality. We should trust and encourage one another to dream big, and follow up with practical, pragmatic collaborative action that takes us towards our shared goals. This inclusive, systemic approach to transformation can enable and empower all of us to live our best lives.

Case example 2: the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA), India[xv]

In looking for different options for interventions to deal with the root causes of collective violence, it is important to be open to a variety of ways of intervening. This example demonstrates how particular groups within communities can mobilize themselves to address their needs.

> SEWA is a trade union registered in 1972. It is an organisation of poor, self-employed women workers. These are women who earn a living through their own labour or small businesses. They do not obtain regular salaried employment with welfare benefits like workers in the organised sector. They are the unprotected labour force of our country. Constituting 93% of the labour force, these are workers of the unorganised sector. Of the female labour force in India, more than 94% are in the unorganised sector. However their work is not counted and hence remains invisible. In fact, women workers themselves remain uncounted, undercounted and invisible.
>
> SEWA's main goals are to organise women workers for full employment. Full employment means employment whereby workers obtain work security, income security, food security and social security (at least health care, child care and shelter). SEWA organises women to ensure that every family obtains full employment. By self-reliance we mean that women should be autonomous and self-reliant, individually and collectively, both economically and in terms of their decision-making ability.
>
> At SEWA we organise workers to achieve their goals of full employment and self reliance through the strategy of struggle and development. The struggle is against the many constraints and limitations imposed on them by society and the economy, while development activities strengthen women's bargaining power and offer them new alternatives. Practically, the strategy is carried out through the joint action of union and cooperatives. Gandhian thinking is the guiding force for SEWA's poor, self-employed members in organising for social change. We follow the principles of satya (truth), ahimsa (non-violence), sarvadharma (integrating all faiths, all people) and khadi (propagation of local employment and self reliance).
>
> SEWA is both an organisation and a movement. The SEWA movement is enhanced by its being a sangam or confluence of three movements: the labour movement, the cooperative movement and the women's movement. But it is also a movement of self-employed workers: their own, home-grown movement with women as the leaders. Through their own movement women become strong and visible. Their tremendous economic and social contributions become recognized. With globalization, liberalization and other economic changes, there are both new opportunities as well as threats to some traditional areas of employment.
>
> Also there is much to be done in terms of strengthening women's leadership, their confidence, their bargaining power within and outside their homes and their representation in policy-making and decision-making fora. It is their issues, their priorities and needs which should guide and mould the development process in our country. Toward this end, SEWA has been supporting its members in capacity-building and in developing their own economic organisations.

Case example 3: Community healing and economic development in Bokfontein, South Africa[i]

The case study of Bokfontein outlined in "The Smoke That Calls" report is worth exploring as an example of how the combination of addressing historical traumas at a community levels and

accessing economic opportunities can be used successfully to prevent collective violence. To this end, the Organisational Work Crew (OWC) helped this community deal with its history of violence through community-based healing and reconciliation initiatives. In addition, the Community Work Programme (CWP), which created jobs in the community was also implemented in this community and could possibly be accessed by other South African communities. The role the leaders in the community and of the Bokfontein Development Forum (BDF) also seemed important in preventing violence and increasing economic opportunities in the community.

Addressing the proximate causes at a community level – medium-term prevention

In attempting to address the problems of poor local governance (including poor service delivery) and political conflict and/or entrepreneurship communities have an important role to play. Although poor local governance includes a number of issues such as corruption, nepotism, and lack of engagement with community (to name a few), there are ways in which communities can create pressure to address this. These could include:

- Independent community groups can become "watchdogs" of local governance structures and service delivery. Through this role they can create ways of gathering information regarding service delivery problems and use the information collected effectively. Community collective action can be used to increase transparency and access to information. The access and use of information is a key tool in holding leaders accountable and fighting corruption. This can be done in a systematic way (as described in the example of Citizen Report Card below) with the support of data gathering organisations. The power of knowledge and data cannot be understated. Building processes that enable communities to collect and use data can be a powerful tool in the fight against corruption.

- Organisations can assist communities to connect with local, provincial and/or national organisations with particular experience and skills in accessing information at their community level. Creating partnerships between these organisations and the independent community movement could translate in building capacity in the community to access information and use it to hold leaders accountable.

