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Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation

Global Comparative Analysis of Public Employment Programmes: Strengths and limitations

Authors: Malose Langa, Juliana Tappe Ortiz, Palesa Mataboge, Vicky Talbot, and Buyisile Mncina

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) is an independent nongovernmental organisation established in South Africa in 1989. We are a multi-disciplinary institute that seeks to understand and prevent violence, heal its effects and build sustainable peace at community, national and regional levels. We do this through collaborating with, and learning from, the lived and diverse experiences of communities affected by violence and conflict. Through our research, interventions and advocacy we seek to enhance state accountability, promote gender equality and build social cohesion, integration and active citizenship. While primarily based in South Africa, we work across the African continent through collaborations with community, civil society, state and international partners.

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CHAPTER 1:
Why Public Employment Programmes are needed

Vicky Talbot, Malose Langa, and Juliana Tappe Ortiz

Introduction

Unemployment is not only prevalent in times of crisis but is an ongoing and structural issue worldwide, with markets being unable to supply enough jobs to meet the demand. In this context, private-sector employment can be complemented by Public Employment Programmes (PEPs). PEPs refer to employment creation by the government through employment-funded programmes (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). Sometimes these programmes are funded through partnership with the private sector. The impact of unemployment is far-reaching and destructive. PEPs offer protection to the most vulnerable groups and assist in the development of infrastructure, which, in turn, promotes social and economic development (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). The impacts of PEPs focus on three key areas, namely the incomes earned by beneficiaries, and the impacts of work participation and from the assets and services that are delivered (Philip, 2017).

Lieuw-Kie-Song and Philip (2010, p. 3) speak of a "spectrum of programmes", with short-term emergency programmes (public works programmes, or PWPs) at one end, and universal employment guarantee programmes (EGPs) at the other. Activities that fall under these programmes include, but are certainly not limited to, infrastructure development, social and community work, environmental work and activities directed at training (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010).

Why PEPs are important

Challenges facing countries worldwide, among them economic crises, impact employment and at times necessitate action by the state in terms of employment creation, including the development of employment-focused programmes (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). However, employment programmes, including those discussed in this report, are not only the result of crises. Unemployment is a constant challenge in many countries.

Employment programmes are, therefore, important because they make people feel proud and recognised through their labour contribution to the economic and social systems of the country (Savenije & Beltrán, 2014). This empowerment is crucial in areas where people have been, or have felt, neglected by the state for a long period of time (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010). Regular employment not only improves self-esteem but also fosters a positive attitude towards the state and the environment (Castañeda, González & Rojas, 2010) - this can have a positive effect on family ties and other relationships.

PEPs can impact on individuals, households and communities, which in turn translates into social, economic and environmental development. While these impacts are often perceived in a positive light, they may also be neutral or negative (ILO, 2012). As will be discussed in this report, adverse effects can accompany the constructive gains that come with PEPs.

Key benefits of PEPs

- PEPs can be cost-effective and speedily phased in. Kostzer (2008) as well as Tcherneva and Wray (2005) point to the experience of Argentina's *Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados*, introduced during the 2001 economic crisis, which showed that a massive employment programme could be implemented in a relatively short time and that a federally funded programme could be speedily administered locally with the participation of non-profit/non-governmental institutions.

- PEPs are self-targeting by design. Self-targeting PEPs and unconditional transfers (World Bank, 2017) are probably preferable during a crisis. Tcherneva and Wray (2005) point to the common drawback of targeted cash transfer schemes, which is that they tend to be relatively unresponsive to changes in the need for assistance. A previously ineligible household that is hit by the unemployment of the main breadwinner, for

example, may find it difficult to get help from such schemes. A reassessment of eligibility in the wake of a crisis is necessary in such cases.

- PEPs have less effect on inflation than measures that aim for a general expansion in aggregate demand and that only boost incomes, since employment programmes directly target the unemployed and affect both aggregate demand and supply, the latter through the expansion of infrastructure, goods and services.

- PEPs can help to stabilise local development and lay foundations for new growth. If the objective is to enable the long-term unemployed to work, while also helping to "crowd-in" local investment through the provision of needed infrastructure and services, then public job creation may be the only effective way to aid those who are less skilled and less well educated. Investment programmes can also help to pave the way for recovery by addressing infrastructure bottlenecks and stimulating investments in new sectors (e.g. green investments and jobs).

- PEPs reduce the depreciation of human capital. Unemployment is typically associated with a depreciation in skills, motivation and work habits. By employing those who would otherwise be unemployed and by offering training and education, PEPs can help to maintain and even appreciate human capital (Tcherneva & Wray, 2005).

- PEPs impact at individual, household and community levels. Although these impacts can be challenging to assess and quantify (ILO, 2012), they must be considered. Participating in PEPs can offer positive impacts, including the provision of work experience, imparting skills and allowing those involved to contribute to their environment. A more widespread impact involves the ability of PEPs to improve working conditions elsewhere, by upholding standards of working conditions and rights that are above those in other employment contexts (ILO, 2012). This illustrates the potentially far-reaching effects of PEPs, and the influence they can have on communities and societies.

- Incomes earned from participating in a PEP go a long way for individuals and communities. The impact of earning an income can be identified by how that income is spent. Primarily, it is used to purchase food and non-food items, pay debts and bills, invest in the household and additional investments, and for savings, health and schooling (ILO, 2012).

- Assets and services are a further benefit of PEPs. Infrastructure and services benefit both participants and non-participants. Focusing on rural areas and on providing infrastructure that is accessible to poor individuals has had positive effects on those who are poor and is an investment with a high rate of return (ILO, 2012).

- Institutional impacts are a further benefit of PEPs. These programmes can call for government structures to have increased responsibilities, budgets and activities. The capacity to implement and manage the programmes needs to be built into these structures. Furthermore, they need to demonstrate participatory elements, no corruption, financial management and transparency, among other factors (ILO, 2012).

- Labour participation may be increased by enabling people who were not previously employed to become economically active. For example, evidence shows that women who would not participate in wage labour have joined PEPs (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010).

- In relation to informing policy, the ability of a PEP to reach numerous objectives is a key benefit. PEPs align closely with policy, with their primary outcomes of employment, income generation and provision of assets/services (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010).

Limits and challenges of PEPs

Gender issues can definitely limit the beneficial effect of PEPs. A special gender perspective should be used when designing programmes. This does not solely mean that women should be encouraged to participate in the PEPs. Additionally, programmes should take into account the dynamics that can be provoked by giving jobs to females who live with unemployed men. A gender focus is prioritised by certain PEPs, such as in India (Sudarshan, Bhattacharya & Fernandez, 2010), and in some, there are more female than male beneficiaries. Gender equality means that both men

and women have access to work opportunities and that these work opportunities meet their "gender expectations". PEPs cannot expect men who grew up in an extremely patriarchal system to sew or to cook for the programme. Therefore, the programme has to respect and challenge gender norms simultaneously. PEPs can challenge these norms by offering traditionally male-related work to women and by encouraging them to think beyond their societal roles if they are interested in other work opportunities.

State support tends to limit the efficiency of PEPs. On the one hand, PEPs need the financial support of the state, but, on the other, they seem to be more efficient if the communities themselves organise the programmes without feeling dependent on the state.
A further challenge is continuity. Most PEPs are not designed to provide support continuously, which is a significant problem given that the target groups cannot rely on these labour offers. Short-term employment tends to translate into short-term impact in relation to income (ILO, 2012). This issue frequently surfaces as a weakness in the chapters that follow. Beneficiaries receive employment and income for the duration of their participation, but when this comes to an end, there is a great likelihood that they will revert to their initial predicament and struggle. "If programmes want long-term direct impacts on income of participants they need to provide longer-term employment…If a programme is to have impact on the poorest, it needs to reach the poorest by providing them with income and/or useful assets and services" (ILO, 2012, p. 20).

PEPs' lack of exchange with the business sector is a further cause for concern. Many PEPs do not have intensive cooperation with the private sector. If the aim is for unemployed persons to find a job in the private sector, cooperation with that sector has to start from the beginning.

Exit strategies also present as a challenge among PEPs. It is often assumed that transferring skills to participants will enable them to find employment once they exit the programme. However, skills are not the sole factor in the ability to find employment – the issue is much more complex than that, and relates to wider factors of the economy. Job opportunities are not being created for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Overall, PEPs do not offer unskilled workers a notable advantage due to the labour market structure in developing countries, where skilled labour is very scarce, and unskilled labour is profuse (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010).

As noted, although participation typically has positive impacts, this is not always the case (ILO, 2012). For example, in homes where there is minimal labour supply, child labour may increase in the programme or the home. Furthermore, participation can be highly negative if the work is abusive or exploits the participants, such as requiring excessive working hours. Late payment or non-payment is a reality and contributes to existing perceptions of abusive working relationships.

The impacts of PEPs at an institutional level can be promising. However, the programmes may allow room for corruption by creating opportunities for funding to be abused and for work to be allocated to people with the expectation of receiving political favours in return. Programme designs should, however, decrease this possibility (ILO, 2012).

The future of PEPs

There is a new policy interest in PEPs, given the global jobs crisis. Governments around the world are grappling with how to stimulate employment - in a context of wider market failure - with new debates over the role and scope of PEPs: as a policy instrument; as part of economic stimulus packages; as part of employment policy; as social protection and active labour market strategies; with the scope to contribute to the environmental agenda; as they relate to social development priorities; and as they relate to building new forms of community participation.

Overview of this report

This report discusses eight case studies based on countries that are implementing PEPs. The first section of the report focuses on three African countries, namely Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa. In Ethiopia, the PEP was formed as a response to the problem of hunger and starvation, while in Kenya it was developed to deal with the problem of youth unemployment. Similarly, in South Africa, the PEP was formed to deal with the issue of unemployment.

The second section covers the implementation of a PEP in India, which is regarded as the biggest PEP in the world, employing over 50 million participants. The Indian PEP was used as a model in developing the South African model and other models in the world.

The third section covers three Latin American countries, namely Colombia, El Salvador and Argentina. In this part of the world, it appears that the PEPs are central in dealing with the problem of violence, together with unemployment.

The last section of the report covers one European country, Greece. The chapter illustrates how the financial crisis, which resulted in massive unemployment, led to the formation of the PEP. This PEP stands in contrast to the rest in its implementation and project focus, given the skill level of the participants.

Finally, the similarities, differences, strengths and weaknesses of the 10 PEPs discussed in this report are represented in tabular form and briefly discussed. As part of this comparison, the impact of the PEPs on violence prevention is considered. If both the direct and indirect impacts of the PEPs are assessed (ILO, 2012), their potential role in violence prevention is apparent. Although more empirical evidence is needed to substantiate this, the positive impact of the PEPs on violence prevention processes surfaces frequently.

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CHAPTER 2:
The impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme: Ethiopia's Programme for Sustainable Food Security

Buyisile Mncina and Malose Langa

A Brief background on Ethiopia

Ethiopia is located in eastern Africa, west of Somalia; its capital city is Addis Ababa. It is the continent's oldest independent country. Apart from a five-year occupation by Italy from 1936 to 1941, it has never been colonised. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile Selassie (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (Henze, 2000).

At 1 104 300 km^2 in size, Ethiopia has a population of 105 350 020 people. Ethnic groups include the Oromo (34.4% of the population), Amhara (27%), Somali (6.2%) and Tigray (6.1%), to name only a few. In terms of the religious demographic, 43.5% of the population is Ethiopian Orthodox, with Muslims comprising 33.9%. Life expectancy is 62.2 years, with males projected to live for 59.8 years and females for 64.7 years. Over 40% of the population is below the age of 15, and the fertility rate is five children per woman (even higher in rural areas). The current government overthrew the Derg regime in 1991 and has made constant efforts to put in place development goals to counter the distress of poverty in Ethiopia. The government's current aim is to achieve a lower middle-income status for the country by 2025 (Olingo, 2015).

The country is predominantly an agricultural country with more than 80% of the population living in rural areas. Ethiopia continues to face rapid population growth, putting tremendous pressure on the land resources, exacerbating environmental degradation and increasing vulnerability to food shortages. The agricultural sector in Ethiopia is dominated principally by small-scale farmers using low-grade technology, and produce is used primarily for household consumption. Cereals constitute the largest share of crop production and amount to approximately 88% of all crops produced. The major food grains grown are teff, maize, sorghum, wheat and barley. Given the limited use of technology and irrigation schemes, these crops are almost entirely dependent on rainfall, leading to a high degree of variability in regional crop yields from year to year and extreme vulnerability to climatic conditions (Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2007). Severe drought conditions have affected agricultural production since the 1990s, placing enormous strain on the people and the economy of Ethiopia (Mahmood, 2016). In 2002, Ethiopia faced a massive famine as a result of a substantial drop in grain prices, thus creating disincentives for farmers to invest in inputs for crop production. This led to a gap in the ability of the market to meet the food needs in the region, leaving about six million people in need of urgent food aid and 15 million people under the threat of starvation (Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2007). Rural poverty remains a critical challenge in the country's socioeconomic development.

Poverty levels in Ethiopia

Poverty is a multifaceted issue involving an individual's or group's participation in the socio-political arena, as well as their level of risk, vulnerability, social exclusion and access to social capital (Enquobahrie, 2004). The World Bank (2004, 2011) speaks of poverty as a pronounced deprivation of well-being, leading to a sense of powerlessness.

In the case of Ethiopia, programmes have been put in place to protect the poor from destitution, sharp fluctuations in income and social insecurity (Enquobahrie, 2004). Rural works, the provision of food subsidies, self-employment, provision of productive assets and appropriate skills, as well as bank credit, are some of the efforts made to ensure that the people of Ethiopia are empowered socially as well as financially.

According to Enquobahrie (2004), the most vulnerable segments of the Ethiopian population are the rural landless, smallholders with a limited size of land, drought victims, female-headed households, the urban unemployed and street children. Furthermore, the following factors have been found to contribute to poverty in Ethiopia: low agricultural production; low non-farm income; low education; poor health; high population growth; and weak institutional structures (Enquobahrie, 2004).

Suggestions for poverty alleviation should be centred around participatory approaches targeted at the grassroots. A critical strategy to empower both individuals and groups necessitates the underprivileged taking part in emerging economic and social opportunities. According to the World Bank Social Protection and Labour Global Practice (2004), empowerment is the end goal of any safety-net programme, which should enhance the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and transform desired actions into outcomes. When empowering a demographic, the intention should be to increase group members' ability to participate, negotiate, influence and control the institutions that affect their lives (World Bank, 2011).