- Community collective action can also be used to encourage the reporting of cases of corruption by local government officials. It can also be used to call for investigations to be conducted where reports of corruption are evident. Communities can also, through partnership with other organisations, seek legal options to address the issues if attempts to follow government processes have been exhausted.

- Organisations can play an important role in outlining the different complaints mechanisms that exist within government structures. In addition, understanding how these can be escalated at a provincial and even a national level will be helpful, especially when local mechanisms fail to respond.

- Communities should make use of the media to highlight their needs and concerns. Even at a local level, media can be used to place importance on communities no longer accepting poor local governance, increasing community knowledge of how to go about addressing it, and encouraging community members to participate in non-violent activities that seek to address this.

- Independent community-led movements need to be aware of and guard against political entrepreneurs when attempting to address the issues that affect them. Although some members of these movements may also belong to different political parties, it would be

important that politics do not interfere with the issues of service delivery and poor local governance.

- Independent community-led movements should attempt to engage with local governance structures and create platforms and opportunities for communication. Given that these are the structures that influence the quality of community members' lives, it would be important to create positive engagement with them.

Case example 4: Holding the state to account: Citizens voice through report cards, Bangalore[xvi]

Rapid growth of Bangalore since the 1970s led to immense demand on essential services that service agencies were unable to cope with, by the early 90's. Government listened to criticisms, without significant corrective actions. The resignation and apathy of residents reinforced the situation. It was in this context of urban growth and poor service delivery, that a small group of citizens initiated the process of preparing CRCs (Citizen Report Cards) in 1993. The group gathered systematic feedback on service delivery from a cross section of citizens through a stratified random sample survey. They presented it as the "voice" of residents to service agencies and the city government. The findings reflected abysmal service standards; proportions of users, who were clearly satisfied with many services, were in single digit percentages. The report was sent to concerned agencies, which had different responses to the feedback. Three agencies sought inputs to improve services. But development agencies across India took notice of this process and its potential for impact. The interest generated by the first CRC led to the creation of Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in 1994. PAC went on to replicate this process in other cities while strengthening the civil society network in Bangalore. By the second CRC in 1999, the CRC process evolved from information gathering and dissemination, to one that actively engaged service providers.

The second CRC indicated improvements in services and an increase in the incidence of corruption. The findings were shared in separate presentations with the heads of four public agencies.PAC also used the findings to facilitate a series of public discussions involving city agencies about measures to improve service delivery. This was followed with several initiatives by city agencies to engage civil society to improve service delivery. The third CRC indicates that satisfaction with services has improved from the single digits of 1994 to over 70% for most agencies in 2003.The experience with this decade-long process, described in Section II, has contributed to significant changes in civil society's engagement with public agencies in Bangalore, and in the manner in which citizens' participate to improve public service delivery. The learning from this experience has been replicated and adapted in other sectors in India and in several countries across the world.

Case example 5: Using its New Law to Powerful Effect, South Africa[xvii]

In 1999, the South African government decided to declare a moratorium on the publication of crime statistics, which are the subject of considerable political controversy. The reason provided for the moratorium was to improve the collation and thereby the quality of the statistics. The moratorium hampered the work of concerned organizations committed to the transformation of criminal justice in South Africa. A newspaper, the Cape Argus, took up the argument with the government and finally launched an application for a specific set of statistics relating to car hijackings in and around the main Cape Town freeway. The newspaper argued that it and its readers had the right to the information because it was a matter of public importance and interest. A South African NGO, the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC), intervened in order to strengthen the case by showing how service providing NGOs, such as Rape Crisis, need the statistics for their work. ODAC mobilised support from a range of such organizations to submit a joint *amicus* application.

As a result of the action, brought using the right to access information, the government was forced to publish a 1998 crime statistics report of its own commission, which specifically stated that there was no reason to withhold crime statistics during the period of re-organization. In fact, it recommended the opposite, in order to encourage public input on the accuracy of the statistics. The Minister for Safety and Security withdrew their contest of the case, and the moratorium on publishing the information was lifted.

Case example 6: Uncovering Corruption in the Thai School System, Thailand[xvii]

The first major case under Thailand's right to access information act revolved around the admissions process to Kasetsart Demonstration School, one of several highly regarded, state-funded primary schools. The admissions process to the school included an entrance examination, but test scores and ranks were never made public, and the student body was largely composed of *deksen*– children from elite, well-connected families. These factors created a widely held public perception that some form of bribery played a part in the admissions process. In early 1998, a parent whose child had 'failed' to pass the entrance examination asked to see her daughter's answer sheets and marks, but was refused. In the past, that would have been the end of the road– she and her daughter would have been left aggrieved, frustrated, and powerless. Instead, she invoked the access to information law. In November 1998, the Official Information Commission ruled that the answer sheets and marks of the child and the 120 students who had been admitted to the school were public information and had to be disclosed. There was a period of public controversy, but eventually the school admitted that 38 of the students who had failed the examination had been admitted because of payments made by their parents. The child's parents then filed a lawsuit arguing that the school's admission practices were discriminatory and violated the equality clause of Thailand's new Constitution. The Council of State, a government legal advisory body with power to issues legal rulings, found in her favour and ordered the school and all state-funded schools to abolish such corrupt and discriminatory practices.

Addressing the accelerators and increasing the decelerators of collective violence at a community level – immediate prevention

The role of the police, economic entrepreneurs, and the youth as accelerators of collective violence is evident. These groups played a role in moving an already tense situation towards violent action. Community-based interventions should attempt to ensure that the role these groups play once collective action begins is carefully managed. In addition, the role of the police and community leaders as decelerators of violence should also be harnessed. Several options for this exist:

- Building relationships between the independent community movement and the police. Open communication with the police and the establishment of a relationship with them will reduce the likelihood of the police reacting aggressively towards protesting community members and possibly reduce the likelihood that local police stations will call in outside units for support. Providing the police with information about any potential protest actions that take place will also allow police to prepare accordingly.

- Ensuring the presence of protest monitors from within the community. This is a successfully employed strategy for protest management with a long history in South Africa. Using community members to monitor and control protest crowds, decreases tensions and reduces the need of police intervention. By using community members, it also becomes easier to identify and manage subaltern crowds that may want to push the crowd towards violent actions and keep the crowd focused on the agreed and established goals of the protest. Using women as protest monitors could also be a good strategy.

- Framing all protest actions in non-violent, peaceful terms. Emphasizing the non-violent nature of protest action beforehand will also help to reduce the likelihood that these will result in violence. Those involved in organizing protest action should endeavour to frame any such action as a peaceful one, where violence is not condoned. Ensuring that this is a core principle of the independent community-led protest movements will reduce the ability of accelerators to occur.

- Communities can also increase their ability to be sensitive to/aware of how subaltern crowds emerge and direct crown behaviour in negative ways, to meet their own agenda. By doing this, these personal agendas will be quickly neutralized during protest action and thereby reduce the chance of violence occurring.

- Organisations can establish contacts between the independent community movements and peace-building organisations that could provide capacity building of community members for managing crowds and conflicts that may emerge during community actions.

- Within independent community-led movements leaders will emerge. Some of these may already be leaders in the community, but who are committed to the independent, peaceful agenda of the community movement. These leaders should use their influence in the community to emphasise non-violent protest actions and condemn violent ones. This should be done actively by referring to it at any opportunity that emerges. Independent movements will also include members from less community engaged groups, such as the youth, and these could play a role in spreading an ethos of non-violence among these groups. Finally, the independent movement should proactively engage with leaders in the community who may not form part of the group to encourage them to play a role as decelerators of violence. This needs to occur before protest actions take place.

Case example 7: Peaceful protest action as a reaction to a military coup d'état, Honduras[xviii]