Social protection should, therefore, create an enabling environment for promoting the economic empowerment of the poor by guaranteeing a minimum income through employment, as well as developing asset management through subsidies, insurance, credit and savings (Mahmood, 2016).

Development of the Productive Safety Net Programme

Ethiopia initially launched a food security programme (FSP) to address the vulnerability that exists in different parts of the country. Since 2003, the FSP has been implemented in 319 chronically food-insecure *woredas* (districts). The core objectives were and continue to be the attainment and improvement of food security.

According to Mahmood (2016), other programmes were formed from the FSP as a means to further empower the Ethiopian population. These include, but are not limited to, the Resettlement Programme; the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which is the focus of this chapter; the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP); the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP) and the Complementary Community Investment (CCI) (Figure 1). Expanding on these briefly, Mahmood (2016) notes that the Resettlement Programme addresses improved access to land; the PSNP's key objective is to prevent asset depletion at both household and community level; the HABP targets improved food security; the CCI emphasises the creation of community assets to complement household investment through the creation of opportunities to allow for this; and the OFSP serves as a complementary measure to the PSNP. The latter was designed to protect existing assets and ensure a minimum level of food consumption, whereas the OFSP encourages households to increase their income from agricultural activities and build up assets (Berhane et al., 2011). These programmes extend over eight regions and 319 *woredas* and provide services to over 6.88 million beneficiaries (World Bank, 2011).

Figure 1: Food Security Programmes in Ethiopia (2005 -2015)



Figure 1: Food Security Programmes in Ethiopia (2005 -2015) continued



Source: Mahmood (2016)

Before exploring the PSNP in more detail, it is important to look briefly at public employment programmes and how they benefit societies. These programmes are intended to create employment, generate income for participants and create assets and/or provide services (ILO, 2012). The impacts of programmes of this nature affect the individual, the household and/or the community, depending on the scale of the programme (local, regional or national level) (ILO, 2012).

Public works are a form of social protection providing temporary employment in times of crisis, such as during severe famines and droughts (Andersson, Mekonnen & Stage, 2009 Gilligan, Hoddinott & Taffesse, 2009; Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; ILO, 2012). As it stands, Ethiopia's PSNP is the largest social protection programme operating in sub-Saharan Africa, with an annual budget of nearly US$500 million (Little, 2008). These costs are covered primarily through the support of nine external donors: the World Food Programme, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands, the European Commission, Irish Aid, the Swedish International Development Agency, the US Agency for International Development, the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank (World Bank, 2004).

Chronic food insecurity has been a defining feature in the understanding of poverty in Ethiopia (Gilligan et al., 2009). As noted, the majority of the poor live in rural areas and are heavily reliant on rain-fed agriculture, which remains threatened due to poor rainfall (Gilligan et al., 2009). Since 1983, Ethiopia has appealed for food aid and other emergency assistance, which propelled the country into food-to-work initiatives, payment for public works as well as direct transfers as a means of assistance (Gilligan et al., 2009; Subbarao & Smith, 2003). On the one hand, public works projects pay selected beneficiaries approximately 6 Birr per day (US$0.75) for their participation in labour-intensive projects intended to build community assets (Gilligan et al., 2009). On the other hand, direct support in the form of cash or food transfers is provided to labour-scarce households whose primary income earners are the elderly or disabled (Gilligan et al., 2009). A suggestion has also been made for complementary programmes such as "livelihood packages" to help generate secondary streams of income until the household is assessed as food sufficient and ready to graduate from dependence on transfers (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010).

PSNPs came into effect in 2005 after efforts from the government of Ethiopia and various donors to tend to the chronic food-security crisis in rural Ethiopia (Gilligan et al., 2009). Initially, it was set to be a three-year intervention with the objective of providing food transfers in food-insecure *woredas* (Figure 2) as well as bridge the food gap (Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004). Beneficiaries (about 6.5 million) were expected to stay in the programme for the intended duration and were to receive either cash or an equivalent payment in food

Figure 2: PSNP *Woredas* in Ethiopia



(FAO, 2011)

(Gilligan et al., 2009). Running parallel to PSNPs were food security services like the OFSP, which provided beneficiaries with productivity-enhancing services such as access to credit, agricultural services, advice on food crop and livestock production, as well as soil and water preservation (Berhane, Gilligan, Hoddinott, Kumar & Taffesse, 2014). In summary, PSNPs were designed to protect existing assets and ensure a minimum level of food consumption, whereas OFSPs were designed to encourage households to increase income generation from agricultural activities and to build up assets through savings and investments, which would , in turn, stimulate economic growth (Gilligan et al., 2009).

Most recently, PSNPs have targeted providing transfers to meet the needs of food-insecure households, which receive support for six months each year for up to five years in order to bridge their annual food consumption gap, protect their assets and build resilience against any socioeconomic shocks (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010).

In 2009, the Ethiopian government redesigned OFSPs to introduce a new programme called HABP, which emphasised, firstly, increased contact and coordination with agricultural extension services. Each *kebele* (township) was to have three development agents specialising in crop science and natural resource management (Berhane et al., 2014). Secondly, credit was offered through microfinance institutions as well as rural savings and credit cooperatives. Lastly, PSNP clients were prioritised for support under HABP.

Safety-net activities are often integrated with development plans to ensure that assets are built-in with the budget allocated (Andersson et al., 2009). These activities include public works, educational incentives and environmental protection measures such as tree planting and soil/water conservation (Andersson et al., 2009).

Target population criteria

Eight principal regions are served by the PSNP: Tigray; Amhara; Oromiya; Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region; Afar; Somali; rural Harari and Dire Dawa (Figure 3) (Sharp, Brown & Teshome, 2006). Chronically food-insecure households are eligible for inclusion in the programme (Gilligan et al., 2009). Chronic food insecurity is defined as a household having had continuous food shortages

Figure 3: Ethiopia Principal Regions



Afar [2]
Amhara [3]
Benishangul-Gumaz [4]
Gambela [6]
Harari [7]
Oromiya [8]
Somali [9]
Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's region [10]
Tigray [11]

(a three-month food gap) in the last three years and receiving food assistance prior to 2005 when PSNPs were implemented (Gilligan et al., 2009). Additionally, households that have experienced severe and rapid asset loss are also eligible (Gilligan et al., 2009), as are those who own no land (Sharp et al., 2006). The PSNP beneficiary criteria also favour households headed by females and where there is no family support (Sharp et al., 2006).

Outside of the set criteria, the participants are largely from male-headed households and are required to be able-bodied and physically capable of performing manual labour (Andersson et al., 2009). The majority of beneficiaries contribute labour to PSNP public works, entitling them to five days of paid work per month per household member. From 2005 to 2007, the public works component paid beneficiaries 6 birr per day, which increased to 8 birr in 2008, 10 birr in 2010 and 14 birr in 2012 (Berhane, Hoddinott, Kumar & Margolies, 2016). When paying in cash proved inconsistent due to limited administrative capacity to run scheduled transfers, payment was made in kind, including food items such as cereal (maize, wheat, barley), cooking oil and beans in exchange for working on labour-intensive projects to build community assets (Berhane et al., 2016; Devereux, 2004). Work in the programmes often takes place between January and June so as not to interfere with farming activities in the second half of the year (Berhane et al., 2016).

Table 1 Gender balance of Public Works and Direct Support beneficiaries by Woreda

Woreda	Public works			Direct Support			Total PSNP Beneficiaries		
	M	F	%F	M	F	%F	M	F	%F
Enderta (2005)	18,231	22,672	55%	959	484	34%	19,190	23,156	55%
Kilte Awlalo (2005)	38,245	37,584	50%	4,299	4,505	51%	42,544	42,089	50%
Bunga (2006)	29,093	29,852	51%	3,467	7,588	69%	32,560	37,440	53%
Chiro (2006)	12,043	10,934	48%	762	1,035	58%	12,805	11,969	48%

Source: Mahmood FSTF / Food Security Offices

Note: *Gender-disaggregated beneficiary number were not availablefrom other woredas.*

Implementation and specific programmes

According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2014), development agents assist communities in planning public works based on subprojects selected through community development planning processes and the pastoral public works guidelines. Each community begins with a strategic plan where community needs are identified, taking into account both men and women. During this process, communities are encouraged to consider projects that are specific to their livelihoods, nutrition, climate resistance and disaster risk management. Potential subprojects are developed and ranked in order of priority, with careful consideration of the time of year for projects to be carried out as well as the number of days to be worked.

The major types of subprojects typically implemented under PSNPs are soil and water conservation, forestry, forage and pasture development, water projects, small-scale irrigation construction or expansion, community road construction and rehabilitation and social infrastructure rehabilitation. PSNPs also emphasise improved health, nutrition and hygiene through behavioural change. What is required from the community is participation in identifying, planning, monitoring and evaluating public works projects to ensure that they are tailored to the prevailing livelihoods in the area (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).

The graduation approach

The graduation approach was originally developed by BRAC, a development organisation dedicated to alleviating poverty, to target ultra-poor households in Bangladesh. It was designed to address the multidimensional needs of extremely poor households. The approach consists of five core components: time-limited consumption support, a savings component, an asset transfer, training in how to use the asset, and life-skills coaching and mentoring (Mahmood, 2016). From 2006 to 2014, the Ford Foundation, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and several international and local partners tested the approach across eight countries, including Ethiopia.

Government agencies are often encouraged to adapt and implement the graduation approach to their country's needs, emphasising the freedom for each state to be innovative and imaginative while still preserving the core elements (personalised, supportive, sustainable) that make the approach effective (Mahmood, 2016).

According to Ethiopia's Ministry of Agriculture (2014), its approach to graduation is by means of a graduation prediction system (GPS) and a wealth-ranking assessment conducted by the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF), to identify potential graduates from the programme. The emphasis on potential households is to ensure flexibility and relief of any pressure on the households to have to graduate as the process is merely one of identification and there must still be other processes to ensure that the household is ready to graduate and can sustain the transition (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). The key principles of graduation put in place by the Ethiopian government are that the process should be evidence-based, transparent, accountable, simple and relevant, flexible and encouraging of community awareness and involvement (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).

The GPS is designed to support the assessment of the likelihood of graduation from the programme. Each woreda has its own tool and these assessments are run annually. Chaired by the *kebele* cabinet, the following steps are observed (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014):

1. Identification of three or four recognisable wealth indicators through a community discussion which focuses on key differences in households (which ones do better than others). An example would be the number of people in a household, the number of hectares cultivated, as well as the number of goats, chickens and cattle. This criterion is weighed against the following categories: very poor, poor, lower middle and upper middle.
2. The PSNP beneficiaries that have been identified as relatively wealthier than others are placed on a master list that is run through payroll software to ensure a trail of the process.
3. From there, the predicted rate of graduation is calculated by the Livelihood Zone Assessment Group. The CFSTF then works out the potential graduate household from the wealthiest to the next wealth group.
4. The list is then posted by the *kebele* council for at least a week prior to a public meeting to discuss it. All the households selected are notified in advance, and a meeting is then held to review the list and allow for corrections and appeals.
5. If there are any disagreements or appeals, these

are taken to the *kebele* appeals committee, where all reservations are explored and a final list generated and submitted of households that will no longer be dependent on the PSNP.

6. Households that graduate from the PSNP remain in it for a year to ensure a complete safety-net cycle. Households may opt to be paid a lump sum or in monthly instalments for the remaining term. They are still expected to participate in public works during this time.

The Ministry of Agriculture (2014) noted that households can also self-graduate – in other words, households can voluntarily withdraw from the PSNP, for example, if they decide that their time and labour can be better used in non-programme income generation. Self-graduation is purely voluntary, and there is no coercion from programme officials – unlike in the past, where it has been noted that households felt pressured to graduate.

As established, the key objective of all the programmes mentioned is to empower the population so that they are able to function without government aid. The goal of graduation is to move individuals and groups from insecurity to security. This happens at two levels – the PSNP and the FSP. A successful exit from the PSNP occurs when a household can meet its food needs for an entire year without PSNP transfers and can withstand moderate economic shocks (Mahmood, 2016). Once the basic needs have been met, individuals and groups receive support in saving money and are also helped to identify a sustainable livelihood that is suitable for their interests, aptitude and local market (Mahmood, 2016). In this way, nearly two million individuals "exited" the programme from 2008 to 2012 (World Bank Social Protection and Labour Global Practice, 2014).

Social benefits of the PSNP

Better access to income, food, health and sanitation frequently translates into less crime and violence, both of which often stem from a frustration with being unable to participate in the economy. With more of the population working, there is a decreased need to seek alternative (negative) means of speedy income generation which may be characterised by violent crime. PSNPs have helped to create job opportunities for Ethiopian women and men in the rural areas. With regards to the empowerment of women, PSNPs seek to strengthen the capacity of women to increase their own resilience and internal strength through economic advancement as well as power and agency. Economic advancement includes accumulating the necessary skills and resources to compete and have fair and equal access to economic institutions (Golla, Malhotra, Nanda & Mehra, 2011), which may occur through the accumulation of agricultural-related assets as well as from physical mobility. Women are empowered to take control of resources and profits, thus challenging gendered role expectations and norms around self-reliance and the status of women. PSNPs have allowed women to have a voice, which has assisted in the formation of supportive organisations and groups that emphasise economic and social development (Golla et al., 2011).

As the population is trained and life-skills programmes run concurrently with the food security programmes, communities are given the power to participate in their own advancement. Better relations are formed between community members that work in these public works programmes.

In short, PSNPs enhance community-level infrastructure and contribute to environmental transformation. At the household level, families experience improved food security, increased asset creation and protection, increased utilisation of education and health services and improved agricultural productivity.

Recommendations

Sharp et al. (2006) provide the following recommendations for PSNPs:

- A local needs assessment should determine the number of people on direct support in any given community.
- For the sake of consistency, a decision should be made on the maximum number of hours participants can work and how many hours effectively translate into full-time employment.
- Provision must be made to grant temporary exemption from work to those who fall pregnant or become seriously ill. Beneficiaries must not be threatened with losing their place in the programme in the event of such work interruptions.
- Self-sufficiency and graduation from the PSNP should be promoted, as well as exploring other off-farm livelihood activities, domestic and childcare work, and schooling.

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CHAPTER 3:
Kazi Kwa Vijana Public Works Programme: Youth, Unemployment and Crime in Kenya

Vicky Talbot

Introduction

The sovereign state of Kenya is located in East Africa, in the Great Lakes region. Nairobi is the largest city and the capital of the country. Kenya has a population of approximately 46 million people (World Health Organisation, 2017), with a split of 78% rural and 22% urban (The Nature Conservancy, 2013). The majority of urban residents live in slums (around 71%) which are characterised by insecurity, unemployment and social fragmentation (Kyobutungi, Ziraba, Ezeh, & Yé, 2008). Economically, Kenya is the "trade hub of East Africa" for transport, communication and financial services (Kaane, 2014, p. 12). There are approximately 97 men to 100 women in the country and, although the constitution calls for equal rights for both genders, women continue to experience economic, political and social inequities (The Nature Conservancy, 2013).

At the time of independence in 1963, the Kenyan government identified the primary barriers to sustainable development as illiteracy and poverty. These were viewed as short-term problems that would be eradicated as Kenya developed and grew economically. However, poverty remains a dominant threat to a significant portion of the population. The elimination of severe poverty and hunger is positioned as a development goal in the Kenya Vision 2030 document, which is aimed at increasing the efficiency of the country's development agenda, and encompasses social, economic and political pillars (Karera, 2012; Mutuku, 2014).

As detailed in the Kenya Vision 2030 document, the youth are a unique population, facing discrimination for multiple reasons (Kaane, 2014; Karera, 2012). These include a lack of physical and financial assets, which results in social barriers for the youth; a high rate of unemployment; a lack of skills among the youth; a shortage of opportunities to advance education and high rates of substance abuse. The youth in Kenya also lack practical experience, which is a prerequisite to enter the labour force. Unemployment is thus exacerbated, given that the youth do not possess these skills. Furthermore, the weak collaboration between education institutions and training establishments and industry impacts on skills development and, thus, the employability potential of young people and the labour force as a whole (Karera, 2012). In a report for a youth employment ministerial conference in Kenya, Kaane (2014) similarly referred to the many challenges facing the youth when they look for jobs. Consequently, youth violence has been on the increase in Kenya (Karera, 2012).

Employment creation is, therefore, a priority and two methods need to be at the forefront of this endeavour, namely economic growth and creating an environment in the informal sector which encourages entrepreneurship. It is hoped that economic growth will increase the number and quality of jobs available and that the promotion of informal-sector ventures will lead to the youth becoming job creators rather than job seekers (Hope, 2012).

Given the various challenges faced by the youth in Kenya, the development and implementation of suitable programmes, strategies and policies should be prioritised by the government (Hope, 2012). The Kenyan government, together with local agencies, international organisations and other local collaborators, has established several initiatives and public employment programmes aimed at empowering youth in order to reduce the high level of unemployment among this cohort. These include the Economic and Wealth Recovery Strategy from 2002 to 2007, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund in 2007, Kenya Vision 2030 from 2008 to date, the Uwezo Fund, and the Kenya Youth Empowerment Programme (KYEP) in 2009. The public works programme (PWP) Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) is a part of the latter and is the focus of this chapter (Korongo, 2012; Mutuku, 2014).

Escudero and Maurelo (2013) found that having an employed individual in a household greatly increased the probability of a youth attaining a job as well as developing entrepreneurial abilities. Thus, PWPs may have immediate and long-term effects on employment, which, in turn, can impact the social and economic climates of the respective areas.

Kazi Kwa Vijana

Youth unemployment is a global concern, especially for developing countries such as Kenya. Currently, the estimated youth unemployment rate at a global level is 13.1 percent, leaving approximately 71 million young people unemployed (ILO, 2016). In Kenya, the youth form the majority of the unemployed population, with around 75% facing unemployment (Elima, 2015), and surveys have indicated that this is the primary challenge facing the youth (Hope, 2012). Unemployment is a concern for the youth from both rural and urban areas in Kenya (Kiiru, Onsomu, & Wamalwa, 2009). For example, in the urban Mathare slums, Muiya (2014) found that a lack of education and other skills cause unemployment in this area. Many youths do not complete their schooling in Kenya, and even those who do graduate lack the skills to enable their employment. There are few technical training institutions in Kenya, as well as the facilities that would prepare the youth for the demands of the workforce (Government of Kenya, 2006). The Kenyan government has been initiating various projects aimed at creating job opportunities for the youth. The KYEP was initiated in June 2010 in order to assist the government in improving the employment of youth. It was launched to provide labour-intensive employment opportunities to the youth and to transfer skills that will increase their chances of acquiring jobs (Elima, 2015).

Kazi Kwa Vijana which translates to "work for youth" was launched in 2009. KKV was launched as a PWP targeted at the youth to provide them with labour intensive work (Karera, 2012). The programme was aimed at tackling unemployment, poverty and hunger within the rural and urban youth population by providing them with employment opportunities through public work projects (Elima, 2015; Hope, 2012). The KKV's objective was to facilitate the youth to earn an income through various projects that lasted between three to six months (Omolo, 2011). The initial goal of the KKV was to provide 200, 000 – 300,000 youth with temporary jobs. Two crucial needs were intended to be met through the KKV, namely offering relief to youth at risk by means of remunerative employment, and contributing to food production, primarily through the improved use of water resources.

The employed youth engaged in small-scale manual projects within their own communities. In rural communities, these projects included clearing bushes, sowing fertiliser and seeds, planting trees and repairing boreholes and access roads. In contrast, the youth in urban areas became involved in building and operating water kiosks, developing and implementing waste management systems, and repairing and maintaining access roads in order to improve the quality of life for the communities, especially those in the slums (Korongo, 2012). Many projects of the KKV included the construction of small dams, desilting dams, and rehabilitating and constructing water pans. Clearing roads, building classrooms and rehabilitating irrigation systems are further examples. The Karuri Project, for instance, involved pipe laying and sanitation block construction. Other projects included maintenance work on the roads, garbage collection and the cleaning of clogged drains in the slums, establishing nurseries, planting seedlings in the catchment area of rivers and digging ponds (Republic of Kenya, 2009). Participants were also involved in cleaning the Nairobi River, which cuts across the Nairobi slums, and constructing roads within the city (Mutuku, 2014).

The number of such programmes that have been implemented in Kenya is postulated to be the result of the violence following the 2007/2008 election, where most perpetrators were unemployed youth (Korongo, 2012). In particular, KKV is said to have been informed by the increasing costs of basic goods resulting from both the post-election violence and the financial crisis taking place worldwide (Amnesty International, 2013). Programmes focusing on economic empowerment are widely implemented in the Great Lakes region, possibly due to the acknowledgement that most youths become involved in violent behaviour when they are idle and not meaningfully engaged (Korongo, 2012).

Factors contributing to an effective PWP include: the creation of assets to assist the poor; fostering further economic possibilities for locals; work schedules that are coordinated with survival needs and coping

strategies of the poorest homes; having the work locations close to the homes of the poorest in order to enable their maximum participation; and an exit strategy that makes long-term employment possible, thereby assisting those who are poorest to remove themselves from their impoverished circumstances. Finally, the PWP should support labour market institutions and non-governmental organisation participation, to ensure that workers' rights are upheld, as well as those of vulnerable groups (Betcherman, Godfrey, Puerto, Rother & Stavreska, 2007; Puerto, 2007).

Target populations for Kazi Kwa Vijana

The KKV programme was aimed at employing 18–35-year-old male and female youth who hold national identity cards (Hope, 2012; Karera, 2012). As noted, the programme aimed at employing 200 000–300 000 youths each year in both rural and urban communities (Mutuku, 2014).

The rate of unemployment among the youth, as indicated earlier, is above that of the overall unemployment rate in Kenya (Elima, 2015), with the rate being higher amongst females than males. Many females in Kenya are not able to complete their schooling due to teenage pregnancy (Elima, 2015). Despite this, the KKV does not appear to have made specific provision for women to be in the programme. Karera (2012) found that males comprised the majority of the participants involved in the programme. Similarly, Mutuku (2014) found a gender imbalance in KKV participation, contrary to the programme's objectives targeted towards gender parity. Although women were not denied the opportunity to participate, the hazardous nature of the projects made it difficult for them to get involved and resulted in them choosing not to participate. Based on his findings, Mutuku (2014) notes that the activities of KKV bar women from participation.

One female respondent stated the following:

> *this job is tough, sometimes we recover dead bodies while cleaning the Nairobi river as one of the KKV project, the situation is just filthy and tormenting but we have to do it for the sake of livelihoods, not every lady can [do] it, you have to be hard hearted to manage it. (Mutuku, 2014, p. 31)*

On the other hand, a male respondent claimed that

> *Women go for ready meant things; they don't want to work hard (implying for soft task). (Mutuku, 2014, p. 31)*

Benefits and limitations

The KKV had an economically empowering impact on both the youth and the economy, even if it was only temporary (Thieme, 2010). Over half of the beneficiaries in Mutuku's (2014) study felt that, overall, there was a fair improvement in their livelihoods despite low wages. They added that KKV was partly responsible for this improvement and that prior to KKV the crime rate had been higher.

Youth have also conveyed the benefits of KKV. In his research, Karera (2012) found that the programme significantly reduced unemployment among the youth, and many young people relayed having received a steady income as well as gaining capital and beginning new businesses, thereby increasing their income. The KYEP–KKV has made it possible for youth to acquire credit facilities and thus to become economically empowered, allowing for the establishment and growth of their own businesses (Ashiku, 2014).

Karera (2012) further found that KKV enhanced the employability of the youth by increasing their level of technical, creative, managerial, leadership and life skills, thus improving their opportunities to enter the labour market. Many youths in his study felt that KKV had helped make them more employable (Karera, 2012).

Despite the benefits of KKV, the limitations appear to outweigh them. KKV sought to put young people to work following the violence after the 2007 elections. However, Thieme (2010, p. 334) illustrates the contradiction in this government-led programme "between state claims and the realities on the ground" – what the government intended the programme to achieve for the youth is not what actually happened for them.

Although its conception was admirable, its implementation was questionable. Specifically, the implementation of KKV was problematic in that the lack of community participation in planning and selecting activities left the participants without a

sense of ownership (Mutuku, 2014). Participation includes taking part in planning meetings, selecting activities and being involved in the design and implementation of the programme. If a community is able to participate, the poor may be empowered to contribute to development interventions, in comparison to passive participation, which is considered to be ineffective at reducing poverty.

KKV was implemented in a top-down approach, resulting in the youth being only beneficiaries and not claimants with a sense of ownership, which likely affected the programme's objectives (Mutuku, 2014). KKV participants associated recruitment into the projects with political affiliation and a 'first come, first served' agenda. Furthermore, 72% felt that the programme implementers controlled activity selection, leaving the beneficiaries with no voice to contribute to this process. One beneficiary stated:

> *KKV was a nice program that could have achieved its objective if only the right implementation measures were put in place, in brief the programme should be Kazi kwa Vijana pesa kwa Wazee literally in English meaning youth for work and cash for the old guards. (Mutuku, 2014, p. 34)*

This statement highlights the limited involvement that participants had in planning and implementing the projects. Most respondents in Mutuku's (2014) study perceived participation to be poor, given the top-down instructions from area chiefs and KKV supervisors. Beneficiaries additionally viewed the chiefs and village elders as possessing too much power in recruiting participants. In terms of referring to the initiative as *Kazi kwa Vijana – Pesa kwa Wazee* (work for youth – money for the old) (Thieme, 2010), respondents in Wachira's (2012) study clarified this by stating that they did the work, while the people in charge and the elderly got the money, rather than the youth. Taking these implementation concerns into account, Mutuku (2014, p. 38) notes that it is worth remembering that "KKV was an abrupt decision informed post-election violence in Kenya in 2008 thus not giving the government prior time to plan for modalities and the overall implementation process".

According to a key informant in Mutuku's (2014, p. 39) study,

> *I must admit that despite the low wage rate KKV managed to engage our youths to meaningful livelihood activities thus improving their livelihoods and consequently reducing the crime incidences within the slums. I also want to suggest that the government should in future consider prior planning to avoid such challenges like recruitment based on corruption, nepotism and ghost workers that were experienced in some areas during the KKV implementation process. This is due to the fact that KKV was an abrupt decision by the then Coalition Government responding to post election violence consequences (hiking prices of basic commodities). In my personal point of view, it was a good initiative despite the hitches.*

Wachira (2012) claims that there are reasons why youth leave school and instead join gangs and use drugs. For instance, the youth lack employment opportunities and thus join militia groups, where they make a lot of money. A report on the KKV highlighted its defects and expressed the need for unemployment to be tackled from a grassroots level, which was asserted to be more empowering in comparison to the repeated cycle of wage labour prospects that offer minimal pay and skills training (Thieme, 2010). Another implementation shortfall noted by KKV beneficiaries is that they experienced issues with the projects, but felt that they could not express them for fear of being victimised and losing their jobs.

The KKV has not proven to be as effective as hoped. International experiences of productive PWPs illuminate the gaps and missing elements in the KKV. First, PWPs should pay an adequate wage rate (Government of Kenya, 2010, in Korongo, 2012). Wage rates for the KKV programme were low, with a daily rate of Ksh.250, equivalent to US$3.1 (Omolo, 2011). The wage rate was perceived as very poor by beneficiaries, who indicated that it was not a sufficient daily amount to match the cost of living. Mutuku's (2014) findings show that over half of the interviewed beneficiaries felt that the wage rate was poor, with only a small number considering it fair. It is imperative for participants to be paid living wages. Furthermore, unreliability was another concern, as payment was often delayed.

It is also important that poor households are targeted by PWPs, particularly when employment cannot be offered to every person who needs a job (Betcherman, et al., 2007; Puerto, 2007). However, this was not the philosophy of KKV as the programme adopted a "first

come first serve" principle (Omolo, 2011).

Ogot (2010) indicates in his research that, despite knowledge of the KKV, only a marginal number of youths in the Emuhaya Division of Kenya felt that they had benefited from it. This is a disturbing outcome, considering that the goal of the programme was for at least half of the youth in each constituency to benefit.