> Shaded from the blazing sun by his straw sombrero, one of the principal leaders of the National Front Against the Coup d'état in Honduras declared, "The only solution to the political crisis is the return of Manuel Zelaya to the presidency before September 30. But this also requires the formation of a national constituent assembly to ratify a new Constitution to allow Honduras to be restructured as a progressive Central American nation," added Rafael Alegría, leader of the Front. Alegria said a new Constitution must contemplate the end of 'traditional groups of power' through enacting deep reforms to the system of government, presidential re-elections, the extension of that term of office to five years, the breakup of the armed forces and a total reorganization of the police.
>
> He spoke just prior to beginning a march through poor neighbourhoods on the north side of Tegucigalpa on the 82nd day of protests against the Honduran coup d'état. Meanwhile, the government that installed itself through the June 28 coup said the only solution is the November 29 general election to choose a new administration. "The general election will be boycotted by the Front, because it will take place under an administration made up of coup forces whose only option is to accept the mediation plan of Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, in line with the position of the United States government," added Alegría, spokesman of the Front and leader of the La Vía Campesina (Rural Path), an international network of small farmers organizations and rural workers.
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> With this political and social movement, the Front has sustained the longest movement of peaceful protest in the recent history of Honduras.

Case example 8: Using trained peace marshals, the United States of America[xix]

> In 1980 and 1981, in Ravenna, a town located in northeast Ohio near Akron, the teachers' union carried out a strike for eighty-five school days. It was the longest strike in the history of American public education. Late in the strike, the teachers scheduled a rally seeking the support from labour unions as well as other teachers' associations. The group asked Kent State University's Centre for Peaceful Change to provide marshals at the rally because of concern about counter-demonstrators and about violence in a polarized community.
>
> Of the twelve marshals recruited, about half were Kent Stat faculty with marshalling experience and the remainder were concerned citizens with ties to some of the teachers. The marshals were trained and attended the rally on a cold Saturday morning in March 1981. The activities of the marshals were varied. First, they talked with the teachers and others and made themselves visible throughout the rally. Second, they provided directions to various teaches' groups about what was going to happen at the rally. Third, the marshals kept the front steps of the courthouse clear of photographers, television reporters and demonstrators because the high point of the rally was a march to the steps of the courthouse by the striking teachers. If the steps had been blocked, the symbolic value of the rally would have been lost.
>
> After three hours the rally ended with no violence. The teachers both informally and formally expressed their appreciation to the marshals for their help.

Conclusion

The analysis of case studies where collective violence erupted or was curbed provides rich information regarding what factors come together to produce such a result. Through a systematic process, common root, proximate, and immediate (accelerators and decelerators) causes were extracted. This provides a basis upon which interventions aimed at the prevention of collective violence can be built. Ultimately, government has a central role to play here, especially in terms of addressing the underlying problems of poverty, inequality and unemployment, as well as the accountability of local governance structures. Without addressing these, the work done at a community level will always fall short of preventing collective violence. Organisations and communities must engage in advocacy actions at a national level in order to create pressure on governments to respond.

At the same time, work does need to occur at a community level. However, it is clear that collective violence challenges some of the traditional concepts of community action and intervention. Interventions require critical engagement with: notions of community; complexities within communities; theoretical models of intervention; processes of community mapping; relationship and credibility building in communities; encouraging democratic participation and processes in communities; and the length of engagement required with communities. Organisations interested in preventing collective violence need to think of these critically before intervening. The prevention of collective violence requires long-term commitment/engagement and organisations should focus their resources on "at risk" communities. Indicators of "at risk" communities are outlined above.

In order to effectively address the needs of communities, awareness raising and capacity building is required regarding: the consequences of the use of violent forms of collective actions; strategies to engage with government that are non-violent; opportunities to connect with other collective provincial and national efforts to address similar issues; ways of recognising and constructively dealing with political and/or entrepreneurial agendas influencing community processes; and democratic processes of community engagement. This needs to happen with different community-level structures (such as training institutions, development groups, businesses, political branches,

concerned citizens groups, civic structures, police stations, Community Police Forum's, and the most vulnerable who are often not heard in existing structures).

Connecting with existing opportunities and processes to address community concerns/needs is an important strategy in the prevention of collective violence. These activities should, however, be accompanied by processes that attempt to deal with the history of collective trauma present in the community and the ways in which traditional methods and ideologies are playing themselves out in current collective actions. Relationship building between communities, local governance structures, and the police are also important here and can play an important role in the prevention of collective violence.

It is important to guard against a superficial, defensive response to collective violence by focussing attention on what is wrong with people who try to use violence to solve problems. Rather, it is necessary to look beyond the violent smoke that calls and ask about the ways in which our South African democracy is failing its people.

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