A further limitation of KKV is the short-term focus of its projects. These projects may be beneficial temporarily, but long-term development requirements may not be addressed. KKV projects lasted between three and six months ; however, the majority of KKV beneficiaries were hired for only three months (Republic of Kenya, 2009), potentially not long enough to eliminate unemployment for the recipients. There is considerable room for improvement in this regard, where certain KKV projects have scope for permanent job creation given that the services are needed continuously. These projects include the Nairobi River Basin Rehabilitation and Restoration, Routine Maintenance of Road Projects, and Trees for Jobs (Karera, 2012). In support of this notion, Trees for Jobs has been marked as a long-term flagship project as part of the Kenya Vision 2030 (Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports strategic plan, 2010-2015).

The KKV programme exit strategy is also an area of improvement. Skills training is one such mechanism to do this. KKV projects use primarily unskilled labour, whereas imparting skills that are relevant to the labour market may prove to be an exit strategy which enables the youth to remain employed (Karera, 2012). Currently, there are no exit strategies to assist participants in the KKV to get job opportunities or skills that would make them employable beyond the programme.

Finally, although KKV is lauded for the creation of equal employment opportunities, and participation of women is said to have increased in the programme, the acute gender differences need to be taken into account with more males been found to be KKV members (Karera, 2012). It is important that strategies are developed to recruit more females in the programme.

Elements for violence prevention processes

Kenyan youth are receiving a great deal of attention with regards to Kenya Vision 2030 and the new constitution, which aims to improve the socioeconomic and political climate of the country (Muthee, 2010). The youth comprise a large portion of the Kenyan population, face many challenges and take a very particular position with regards to political violence and crime (Elima, 2015).

Unemployment and underemployment are considered primary economic reasons for young people engaging in violence (Korongo, 2012). Given the discussion above around the level of unemployment in Kenya and the challenges that this brings for the youth, the KKV may very well contribute to violence prevention in Kenya. The government has structured employment policies for the youth as they are viewed as a risk group to become involved in various forms of violence (Elima, 2015).

Mutuku (2014) found that youths living in Kenyan slums had given up as they could not meet their basic needs due to poverty. They, therefore, adopted risky lifestyles to cope, including prostitution and joining organised gangs. Mutuku's (2014) research focused on two slum sites in Nairobi – Mathare and Majengo. Both slums face challenges of prostitution, gangs and militia groups due to the extreme overcrowding and high unemployment rate, making these communities unsafe. Beneficiaries of the KKV in these slums felt that their lives had improved, in part due to decreased crime rates. A key informant in these slums noted that by engaging youth meaningfully and contributing to improved livelihoods by providing employment, an income and skills, the KKV appears to have reduced the incidence of crime (Mutuku, 2014; Wachira, 2012).

The severe socioeconomic inequality in Kenya affects the youth significantly. Around half of the citizens live in poverty, with the result that most youths do not have adequate access to necessary services to meet their needs (Government of Kenya, 2010, in Korongo, 2012). This deficiency, combined with unemployment, is related to increases in crime, alcoholism, drug trafficking and prostitution among the youth. Most violent offenders in Kenya's major towns are young people from poverty-stricken families (Korongo, 2012).

Gangs are becoming more common in Nairobi, and most criminal activities are perpetrated by the youth. Disturbingly, more than half of the prisoners in the country are between the ages of 16 and 25 (USAID,

2009, in Korongo, 2012). The positive impact of KKV in this regard is illustrated by Wachira (2012), who reported former militia and gang members stating that they decided to change their lives and become involved in community projects, including plans to get involved in KKV.

Gender stereotypes and discrimination additionally contribute to the violence in the country. For example, men are expected to be breadwinners and to provide for their families. Due to the poverty within these communities, the young men engage in crime and violent behaviours in order to meet this expectation (Ruto, 2009, in Korongo, 2012). By providing male youth with employment, the KKV allowed them to secure an income and provide for their families in ways that they could not when they were unemployed. Furthermore, if men can get jobs, their socially constructed role of being the provider may be fulfilled, potentially leading to less violence aimed at women (Korongo, 2012).

Conclusion

The Kenyan youth are a vulnerable group, facing multiple challenges. In particular, the extreme rate of unemployment among this cohort has far-reaching effects on their livelihoods (Billystrom et al. 2016; Kaane, 2014; Karera, 2012). Numerous programmes and strategies have been established by the Kenyan government, together with various collaborators, in an attempt to empower the youth and reduce their unemployment rate (Korongo, 2012; Mutuku, 2014) – the KKV is one such programme. Launched in 2009 in response to the post-2007 election violence (Thieme, 2010), it provided youth with temporary labour-intensive work aimed at tackling unemployment, poverty and hunger (Elima, 2015; Hope, 2012). Despite these efforts, the KKV does not appear to have had the desired effect on the youth and the country as a whole, and the high rate of youth unemployment endures (Elima, 2015). KKV has been shown to benefit certain youth with regards to skill development and employment opportunities (Karera, 2012). However, these benefits appear to be limited, and the programme's implementation is defective on many levels, resulting in its objectives for the youth not being fully achieved (Mutuku, 2014; Omolo, 2011 Thieme, 2010). One area that does appear to be impacted by KKV is the level of crime within the country, with decreased rates attributed in part to the programme (Mutuku, 2014; Wachira, 2012). This is a noteworthy effect of the KKV given the high crime rate in Kenya (Korongo, 2012; Mutuku, 2014; Wachira, 2012). With improved planning and implementation, the efficacy of KKV may increase, thereby impacting

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CHAPTER 4:
The Community Work Programme (CWP) and urban violence prevention in South Africa

Malose Langa

Introduction

Statistics South Africa (2017) recently placed South Africa's unemployment rate at just over 25%. As a result of the high rate of unemployment, various government programmes were developed for skills development and also to create work opportunities. The two public employment programmes in South Africa are the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and the Community Work Programme (CWP). However, the focus of this chapter will only be on the CWP in terms of its inception, target population, gender differences, common projects undertaken in communities and the impact of such projects in reducing violence.

A Brief overview of the Community Work Programme

The Community Work Programme (CWP) as the public employment programme was first piloted in 2007. In 2010, it was formally established as a full government programme within the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). At each site, the CWP is managed by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with community and development work experience that are appointed by COGTA. The programme was designed to provide "an employment safety net" to eligible unemployed people by offering them regular work two days each week for an indefinite period. As of June 2017, general CWP participants were earning R81 per day, and their coordinators were earning R2100 per month. Any unemployed South African citizen over the age of 18 years is qualified to join the CWP. In April 2015, 186 sites were operating in 140 municipalities across the country, with an average of 1000 participants per site. The total number of CWP participants is 243162 (CoGTA, 2017). The government plans to increase the CWP participants across the country. In his State of Nation Address in January 2016, President Jacob Zuma asserted that the state aims to increase participants in the CWP to 1 million.

CWP participants work two days per week. The work that participants in the CWP do should be 'useful work', which is defined as work that contributes to the public good, community goods or social services.[1] By working in the CWP, participants receive a stable basic income of R92.00 per day, amounting to R736.00 per month. While the CWP was not intended as a provider of permanent employment, but rather as an 'employment safety net' while people are still searching for permanent job opportunities (Phillips, 2013), the reality is that many participants stay in the programme over multiple years due to a lack of a clear exit strategy.

Gender differences in the CWP

In April 2014–March 2015, it was estimated that 75% of the participants in the CWP are women as compared to 25% men (Brankovic, 2017). Reasons were given by Brankovic (2017) and Bruce (2015) as to why the majority of the CWP participants were women. Firstly, the nature of work done in the CWP is considered feminine, which mainly includes cleaning of the streets and providing social support to the elderly, sick people and child-headed households. Not many men were keen to be involved in this work (Mheqe, Mataboge, Langa, in press). The work was considered to be more suited for women than men. Despite this, there were a few men who were involved in this work. Mheqe and his colleagues interviewed some of the men about their involvement in the CWP and the meaning they derived from doing work that is considered to be for females. Secondly, the work done in the CWP happens within their respective communities, making it easy for women to work in the programme while still managing their caregiving

1. It is important to note that these figures are always contested by other statisticians. They should be used and interpreted with care.

roles as mothers. Some men interviewed by Langa (2015) and Masuku (2015) argued that 'real' work constituted going to a workplace such as a factory than to be cleaning streets within their community. Men who were seen doing such work (CWP) were not regarded highly (Bruce, 2015; Langa, 2015; Masuku, 2015). Thirdly, many men raised concern regarding the payment for participation in the programme. They argued that the payment (R608.00) was not enough to support their families. Similarly, women too had the same concern but it was mentioned that many women were using their CWP payment to supplement their other sources of income such as child support grants and pension for those who were older than 60 years old.

Projects implemented through the CWP

One of the key requirements for the implementation of the CWP projects is the consultation and participation of the community members. Before the CWP is implemented, a community meeting must be held to inform community members about the project and the selection criteria for potential participants, as well as to discuss potential projects that may be undertaken. Key local stakeholders are also elected to form a Local Reference Committee (LRC), which must guide and provide oversight about the implementation of the CWP projects. The effectiveness of the LRC to play such a role has been raised as a major concern in other studies (see, for example, Langa, 2015; Masuku, 2015; Mullagee & Bruce, 2015).

In many communities studied by CSRV such work included: care work of supporting elderly people, sick people and child-headed households; working in schools by keeping the schools clean and serving as teachers-assistants by assisting pupils with homework; dealing with issues of safety, violence and crime by working with the police to assist victims of all forms of violence; patrolling crime hotspots; and cleaning the environment by cutting long grass, clearing drains, and planting trees.

Impact of the CWP in violence prevention

It is important to note that the CWP was not developed as a violence prevention programme but the multiple-site study conducted by CSVR in six communities, has demonstrated that the programme provides a viable strategy to prevent violence in communities through addressing the underlying and direct causes of violence.

Crime and violence are a major concern for many South African communities. So it is not surprising that some of the projects initiated by the CWP participants were aimed at reducing crime and violence in their communities. Some activities included cutting grass in areas considered to be 'crime hotspots' to create a safe environment for people to walk freely in open spaces and engagement with local governmental authorities in other sites to fix street lights. In addition to this, patrols were also done by the CWP participants to ensure that community members were safe at all times. Evidence gathered in these communities demonstrates that initiatives such as this did help to reduce crime in their communities (Langa, 2015; Masuku, 2015; Mullagee & Bruce, 2015).

In other communities, the CWP participants worked closely with the police to deal with crime-related problems, including organising awareness campaigns with school-going pupils about the risks of committing crime. This work was aimed at discouraging young people from becoming involved in gangs and criminal activities (Langa, 2015; Mullagee & Bruce, 2015). Although crime continued to be a problem in some of these communities, many informants interviewed asserted that these public campaigns do help in raising public awareness about crime and violence.

The other impact from this work is that the CWP participants managed to form close working relationships with other local stakeholders in their communities as well as various government departments such as Social Development, Health, Correctional Services and Public Works in order to deal with several issues affecting communities.

Given the above examples, it is evident that the CWP does have the potential to prevent crime and violence in communities, although more empirical evidence collection is needed in this regard.

Concluding remarks

It is important to mention that the CWP was not specifically intended to be a crime-and violence-prevention programme during its conception by the government, yet it does have the potential to play such a role. This is because it facilitates economic inclusion for those who are unemployed, despite the payment not being enough to meet all the basic needs. Some participants asserted that they are able to use this little money to buy basic needs and start-

up other income generating projects as part of their plan to exit the programme.

It is also evident that the CWP facilitates social cohesion through various processes, which in turn play a role in violence prevention. Before the inception of the CWP in the six communities researched by CSVR, many community members did not know one another despite living in the same neighbourhood. The inception of the CWP facilitated the process of participants getting to know one another, which served as the first step towards them working together to assist community members and enhance social relations and the spirit of collegiality among community members. In addition, the work in the CWP is generally organized in work teams. Generally, the CWP appears to foster a high level of cohesion among community members, drawing together participants from different neighbourhoods to work together for the betterment of the communities.

In communities that have been torn apart by violence and conflict (both political and interpersonal), the CWP offers a model for restoring agency to a community to address its priority concerns in a way that builds social cohesion and restores the capacity to act collectively to address violence.

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CHAPTER 5:
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act: A Public Employment Programme in India

Palesa Mataboge

Introduction

India is located in the southern region of Asia. It is the second most populated country in the world after China, with a population size of 1.2 billion people. According to a study by Mahaptra, Sakhuja, Das and Singh (2008), over 70% of the Indian population live in rural areas and support themselves through agrarian farming.

Regarding age and sex distribution, studies (WHO, 2012) have shown that 50% of the Indian population are below the age of 25, with 65% being below the age of 35 (Mahaptra et al., 2008). This is a result of high fertility rates in India, which have, however, declined over the years. According to a study conducted by Shah and Mohanty (2010), the total fertility rate in India dropped from 3.6 children per woman in 1991 to 2.4 children per woman in 2011. This reduction in the fertility rate is attributed to a number of factors, such as increased literacy levels among females, resulting in women opting to have fewer children as they focus more on their careers (Shah & Mohanty, 2010).

In the mid-1990s, India went through a period of severe drought, and this negatively affected agricultural productivity in the rural parts of the country, resulting in 38% of the rural population living in poverty (Breitkreuz, Pattison-Williams, King, Mishra & Swallow, 2017). Furthermore, this led to an increase in unemployment during the period, and with fewer economic opportunities in rural areas, people started migrating to urban areas. This rural-urban migration led to overcrowding in cities, which resulted in resources being put under pressure and higher rates of crime due to overcrowding (Jacob, 2008). The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, or MGNREGA (then known as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), was developed as a public employment scheme to create temporary job opportunities for people in rural areas (Lieuw-Kie-Song & Philip, 2010). The programme intended to curb the rural-urban migration which was leading to excessive population pressures in cities and putting resources under strain (Shah & Mohanty, 2010). Moreover, the Act was also developed to realise various provisions in the Indian constitution, including the right to work and to social security for people in rural areas (Mukherjee & Sinha, 2013).

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

The MGNREGA, initiated in 2005, is the largest public employment programme in the world. It currently provides unskilled manual work to 57.8 million adults, up from 38.9 million in 2014. The programme has made great strides since its inception and is currently implemented across all states in India (Mahapatra et al., 2008). The programme was rolled out in three phases. In the first phase, it was implemented in 200 of the poorest districts across India (Banerjee & Saha, 2010). These districts are characterised by low agricultural productivity and high rates of poverty and unemployment. During the second phase, the programme was extended to an additional 130 rural districts. In the third phase, it was extended further to cover over 50 million rural households in 618 districts (Amaral, Bandyopadhyay & Sensarma, 2015).

The Act guarantees 100 days of work per year to at least one adult, in all rural households, who is willing to do unskilled manual labour. Workers initially received a minimum wage of Rs.60 per day in 2006; in 2013, the rate was increased to Rs.142 per day for each job card holder (Khera & Nayak, 2009; Negi, Singh & Dhanai, 2015). Any adult person may apply to work in the programme provided that they are unemployed at the time of application, live in a rural area and are willing to do unskilled manual labour. The programme guarantees the provision of a job within 15 days of application submission; failure to do so results in the applicant being eligible for an unemployment allowance – the amount of which is determined by

the state (Ministry of Rural Development & Centre for Wage Employment and Poverty Alleviation, 2014). Applicants that fit the above-mentioned criteria are given a job card by the local government, which manages the programme locally (Shah & Mohanty, 2010). The card serves as proof of application to work in the programme and contains the applicant's details, including their names, age and home address. Successful applicants are informed by letter or by public notice displayed at the local government offices in the district (Shah & Mohanty, 2010).

In terms of provisions offered to programme beneficiaries, the work they are given should be within a five-kilometre radius of their home, failing which they are eligible for a daily commuters' allowance, which is equivalent to 10% of the employment wage (Basu, Chau & Kanbur, 2007). A study by Chaarlas and Velmurugan (2012) shows that workers' wages range according to district – for instance, in Villupuram district workers earn Rs.80, while those in Puducherry earn Rs.125. The programme clearly stipulates that employees should earn a minimum of Rs.60 per day (Chaarlas & Velmurugan, 2012; Jacob, 2008). Working hours are from 9am to 5pm. All employees are eligible for a one-hour lunch break, and wages are paid within 14 days.

Work done in the MGNREGA

In terms of identifying and selecting projects for manual labour, the process involves consultation between community members and government officials. Community members meet to discuss and identify work that needs to be prioritised and are thus involved in identifying projects. Their suggestions are submitted to the local authority responsible for the management and implementation of the programme (NREGA, 2007). The local authority may also suggest other projects that need to be undertaken (Mukherjee & Sinha, 2013). The local authority is then responsible for preparing a list of permissible works and preferred works. These works are identified according to their economic, social and environmental benefits, their contribution to social equity and their ability to create permanent assets (Mukherjee & Sinha, 2013). The local authority is responsible for providing all the tools and resources needed to do the work (Mukherjee & Sinha, 2013).

Work undertaken in the projects includes creating durable assets and supplementing land and water resources. Projects such as water and soil conservation and land development are given top priority in the programme. The work typically includes activities such as water harvesting and water conservation, which includes digging new tanks and ponds (Bassi & Kumar, 2010). Some projects entail infrastructure development, including road construction and flood control through paving and installing new drainage systems. In other projects, participants work on farms to plough and harvest (Bassi & Kumar, 2010).

Participants in the MNGREGA

In total, 57 million workers were registered in the programme in 2015. Of these, 40% were men, and 60% were women. It was argued at the programme's inception that women are worse affected than men by poverty and unemployment in India and worldwide. Thus, a main aim of the programme was to recruit more women than men – ideally, the programme wanted 70% of participants to be women (Ong & De, 2016).

Why target women

Due to high rates of unemployment, women around the world experience high levels of poverty. Lack of employment makes women susceptible to intimate partner violence (IPV) (Grown, 2014). Due to gender discrimination and other patriarchal practices, women still have great difficulties securing their basic needs, such as getting an education, finding employment and having fair control over household income (Amaral et al., 2015). It is for this reason that MGNREGA targeted women in order to help them earn an income and be financially independent (Sudarshan, Bhattacharya & Fernandez, 2010).

Although the programme's target for female participation was 70%, their participation rate varied across states. In some states, many women participated; in others, very few did. It appears that women's participation rate in semi-rural areas was higher than in remote rural areas. For example, of 26 states, only six – Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Tripura – had over 50% female participation (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010) while ten other states had participation levels of between 25% and 38%. The lowest female participation rates were reported in Jammu and Kashmir, at just over 5%, and in Himachal, at 13% (Sudarshan et al., 2010). Kerala had the highest number of women (85.01%) participating in the programme – attributed to the fact

that women there earned more (Rs.125) than women in other states (Rs.70–Rs.80) (Sudarshan et al., 2010). It is important to note that women recruited in Kerala were first-time workers, widows and the elderly (Sudarshan et al., 2010). It is thus also hypothesised that these women desperately needed these job opportunities, more so than women in other states. Another positive factor found in Kerala is that female participants were able to express their views during community meetings, which made them feel that they were an integral part of the programme and that their views were valued (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010).

Many states in India are still highly patriarchal. In many rural villages, women are encouraged to stay at home and raise children, and their participation in the programme is frowned upon. This is one of the reasons for women's low participation in some states. Other factors contributing to low female participation include a taboo against women doing jobs that are considered too masculine, such as road construction and digging holes (Saha, 2014). On the whole, however, MGNREGA appears to have contributed to the empowerment of women in rural areas, despite their participation being low in some states.

A study by Kera and Nayak (2009) found that the programme gave financial means to women to meet some of their basic needs as well as support their families. Amaral et al. (2015) also found a reported increase in education outcomes among children whose mothers were participants in the programme - this is due to provisions the government included in the programme to make working less of a burden for women. For example, establishing crèches for registered female recipients with children and making sure that women earn the same wages as men (Amaral et al., 2015). Some women did additional jobs to supplement their income, including seasonal work such as collecting and selling "forest produce" like tendu leaves, mohua flowers and wood (Khera & Nayak, 2009). In summary, it is evident that MGNREGA has given women opportunities to work, earn wages, be financially independent, support their families and fulfil their civic duties.

Violence against women

IPV (Intimate Partner Violence) affects approximately 33% of women globally (Amaral et al., 2015). The financial dependence of women on men has been found to be one of the many contributing factors to violence against women (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010). Due to the high gender wage gap in India, women are generally rendered vulnerable to IPV (Amaral et al., 2015). A 2017 study shows that approximately 70% of women in India have experienced IPV (Dharshini, 2017). These rates have increased over the years, as a study conducted in India a decade earlier, in 2007, indicated that 50% of women reported having experienced IPV (Jeyaseelan et al., 2007).

Some researchers (e.g. Pankaj & Tankha, 2010) argue that the inclusion of women in the MGNREGA has lowered the rates of IPV, while others (Holmes, Sadana & Rath, 2010) argue that it has increased IPV. According to Pankaj and Tankha (2010), MGNREGA has given women financial independence, which in turn has empowered them to be assertive in their relationships and to contribute financially to the well-being of their families without relying on their partners. Such relationships, the researchers claim, are characterised by equality between men and women (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010). On the other hand, studies by Amaral et al. (2015) and Holmes et al. (2010) indicate that women's participation in MGNREGA has in fact perpetuated IPV. Holmes et al. (2010) found increased rates of IPV, especially in homes where men were unemployed and women were employed. They claim that men in these relationships feel emasculated and use violence to assert their power and authority over their working partners. Violence in these relationships is used to restore men's sense of manhood in the face of unemployment and their inability to occupy the position of breadwinner (Holmes et al., 2010). A more recent study by Amaral et al. (2015) also found that the existence of MGNREGA had increased rates of IPV against women.

Challenges experienced in implementing MGNREGA

A number of challenges were encountered in implementing MGNREGA. The programme has specified that 70% of all the participants should be women but, as noted, the participation of women in some states was low due to the fact that women are still considered inferior and too weak to perform certain tasks (Sudarshan et al., 2010). Some women were discouraged by their partners and family members from joining and participating in the programme. Women were also discriminated against in terms of performing certain tasks that were considered too manly, such as working on construction sites. In the study by Khera and Nayak (2009), women spoke about

male site managers not permitting them to access certain work sites, claiming that they were too weak to work there.

Another major challenge was allegations of corruption in the management of the programme. Various studies (Ghose, 2011; Dutta, Murgai, Ravallion & Van de Walle, 2012) report that officials were found to have misappropriated funds meant for the project for their personal use. Other corrupt activities included claiming expenditures for work that was in fact never done, old public works being passed off as new, and paying bogus participants who were not working in the programme (Chaarlas & Velmurugan, 2012). New systems were developed to deal with corruption in the programme, including regular audits of the finances and of the participants to ensure there were no bogus workers in the register. All relevant management documents are available to the public, who can check for any irregularities and monitor how the project is being implemented. Civil society organisations have been playing this role.

Social and economic benefits of the MGNREGA

Public employment programmes have provided meaningful contributions to structural and contextual problems in different countries. In the case of India, MGNREGA played a significant role in dealing with the problem of poverty and unemployment in rural areas. This programme has inspired many other public employment programmes worldwide, including the Community Work Programme in South Africa. To date, the MGNREGA remains the largest public employment programme in the world.

It is through MGNREGA that the Indian government was able to realise various constitutional rights for its rural citizens, including the right to work and to social protection. MGNREGA has also demonstrated the Indian government's commitment to alleviating poverty and unemployment through massive funding provided to the programme every year. The programme provides a stable income for the participants for 100 days annually. Some participants use this income to supplement other sources of income to support their families. The income also opens up other economic opportunities – people have money to spend at the local shops, which benefits local economies.

A social benefit of the programme is that women are targeted as participants. They use the wages earned to support their children, which directly and indirectly contributes to their healthy emotional and physical growth. Pankaj and Tankha (2010) found that children whose mothers are in the programme perform well at school. Their good academic performance is attributed to the fact that their mothers appear to be emotionally happy as a result of having work. This, in turn, contributes to the emotional well-being of their children (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010). The latter are some of the unintended social benefits of the MGNREGA programme.

The programme has also been found to be a protective factor for women against gender-based violence, despite some studies showing the opposite. Women, on the whole, appear to feel empowered by their participation in the programme. Both indirectly and directly, the programme has also managed to deal with some patriarchal and sexist attitudes towards women, even though there is still a long way to go before women in India are fully liberated. In small ways, the programme seems to have contributed to the liberation of women in states such as Kerala, where they are allowed to participate in public meetings and express their views about projects that need to be undertaken in their communities.

Conclusion

Public employment programmes around the world are important policy tools and have a long history of offering humanitarian relief in developing and developed countries. The MGNREGA is one of the most successfully run public employment programmes in the world. The programme started formally in 2005 amid an employment crisis in India. It has since created temporary job opportunities for more than 50 million people in India, 60% to 70% of whom are women, and has contributed to their social and economic empowerment. Today the MGNREGA is seen as a model for other countries in the world. The programme certainly inspired several other public employment programmes that were enacted after it. One of the most commendable features of MGNREGA is the social audit process, which allows for transparency and accountability.

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CHAPTER 6:
Consolidation, Reconstruction and Entrepreneurship: Colombian Public Employment Programmes

Juliana Tappe Ortiz

Introduction

Latin America is a continent where violence and unemployment are typical features of the everyday lives of most of the population. It is the most violent region in the world, with 8% of the world's population but 34% of global homicides (Instinto de Vida, 2017). In terms of Colombia, the current unemployment rate is 8.7% (National Statistical Department Colombia, 2017) compared to the world rate of 5.7% (World Bank, 2016). The Colombian homicide rate of 21 murders per 100 000 people (Instinto de Vida, 2017) exacerbates this already negative view of the continent. Brazil, Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala show even more dramatic homicide rates.

Although Colombia is well known for its cocaine production and involvement in the drug trade, its entangled and long-armed conflict has shaped the country's history significantly and is still one of the main reasons for the violence and unemployment. Syria and Colombia have the highest numbers of internally displaced people in the world, with 6.6 and 6.3 million people, respectively (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2016). The peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, or FARC) is a historic milestone for the country. It was signed in November 2016 after half a century of conflict, many attempts at negotiation and a failed referendum in October of that year, with 50.24% voting against the peace deal.

In the upcoming months, Colombia will no doubt be eagerly observed to see how the momentum generated in the peace agreement works to reduce multidimensional forms of violence. Additionally, it will be interesting to measure how the country transforms its current image concerning infrastructure and conceptualisations of the state in order to deal with other actors and factors of violence, such as the cocaine trade and armed groups like the National Liberation Army *(Ejército de Liberación Nacional).* Especially in Colombia's rural areas, it is extremely important for the government to fill the gap left by the disarmed FARC in order to prevent the emergence of other illegal armed groups seeking to control whole territories and trade routes, as the FARC did.

Colombia is a medium-sized country with a steady level of economic growth since the 2000s, which means that fewer people live in extreme poverty than in the past. However, inequality, non-state armed actors and economic development solely based on the exploitation of natural resources continue to be the biggest challenges the country faces in the twenty-first century.

Public employment programmes in Colombia

Low wages and informal labour are widespread phenomena in Colombia. The self-employment rate is high (52%), and many employees have irregular labour contracts (Bozzoli, Brück & Wald, 2013). Additionally, 83% of those independent Colombian workers are active in informal labour, and a form of social security covers only 7% of them (Bozzoli, Brück & Wald, 2013). Only 58% of employed workers contribute to the state pension system. Colombia's income inequality is one of the highest in the world (Gini-coefficient of 0.51), there is almost no redistribution of resources through taxes, and financial precaution does not take place practically. Furthermore, internal displacement has left many people living in extreme poverty and without resources (OECD, 2015). Even though violence has decreased since the peace negotiations, it is still a major challenge for members of the trade unions and union leaders, as they are often the targets of contract killings (ENS, 2008).

In recent years, the Colombian government has tried to address these work-related and social problems by implementing several reforms that are

slowly showing results. Examples are the Law to Formalize and Generate Employment of 2010 and the 2012 reform of the tax system, which led to a 5% reduction in informal labour in less than four years (OECD, 2015). Furthermore, the unemployment rate is steadily decreasing. The remainder of this chapter focuses on two public employment programmes: the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (*Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial*, or PNCRT) and the Young Rural Entrepreneurs Programme (*Jóvenes Rurales Emprendedores*, or JRE).

National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT)

The PNCRT is a public programme that aims to show government presence in areas that were formerly de facto ruled by non-state illegal actors. This reappearance of the state should decrease mistrust and involvement in illegal work within the population. Both elements are key to promoting endurable peace-building, economic development and structural change in a country where illegal trade is one of the main reasons for conflict. It is crucial to break Colombian civilians' support for illegal armed groups, which finance and protect their communities and households, and to move the monopoly of power from non-state actors to the state. The illicit economy and illegal actors continuously undermine the state's authority and power, making it hard to institutionalise control over the territory and to consolidate state presence. Therefore, territorial reconstruction and consolidation are the main aspects of this public employment programme, which was implemented in 2012 and still functions today. Other public policy programmes with a focus on consolidation – *Grupos Polivantes y Rehabilitación* (1958–1962), *Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación* (1982–1990) and Plan Colombia (1999–2005) – were not successful as the conflict of five decades outlived them. PNCRT is the largest state-building and peace-making programme ever implemented by the Colombian government and is partially funded and supported by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Bogota. Interestingly, several state agencies (from both civilian and military areas) and USAID's operators work together, which is quite unusual for Colombian public policy programmes.

Young Rural Entrepreneurs Programme

Another public approach was the JRE, implemented from 2004 to 2013. It was a rather small-scale programme compared to the PNCRT's huge intervention. Its main idea was to support young Colombians in rural areas by helping them set up businesses through entrepreneurship training. Through this programme, participants created viable and sustainable small businesses aimed at increasing productivity and competitiveness in rural areas. Young people living in rural areas in Colombia are a very vulnerable group as many were victims or perpetrators in the conflict and participate in illegal economies. Similar to the PNCRT, this approach also starts from the perspective that illegal work and violence are the results of the state's long absence from the rural areas. The aim to create new and creative economies through this programme is , therefore, a way to reintegrate the state into the rural society and to foster economic ties and trades, which will help to promote national development.

Target populations for PNCRT and JRE

The youth unemployment rate is extremely high in Colombia, at 21% (World Bank, 2016). The JRE was thus specially designed for unemployed young persons (between the ages of 16 and 35) from low-income households, mostly in rural areas. Eighty-six percent of the positions in the programme were given to individuals from the target group, including those at risk of being recruited by drug cartels and those in extreme poverty. However, the programme also accepted some individuals from marginalised urban areas. There was no age restriction for persons with disabilities, a history of displacement or demobilisation and single-household women and peasants (ILO, 2017). In total, people from over 1 091 municipalities across the region benefited from the public policy programme. In 2013, 220 000 students graduated from the programme – the highest number of students per year achieved over the programme's nine years (overall, more than two million students graduated). Students received vocational training in strategic and high-demand labour areas in order to have a positive impact on their employability and integration into the labour market. In addition, training included a component on entrepreneurship and management to strengthen the entrepreneurial skills of beneficiaries. The programme did not discriminate on the basis of gender, although organisers were aware that rural men are differently affected by unemployment than women, bearing in mind that in Colombia males are traditionally the ones responsible

for providing an income for their families. The data on graduate students show that men and women were represented equally – roughly 70 000 per year per gender (ILO, 2010).

For the PNCRT, the Colombian government chose municipalities with a low presence of state institutions, high levels of illicit economy and a history of armed conflict, but also with a minimum level of security already achieved by the army in order to protect programme implementers. Of the 1 123 districts in Colombia, 51 were chosen to participate in the programme (about 5% of the population), illustrating the extent of the approach. The municipalities or groups of municipalities had to function as a cohesive political and economic unit in order to address different *veredas* together (*veredas* are rural communities of 20–500 people). Additionally, they had to cultivate illicit crops and have a deep connection to non-state actors. Municipalities that were not safe enough for development helpers or that did not meet the criteria mentioned above were not selected. Figure 1 shows Colombia's municipalities and those that were eligible for the programme.

The Colombian government divides zones into white, yellow or red depending on the vulnerability of the municipality. The red zones are areas where the programme could not be implemented as it would have been too unsafe for programme implementers and communities to eradicate illicit crops with such a high presence of non-state armed actors. The PNCRT was especially developed for yellow zones, which means that these are the regions where it is implemented according to the criteria mentioned.

In comparison to the JRE, this initiative supported communities rather than individuals. Additionally, it included military operations and foreign aid in those municipalities that had been excluded from the development of the country.

Implementation

Before the nation-wide implementation of the PNCRT, in 2007 the Colombian government tested the design of a pilot programme, which came to be known as the La Macarena Integral Consolidation Program (*Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena*). After international and internal recommendations, the revised public programme was started in 2012.

Figure1: Colombian Municipalities



Source: Fundación las 2 Orillas (2015)

In a nutshell, the programme envisions a phased, sequenced approach to establish a full government presence, starting from virtually nothing.

First, the programme entails a military operation, given each zone's precarious security situation. Armed forces carry out offensive actions to evict non-state actors from the zone, destroy their support and supply networks, and support coca eradication (PNCRT, 2012). In order to receive government support, communities and municipalities have to show their willingness to give up illicit crops by fumigating or manually pulling out coca plants. They also have to respect national law in order to be protected by the Colombian state. Once the guerrilla presence is cleared or reduced from the region's most important areas, other state representatives enter, principally civil police and some development workers carrying out consolidative projects (Isacson, 2012). Each individual community has complete decision-making power to develop a certain project, which will be financed by the state ($16 000–21 000 per project). This bottom-up approach is supposed to encourage historically neglected communities and may be seen as a step towards emancipation. After achieving security through military force, the economic, social and institutional development starts, with the help of the beneficiaries. Figure 2 underlines the procedure.

Figure 2 clearly shows the three phases of this public programme: territorial recovery, regional transition and consolidation through civil society participation and good governance. Furthermore, it underlines the shift from security to social and economic development. After securing stability, regional programme managers explain to the respective communities what is expected from them and what they will receive from the state apart from security. USAID is most active in this development part of the process. The programme grants communities a certain budget to invest in communal ideas or projects (usually infrastructure improvements).

The aim is not only to provide needed assistance and investment but also to gain the residents' trust by delivering both private and public goods. Longer-term assistance involves identifying or helping to create productive projects, providing training in licit crop cultivation and linking the producers to a value chain or market. This means that former coca producers are entitled to financial aid when they produce legal crops like cocoa and coffee (about 20 000 families, called *Familias Guardabosques*, have received about $300 each). With this individual help, food security can be assured in order to make it possible to change from one production line to the other in a smooth way.

Figure2: : Implementation plan of the PNCRT



Source: PNCRT (2012)

Institutional development is another aspect of this programme. This means that state institutions are further developed and reinforced (e.g. town halls, public spaces). In many town and villages in Colombia there is no institutional representation of the state; therefore this step belongs to the consolidation of the countryside. The programme also assists municipal leaders to improve their policies. In the end, the programme aims to achieve consolidation in a zone recovered from armed actors other than the state. The population should be enabled to participate in the nation's politics and economy. Military departments then leave the municipality to start the first phases of similar operations in new regions.

However, the results for the PNCRT to date do not show that financial support for armed actors decreased as a result of this programme. Support for the illicit economy dropped in general across the whole country, not only in PNCRT zones. Regions in which only the Colombian government operated, without USAID, showed better results than regions with international cooperation (e.g. Catatumbo and Putumayo). This might be because the programme was more efficient in those areas or that they experienced other dynamics. Within the broader PNCRT programme, the programme against illicit crops (*Programa Contra Cultivos Ilícitos*) produced new job opportunities for many men, who by 2014 had helped clear over 65 000 hectares of coca plantations (Diálogo Americas, 2014). That said, many societal expectations could not be met through the programme because the ministries of health, education and transportation did not engage in the project, or needed a long time to act in the respective zones (Isacson, 2012). In general, it is difficult to measure the PNCRT's achievements as the programme is still functioning and the Colombian government finds itself in a process of transformation due to the peace agreement, which entails many new risks, duties and opportunities for building a state in former FARC-ruled regions.

The JRE, as noted, works with individuals. It is a theoretical and practical training programme for vulnerable persons and youths from the countryside. Like the PNCRT, it first started as a pilot programme in 2003 in 167 municipalities (in the end it covered over 1 000 municipalities). The programme focuses on entrepreneurship training, preferably in the agricultural, livestock and fisheries industries, on agro-forestry and on rural trade and services. Students do not earn money but learn how to manage their business ideas or plans. Furthermore, the programme offers gross capital goods (e.g. seeds, animals or working tools). These goods are fundamental to the development of a productive project. The Colombian National Vocational Training Agency (*Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje*, or SENA) carried out the programme with the help of municipal and departmental entities and labour unions. Additionally, the JRE sometimes called for the most innovative business idea of the year and granted money for the best proposal, the amount depending on what the SENA wanted to invest in the programme (up to US$2 000) in a particular year.

The programme began with the SENA entrepreneurship units defining productive projects in partnership with municipal agencies and the participants. After that, the training content was set, depending on the projects to be undertaken (beneficiaries participated in at least 200 hours of classes for their business idea). Students graduated when they had developed the skills necessary for the chosen project, without exceeding the maximum time allocated for each project (five or six months). The duration of the training process varied from one project to another and from one group of students to another, given that this public programme focused on the individual and his or her business idea. Once the project was launched, the SENA entrepreneurship unit tracked it for a period of four or five months. Thereafter, assessment and training continued if students asked for it. For example, they could learn how to develop a business plan and apply for funding. Additionally, they received advice from other entities and SENA training centres, particularly its enterprise units (ILO, 2017).

The JRE achieved many of its objectives, the most important being that entrepreneurial activities in rural areas increased. However, it is not clear if the programme helped to prevent rural migration, as leaving the countryside is still a common practice for young Colombians. The programme's success is reflected in its drop-out rate of only 10% (ILO, 2010). Students affirm that they stayed in the programme because it was flexible and because they could follow their own projects and ideas. Further benefits of the JRE programme are discussed below.

Benefits

According to the impact evaluation, the JRE programme had a positive effect on graduates' labour income per hour. In particular, there was an increase of US$1.50 in daily income. In addition, graduates are 13–14% more likely to find a job compared to the control group. A survey among participants shows that the course gained widespread acceptance – almost 88% of the beneficiaries affirmed that the course met their expectations. About 75% of participants established self-owned businesses and demonstrated improved skills concerning their relationships with providers, other inputs (e.g. fertilisers, seeds and tools) and financial institutions (SENA, 2012). They helped to develop new economies (e.g. biological products, renewable technology and ecotourism). Compared to the control group, programme participants had an increased probability (of between 75% and 88%) of starting a new business. In addition, after completing the training, it is more likely that participants are hired by someone who is engaged in entrepreneurial activity (50%). The programme not only provided administration and management skills but also improved participants' access to more reliable clients (punctual with payments) than they might have encountered outside of the JRE network (Castañeda, González & Rojas, 2010). An interesting aspect is that the programme improved participants' self-esteem and they saw their ideas and projects in a more positive light than before. In general, the programme increased the capacities of employees to maintain adequate turnover and customer management. Moreover, it promoted networks among JRE beneficiaries and reduced conflicts with partners and clients (Severo, 2012). There is a generational benefit in that parents can learn from their children's new skills and knowledge, so improving the quality of life of the whole family.

The PNCRT definitely brought benefits to the formerly neglected municipalities, not least the recovery of security. This improved not only because the Colombian government took action but also because the FARC showed increasing weakness in its governability and implementation of power. Other benefits included economic development, the protection of human rights and private investment (Mejía Quintero, 2015). In some areas, the PNCRT also improved the population's view of the government. Many municipalities embraced the presence of governmental institutions and viewed consolidation investments as an opportunity to reduce the isolation and insecurity of their community (Barry, 2013). "The investment on the focused regions is historic, representing an increase of almost 400%. There has been almost two trillion [Colombian] pesos (US$ 517,000) made in national state investments, with almost 27 state institutions functioning as intermediaries" (Diálogo Americs, 2014. The benefit accrues from the fact that the beneficiaries decide what will happen with the governmental grant in their community. This procedure trains and empowers mayors, and the whole population of a municipality.

Limitations

Many of the PNCRT's consolidation efforts have not been successful in the 51 regions chosen for the programme's implementation. To date, the military has had to stay in the municipalities and has not been able to move on to other regions. This is particularly risky because more and more Colombians associate the military with the government as in some regions, the military has been providing health services and children's education (Barry, 2013). Military operations also increase the risk of human rights violations and should be gradually phased out as civilian institutions begin operating freely during the stabilisation phase.

Furthermore, in the context of a lack of governmental engagements, US-based state-building efforts have generated strong distrust towards consolidation in some regions, as citizens attribute interventions and any benefits to non-state actors and military force. Therefore, some municipalities still feel ignored by the state, and this feeling of exclusion continues to be a factor provoking further violence.

Another aspect is that the PNCRT fails to recognise the special characteristics of certain municipalities. In areas with a historically high level of corruption, it is not easy to engage with mayors and the population refuses to listen to their leaders or governmental operators. The programme does not differentiate between areas where the state is functionally absent (e.g. the Macarena) and areas where state institutions exist but are captured by illegal actors (e.g. Bajo Cauca). It is possible that the two types of regions require different kinds of state-building approaches.

Additionally, the programme does not seriously consider the huge problem of landownership in Colombia. In the end, consolidation is a question of shifting power from landowners and armed actors to the state. This challenge sets limits to the complete implementation of the programme.

Finally, municipalities chosen for the PNCRT do not show lower levels of illicit plantations than the comparison group. Illegal economic trade decreased in general across the whole country. Nevertheless, PNCRT municipalities have improved their infrastructure and their economic development, and in some municipalities, fewer human rights violations have been registered.

JRE's limitations appear to be focused around its conceptualisation. First, the programme did not include a gender perspective. Entrepreneurship was related to traditionally male-associated areas (e.g. agriculture and the fishing industry), and the programme did not encourage female participants to develop their own business ideas. This omission risked reproducing stereotypes, with females finishing the programme and then handing the responsibility to act for their families back to men. In the long run, this can lead to frustration for female participants within the business and for their families (Cordero & Romero, 2016).

Second, the JRE programme offered a very individual approach. On the one hand, this was important in that it encouraged young people who do not receive much support from their families and other institutions. On the other hand, this approach did not take into account that many Latin American societies are based on group identities. In Colombia, the development of the BACRIM (*Bandas criminales* – criminal gangs) led to a new type of youth gang where gang members define themselves by group membership. The BACRIM are linked to Mexican drug cartels and operate in similar ways around the drug trade in Colombia. It was hard to motivate these young people to join the JRE if other of their group members did not participate in the programme (Sánchez Torres, Zuluaga Gordillo & Chegwin, 2017).

Third, the JRE programme did not specifically strengthen bonds between the private economy and young Colombians. Both sides hold many prejudices and stereotypes, which made it hard to connect them. SENA and the JRE programme did not focus on bringing these disparate parts together, thus limiting future job possibilities for young Colombians (IDRC, 2016).

Elements for violence prevention processes

It is not clear whether either of the two public policy programmes directly prevented violence, as there is no causal evidence to suggest that work opportunities reduced violence. However, there are signs that this may, in fact, be the case. Seemingly, violence and unemployment can be challenged through public programmes, making it more likely that the implementation of employment programmes has an impact on violence (Cordero & Romero, 2016).

Young rural Colombians have been exposed to cultural, structural and direct violence for half a century (Galtung, 2003). Half of the victims and perpetrators in Colombia are under the age of 28, which makes them the most vulnerable target population regarding violence. Features of violence that young people encounter, mainly in rural areas, include forced displacement, forced recruitment, antipersonnel mines, fumigations and armed actors (Aguilar-Forero & Muñoz, 2015). The JRE programme, therefore, involved processes to prevent violence by addressing the most vulnerable group suffering from the effects of violence in the Colombian conflict.

Furthermore, the offer of illegal work is very seductive for the youth as it is an offer to escape from poverty in a relatively short time compared to training and job offers, which might only pay off in the long run. Illegal economies tend to go hand in hand with violence (less so in Bolivia), accounting for the increased level of violence in rural areas where illicit crops grow.

Therefore, it is crucial to introduce young rural Colombians to work alternatives and opportunities, which the JRE programme did. It is essential for the prevention of violence to focus specifically on young people at risk of being recruited by drug cartels, as well as those in poverty.

Benefits

According to the impact evaluation, the JRE programme had a positive effect on graduates' labour income per hour. In particular, there was an increase of US$1.50 in daily income. In addition, graduates are 13–14% more likely to find a job compared to the control group. A survey among participants shows that the course gained widespread acceptance – almost 88% of the beneficiaries affirmed that the course met their expectations. About 75% of participants established self-owned businesses and demonstrated improved skills concerning their relationships with providers, other inputs (e.g. fertilisers, seeds and tools) and financial institutions (SENA, 2012). They helped to develop new economies (e.g. biological products, renewable technology and ecotourism). Compared to the control group, programme participants had an increased probability (of between 75% and 88%) of starting a new business. In addition, after completing the training, it is more likely that participants are hired by someone who is engaged in entrepreneurial activity (50%). The programme not only provided administration and management skills but also improved participants' access to more reliable clients (punctual with payments) than they might have encountered outside of the JRE network (Castañeda, González & Rojas, 2010). An interesting aspect is that the programme improved participants' self-esteem and they saw their ideas and projects in a more positive light than before. In general, the programme increased the capacities of employees to maintain adequate turnover and customer management. Moreover, it promoted networks among JRE beneficiaries and reduced conflicts with partners and clients (Severo, 2012). There is a generational benefit in that parents can learn from their children's new skills and knowledge, so improving the quality of life of the whole family.

The PNCRT definitely brought benefits to the formerly neglected municipalities, not least the recovery of security. This improved not only because the Colombian government took action but also because the FARC showed increasing weakness in its governability and implementation of power. Other benefits included economic development, the protection of human rights and private investment (Mejía Quintero, 2015). In some areas, the PNCRT also improved the population's view of the government. Many municipalities embraced the presence of governmental institutions and viewed consolidation investments as an opportunity to reduce the isolation and insecurity of their community (Barry, 2013). "The investment on the focused regions is historic, representing an increase of almost 400%. There has been almost two trillion [Colombian] pesos (US$ 517,000) made in national state investments, with almost 27 state institutions functioning as intermediaries" (Diálogo Americs, 2014. The benefit accrues from the fact that the beneficiaries decide what will happen with the governmental grant in their community. This procedure trains and empowers mayors, and the whole population of a municipality.

Limitations

Many of the PNCRT's consolidation efforts have not been successful in the 51 regions chosen for the programme's implementation. To date, the military has had to stay in the municipalities and has not been able to move on to other regions. This is particularly risky because more and more Colombians associate the military with the government as in some regions, the military has been providing health services and children's education (Barry, 2013). Military operations also increase the risk of human rights violations and should be gradually phased out as civilian institutions begin operating freely during the stabilisation phase.

Furthermore, in the context of a lack of governmental engagements, US-based state-building efforts have generated strong distrust towards consolidation in some regions, as citizens attribute interventions and any benefits to non-state actors and military force. Therefore, some municipalities still feel ignored by the state, and this feeling of exclusion continues to be a factor provoking further violence.

Another aspect is that the PNCRT fails to recognise the special characteristics of certain municipalities. In areas with a historically high level of corruption, it is not easy to engage with mayors and the population refuses to listen to their leaders or governmental operators. The programme does not differentiate between areas where the state is functionally absent (e.g. the Macarena) and areas where state institutions exist but are captured by illegal actors (e.g. Bajo Cauca). It is possible that the two types of regions require different kinds of state-building approaches.

Finally, a major problem for many young rural Colombians is low self-esteem. Many do not feel accepted by society, and this negative identity can lead to violent behaviour. Additionally, their low level of social capital makes it hard for them to find work. Therefore, focusing on young people's self-esteem should be an aspect of every public employment programme. In the case of the JRE, the programme encouraged and empowered young Colombians to develop their own project or business plan and to appreciate their own thoughts and ideas, which in the end makes them feel more confident and satisfied with their work (Castañeda, González & Rojas, 2010).
To summarise, the JRE programme entailed three important aspects of violence prevention: first, young rural Colombians, the most vulnerable group of the conflict, were the target cohort; second, alternative and non-dangerous economies were the main focus of the entrepreneurship programme; and third, the programme addressed negative self-esteem within vulnerable groups, which is a reason for violent actions.

The PNCRT tackles violence from a different angle. First, its military operations provide security from the start (even though, as noted, this might not be the case in the long run) in regions that have not been safe from non-state armed actors for many years. At most, the PNCRT might prevent upcoming violence due to military actions.

The PNCRT's economic approach of eradicating illicit crops and creating and supporting legal trade might help prevent violence. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2016), illicit trade provokes spillover effects such as increased migration, violence and even terrorism. Through the provision of public goods, infrastructure and individual grants, the PNCRT aims at improving economic development and security in formerly excluded areas. The eradication of illicit crops might be an approach to preventing violence, as the contrary idea – that of drug legalisation, as in Uruguay – does not result in any significant decrease in violence (Robinson, 2016).

Furthermore, the PNCRT programme encourages people by giving them decision-making power over their community projects. This is crucial in developing positive self-esteem, which can reduce violent behaviour. In historically state-neglected areas, this form of recognition is very important for populations that constantly felt mistrusted and that became very hostile towards the government. Additionally, populations in red and yellow zones (see Figure 1) suffered most from violence during the conflict. If these people see the state engaging in their community while giving them the power to make decisions, they will probably feel more valued as citizens and engage less in economies that damage Colombian development in general.

In sum, the PNCRT's effects on violence prevention processes depend on the programme's target group – the areas in the countryside from where most victims and perpetrators come. The programme focuses on illicit crop eradication, as illegal trade is a factor in violence, and tackles negative self-esteem by encouraging the (often suspicious) population to make their own financial decisions with the help of governmental and international institutions.

To conclude, both programmes use an empowerment approach to prevent violence. Empowering neglected communities and strengthening their capabilities is crucial for creating a positive environment where violence is not used as a medium to improve living conditions.

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CHAPTER 7:
Youth Gangs, Violence and Community Approaches: El Salvadorian Public Employment Programmes

Juliana Tappe Ortiz

Introduction

Youth gangs are a huge problem for many Central American countries as gang members severely affect social security, social cohesion and economic development. These gangs can be traced back to the 1980s in Los Angeles where Central American immigrant communities formed youth gangs like *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS-13) and the *Barrio Dieciocho* (18th Street gang). When these Central American youths began to return to their home countries in the 1990s (often due to US deportation policies), and as US cultural influences spread more widely in Central America, youth gangs in the region began to adopt the style of Los Angeles gangs (Falkenburger & Thale, 2006). Today, youth gangs in Central America have become more violent and visible, mainly in cross-border regions.

El Salvador has as an estimated 60 000 gang members (plus 9 000 imprisoned) who are responsible for many acts of violence in the country. Furthermore, they have a network of friends and families of about 400 000 people (Glenda Táger, 2016). With a population of 6.3 million, this means that almost 8% of El Salvadorians are involved in gang activities or support them directly or indirectly. Between 2001 and 2017, El Salvador saw levels of violence comparable only to war zones. With a rate of 81.2 homicides per 100 000 in 2016, this small nation is one of the most violent places on earth. The increase in criminal activity in El Salvador's emerging democracy is caused by a combination of internal conditions on the one hand – social inequality, marginalisation, violent political cultures and poor governance – and, on the other, it is also a transnational phenomenon because criminal activities have become more international through illicit flows of drugs, people, arms and money. Additionally, governments all over the world tend to give "securitised" responses to these problems, which worsen rather than prevent acts of violence (Aguilar Umaña, Arévalo de León & Glenda Táger, 2014). Guatemala and Honduras face similar problems to El Salvador and use the same policy of *mano dura* (a term for tough-on-crime policies) to reduce gang activities. However, continuously high levels of homicide and violence suggest that the policy has not been effective.

In 2012 and 2013, the two biggest youth gangs in El Salvador implemented a truce with the help of the government and the Catholic Church, which almost halved the murder rate. However, further negotiations were ruled out in 2014, and the truce ended that year. Since then, the government has announced anti-gang legislation, increased oppression in prisons and mobilised the army to fight gangs in some municipalities, despite gang members offering dialogue (Hernández & Hamilton, 2016). Since 2015, El Salvador has declared youth gangs to be terrorist organisations, subjecting them to anti-terrorist legislation.

Youth gangs are not the only violent actors in El Salvador's history. Persistent socioeconomic inequality and civil unrest culminated in a civil war (from 1979 to 1992) between the military-led government and a coalition of left-wing guerrilla groups, which ended with a negotiated settlement. El Salvador's economy is dominated by agriculture and closely linked to the economic development of the US. In general, it is still a relatively young democracy and a small country with a long history of violence and political and economic instability.

Public employment programmes in El Salvador

Since the end of the civil war, El Salvador has implemented major structural reforms and macroeconomic policies that resulted in strong economic performance, with an average yearly GDP growth of around 6% during the 1990s, as well as a sharp reduction in poverty (nearly 27 percentage points) between 1991 and 2002 (World Bank, 2016,a).

Crime and violence make economic development more expensive, have a negative effect on investment decisions and hinder job creation. In 2014, public employment [in El Salvador] was the second lowest in the [South American] region, at 8.3% compared to a regional average of 12%. Of the total [national] budget, only 9.5% was spent on social benefits, compared to a regional average of 24.6% (OECD, 2017). Public institutions seem to be very weak, which leads to the marginalisation of less fortunate sectors of society. Almost half of the working population is self-employed and 7% are unemployed; youth unemployment is higher at a rate of at least 13% (World Bank, 2016, b). Public employment programmes have not effectively addressed these problems. One of the only effective measures the Ministry of Labour undertook in the last few years was the fight against child labour in the sugar-cane industry, which led to a reduction in child labour of almost 92% between 2003 and 2014 (Ayala & Avalos, 2016). An example of a not-yet-implemented but well-developed programme is the National Action Plan for Youth Employment (*Plan Nacional de Acción de Empleo Juvenil*). It was meant to start in 2012 and run until 2024 but the president never signed the plans. Its main focus is to generate work offers through cooperation with private and public companies and to prepare young El Salvadorians for work in agriculture and tourism (PAEJU, 2012). The International Labour Organisation and the Ministry of Work and Social Prevision elaborated the plan. This programme would have shown that El Salvador is aware of the fact that the young population is a huge factor for the economic and social development of the country (Bolaños Cámbara & Rivera, 2016). Twenty percent of El Salvadorians aged 15 to 19 and over 30% of 20–24 year olds say they neither work nor study (the official term used to describe them is "NiNis" – *ni trabajan, ni estudian*), which is not only an economic but also a social problem and a cause of violence.

In the following sections, two implemented public employment programmes in El Salvador are discussed: *Prevenir* (Preventing) and the *Projóvenes* Programme II.

Projóvenes II

The *Projóvenes* Programme II (*Proyecto de Prevención Social de la Violencia con Participación Juvenil* – Social Prevention of Violence Project with Youth Participation) is a public policy programme designed to promote social cohesion in metropolitan areas in El Salvador. It started in 2009 and showed effective results until 2014. The first version of the project, *Projóvenes* I (implemented from 2003–2009), covered an area of 13 municipalities in El Salvador (out of 262). Over 50 000 young adults aged between 20 and 25 years benefited from that programme. The UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean estimated that over 350 000 people profit indirectly from the programme (ECLAC, 2017). It is implemented by the National Council of Public Security (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública*) in cooperation with the National Youth Institute (*Instituto Nacional de la Juventud*, or INJUVE). The European Union and the El Salvadorian government funded the programme. To sum up, the main idea of the programme was to mitigate risk factors associated with potential violence and juvenile delinquency, consolidating the capacities for rehabilitation and social violence prevention.

Prevenir

In contrast, *Prevenir* is a public employment programme across the region, providing social, economic and work alternatives and opportunities for people at risk in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. It started in 2009 and will last until 2018. The programme was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung*, or BMZ), financed by the BMZ, Australian Aid and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS, Netherlands) and is executed by the respective governments and the General Secretariat of the Central American Integration System (Prevenir, 2017). The most important aspect of *Prevenir* is a primary prevention strategy mostly for young people at a high risk who have not yet become involved in or experienced violence. The approach is characterised by integrating the complete social environment of young people in violence prevention measures. This means that *Prevenir* promotes cooperation between local communities, youth employment and the employability of socially disadvantaged young people and offers violence prevention in school and out-of-school education. In a nutshell, the programme functions as an intersectional connection between organisations and institutions in selected municipalities throughout the region, preventing

violence by improving work and educational opportunities for young Central Americans.

Target populations for *Prevenir* and *Projóvenes* II

Prevenir's target population is children and young adults who are at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators. A special emphasis lies on single-mother households and families affected by unemployment. Typically, the single mother rules the house and acts as the leading person who works for her children and decides everything in the everyday life of the family. Children have to contribute to supporting their family on a social and economic level. Sons feel the pressure to work, even at a young age (a question of gender roles and masculinity), whereas females are expected to stay at home and care for their siblings and the elderly who live in the same household. As the programme uses an environmental socialisation approach to prevent violence, the target group can also include parents, community members, police officers and teachers who have a certain influence on the youth. Furthermore, considering that gender-based violence is a major problem in Central America, the programme entails a gender perspective, paying special attention to young females' and girls' rights and participative possibilities. Furthermore, it recognises gender disadvantages in employment opportunities and promotes gender equality at workplaces (Prevenir, 2017).

The target population for *Projóvenes* II consisted of young adults from 78 communities in 14 metropolitan municipalities. The chosen communities and neighbourhoods had serious problems with violence and delinquency and were known to be socially excluded. By considering young adults from these areas, the aim was to strengthen the communities from the inside because a crucial aspect of the programme was to motivate young people to assume responsibilities within their environment. This meant that young people were seen as protagonists and the driving force of change and transformation in the spaces they inhabited, with the intention of facilitating interactions between and within their communities and improving community relations in general. The chosen 14 metropolitan municipalities were areas in a very precarious situation, known for their violence and criminality. In general, the 14 municipalities were quite different concerning infrastructure, security and quality of life; however, there were some similarities. All of them were situated around the capital of El Salvador, the area with the highest number of people living in extreme poverty (Savenije & Beltrán, 2012). From an economic and cultural perspective, those 14 municipalities were very important because 70% of private and public investment was located there. Additionally, it was an area with a big cohort of young people (one out of every four people aged 0–29 lives there). This meant that the programme focused on a region in which over half of the population belonged to the target group. No gender preferences concerning the participants were made, even though some individual projects were gender related. Another important aspect was that 34.5% of the population (4–28 year olds) from those municipalities did not study because of work commitments. Unemployment was also an important factor in the communities (Savenije & Beltrán, 2012), underlining the vulnerability of the sector in which the programme took place.

Implementation

In terms of the implementation of the *Projóvenes* Programme II, it is relevant to consider the components of the model of the Social Prevention of Violence Project with Youth Participation (for a more comprehensive description, see Savenije and Beltrán [2012]). This model describes youths as a target group in two ways: on the one hand, they are the beneficiaries of the prevention efforts and, on the other, young people are active participants and actors in the design and implementation of prevention activities. Compared to many other public programmes, this means that young people design their programme according to their needs and expectations. This bottom-up approach expects young people to assume a certain responsibility within their communities, thereby fostering a reciprocal approach to promote social cohesion.

Within this programme, young people could engage as community operators, youth facilitators and volunteers. Those who participated in the project for a relatively long time could become community operators. They received a two-year scholarship to allow them to pursue prevention activities in their neighbourhoods. Part of their preparation consisted of practical training in different issues related to prevention. They also participated in a programme for the social prevention of violence, offered by the National University of El Salvador, and received

an official diploma to certify them as specialists trained in prevention. Community operators were primarily responsible for laying the basis to stimulate improvements in the community. For this task, they were trained in management, planning and the implementation of projects and activities. Youth facilitators were young people who joined the project as volunteers. After participating in the project for at least one year, they could also get a scholarship while dedicating themselves more intensively to prevention activities. The facilitators also received various types of training in the field of prevention, as well as in other topics, depending on the area in which they participated (e.g. sports, environment). Volunteers participated without receiving payment and supported the different activities in their neighbourhood whenever they had the time for it. Several volunteers, some of whom were already adults, also received training on specific topics. Non-governmental organisations, municipal governments, INJUVE and other organisations supported the youths throughout the training and the development of community projects. In return, young people volunteered in these institutions (Savenije & Beltrán, 2014).

The projects fell into different categories: family, sports and recreation, art and culture, and health and environment. One "environment" project, for example, was to restore and clean public places, which enabled the development of communal activities in sports complexes, parks, squares, streets, cultural and community centres. Young people were involved in the administration of these places, with the aim of sustaining the restoration efforts through maintenance, proper use and environmental care. Another project, with a "family" focus, was a scholarship for young single mothers, allowing them to participate in vocational training that would help them find a job (Savenije & Beltrán, 2014).

In total, the programme directly benefited more than 100 000 young people. Various scholarships were given: 1 463 scholarships for business activities, 514 scholarships for social inclusion and 284 scholarships for entrepreneurship. Scholarships amounted to roughly US$125 per month per beneficiary. Additionally, technical, mechanical, cultural and educational ideas were also supported. One particular project included the construction and rebuilding of public sanitary facilities, which are used by 688 000 young adults in the area. Because of the programme's flexibility, the approach included the management of public spaces, vocational training, community and institutional development.

Prevenir has been widely implemented and includes community models of preventive youth work and community police work. The most important models that have been implemented are presented below. It is worth noting that *Prevenir* aims to improve the whole environment of young people at risk.

The first part of the programme is a municipal-level action plan for productive reintegration of youths through employment and small entrepreneurship. This works through an agreement between local authorities, the private sector, the community and gangs, based on a participatory needs assessment. The plan includes a range of complementary activities, such as capacity-building workshops on conflict transformation and a culture of peace for youths involved in violence; arts and cultural activities; and reconstruction and improvement of public spaces (Arévalo de León & Glenda Táger, 2016). Additionally, one part of the programme, called *Miles de Manos* (thousand hands), teaches violence prevention methods at schools and educational centres. Teachers and educators are taught to share peaceful and cooperative solutions to conflicts with their students.

Furthermore, *Prevenir* has had its own digital platform for youth employment opportunities since 2015, called *tuchance.org*. This website shares scholarship offers for education, entrepreneurship and employment options. In order to improve juvenile employability, National Vocational Training Centres offer special courses for the beneficiaries of the programme, including computing and screen-printing (Prevenir, 2017).

The second aspect of *Prevenir* is just as important to prevent violence as youth employment strategies because it focuses on a key conflict figure in El Salvador: the police. *Prevenir's* community-policing model is an approach to sensitise police officers to the causes of violence and the challenges community members face every day. In El Salvador, the community-policing model and the establishment

of local violence prevention committees have become key elements of the National Policy of Justice, Public Security and Social Cohesion. The training in community policing in El Salvador comprises a 10-day training session for all police officers. The training programme, developed by the National Academy of Public Security, emphasises the changes in the approach required by the perspective of prevention. Police officers and agents should be able to understand the causes of violence, respond appropriately to its different forms, and react adequately to different types of public disorder and criminal activity. Community police officers are often confronted with diverse and often contradictory attitudes, perceptions and expectations around citizen security and must often engage in conflict mediation (Bihler, 2015).

The results of *Prevenir* are quite positive. In total, about 48 000 students have benefited from *Prevenir* in El Salvador (24 000 males and 24 000 females). The community-policing model has been implemented in 12% of municipalities in El Salvador, which means that 75% of all police officers have received the training. *Miles de Manos* is part of the educational curriculum in 130 schools and education centres (over 1 884 teachers were trained), reaching about 42 000 children and young adults (equal gender representation). About 2 097 young people between the ages of 15 and 30 have completed a special course at a Vocational Training Centre to improve their employability. Roughly 200 young adults have found an internship in a local company, and more than 2 900 people are registered on the website *tuchance.org* to receive more information on employment and education opportunities. Additionally, two community centres have been equipped with computers and internet access for the young population, making it easier to find jobs online (Prevenir, 2017). It is not clear if the programme prevents violence and facilitates employment in the long run, as it is still a fairly new programme and will continue to run until 2018.

Benefits

Prevenir and *Projóvenes* offer different benefits to basically the same target group, but *Prevenir* is more sensitive towards gender inequalities and *Projóvenes* focuses more on youths from vulnerable metropolitan areas.

Prevenir's main benefit is that it is an integrated approach which sees poverty and violence as a product of the whole environment surrounding children and young adults in El Salvador. This is extremely important given that most public employment programmes concentrate only on the unemployed individual instead of seeing unemployment as a structural problem caused by interactions with family members, police officers, teachers, gang members and community friends. The conventional model of policing, characterised by top-down hierarchical structures with management styles focused on command and control, has been unable to solve the security problems of the communities in Central America. Therefore, the *Prevenir* programme adds huge benefit in broadening police officers' conceptions of security and violence. Additionally, in El Salvador, a decrease in the distrust that existed among police officers, and between police officers and citizens, including youths, was reported (Prevenir, 2017).

According to *Prevenir*-giz, the pedagogical approach in schools to preventing violence (*Miles de Manos*) reduced physical violence against young people by 20% over a period of six months. Communication between teachers and students has improved, and learning and behavioural issues are being resolved as a community (Prevenir, 2017). However, it is unclear if the programme has reduced violent behaviour in general and, if juvenile unemployment rates will decrease in the long run.

As a community work programme, *Projóvenes* was a tool for preventing violence and building safer communities. Its main benefit was social cohesion as all community members were encouraged to get involved in violence prevention initiatives, which is often missing in communities characterised by violence. It was emphasized that it is important for communities affected to work together to address some of the risk factors.

Young adults and children learned to take responsibility for their community during the organised violence prevention projects. Education was emphasized as one of the key outcomes and support for young people to complete schooling, including tertiary education. Training youths methodically and awarding them a formal diploma not only gives them recognition but also prepares

them for the future. At the same time, this kind of recognition generates appreciation in the community and becomes an incentive to continue working with other young people in the neighbourhood. This can create a feeling of belonging, which makes violence between the community members less likely. The success of the programme can be measured by the fact that it was implemented for a second and third time. Additionally, many youth testimonies show that, for the first time, young people felt proud and empowered around their own ideas and dreams.

> *I improved my character. In the past I did not discuss, propose ideas, or talk. Now I don't feel uncomfortable anymore! (Savenije & Beltrán, 2014, p. 13)*

Another benefit is that apparently, only community projects organised by community members can access gang members, who generally do not participate in government public programmes and exclude themselves from public help. According to the testimonies, gang members attended community events if community volunteers invited them:

> *That time about 55–60 people came and half of them were gang members. They recognize the work we do in the community. Before, I had no contact with them. Now we communicate, because they help with the work in the community. (Savenije & Beltrán, 2014, p. 13)*

Gang members joining the community work is a huge benefit of a bottom-up approach like *Projóvenes* II.

The *Projóvenes* programme combined the self-improvement and employability of young people with social prevention work and better living conditions in the community. This leads to social cohesion and probably to less violence, even though this has not been measured in detail.

Limitations

A possible limitation of *Projóvenes* is that bottom-up approaches may let municipalities off the hook in respect of not engaging much with the programme. However, community programmes dealing with children and adolescents need the support and experience of adults in order to solve many of the problems they encounter. Experiences of intimidation or assault, for example, can cause fear, discouragement and even withdrawal from community work. Psychological support is essential, in addition to training. Community leaders and people working in neighbourhood associations or experts in the municipality in the areas of social, community or cultural work can be excellent advisors to youths and should engage actively in the programmes without taking the lead.

Participation of gang members in volunteer work can also be a risk for the community because this implies that gang members can establish more ties with the community. If they gain the upper hand in community work, the programme will not function any more as an empowerment project for children and adolescents, who are at risk of being recruited by youth gangs.[2]

A financial limitation is that the programme never ran independently from external donations. Volunteers could not travel from the places where they lived to the spaces where they carried out their activities without a stipend. They often lacked the resources to pay for their transportation and food while away from home. This financial dependency required constant political support from private and public institutions. Mainly in El Salvador, support for a programme like *Projóvenes* is not very secure because populist tendencies within the population reject giving money to "future criminals" and persons without a proper education and job. Tough-on-crime policies are more popular than community approaches, which makes iron-fist election promises a frequently used tool of El Salvadorian politicians (Falkenburger & Thale, 2006). Therefore, the political climate made this initiative quite vulnerable.

Prevenir's limitations can also be connected to the fact that many persons who live in other areas of the town mistrust people who live in communities. A 10-day workshop for police officers is hardly going to be enough to deconstruct centuries of stigmatisation of young people as criminals. Additionally, the programme does not focus on the suspiciousness

2. This is a problem that German society has to deal with because so-called neo-Nazis tend to engage with social work and community projects in rural areas. In sparsely populated regions, those extremists offer to help in schools as parent assistants, in churches as voluntary workers and in youth organisations as financial and social supporters. The role of neo-Nazi women is very interesting in this case because they are often seen as the "sympathetic and harmless face" of extremism, even though their grassroots engagement sets the baseline for the neo-Nazi ideology. This approach of blending in and supporting social projects while recruiting new members undercover is extremely dangerous. For further readings, see Fischer and Volkmann (2008) or Borstel (2008).

community members tend to have towards the police. Many community members have little confidence in the capacity of police officers to protect children and young people against violence. This is why some communities develop their own community police out of their own members, without any connection to the municipality (Müller, 2010).

Furthermore, *Prevenir* cannot rely on strong government support, which reduces its efficiency on the ground when actions are only connected to foreign investment. El Salvadorians do not see it as an El Salvadorian public programme. Community members, therefore, continue to feel neglected by the government, and this feeling of exclusion continues to be a factor provoking further conflict.

Concerning future or current gang members, this programme does not offer a very comprehensive approach, as gang members are not listed as persons who influence young adults and children. In El Salvador, this does not represent the reality of the people living in the communities. Preventing violence through teachers, family members and police officers is not enough in a country where the backdrop of poverty and the absence of prospects and rights make many marginalised young people see crime, the economic activities of youth gangs and the drug trade as a chance to get ahead. In El Salvador, up to one million people are estimated to be financially dependent on the activities of these gangs. Therefore, a programme which claims to tackle all violence factors and actors that have an impact on the youths cannot exclude gang members, although cooperation might be challenging.

Elements for violence prevention processes

In El Salvador, the lack of employment opportunities, job insecurity and inclusion in low-productivity activities are the main challenges faced by young people when looking for a job. In addition, problems of violence, crime and early drop-out from school complicate young people's chances for future career paths. Youth violence in El Salvador can be attributed to a large variety of factors. Male dominance (machismo), violence as a means of enforcing individual and collective goals, violence in the family setting and against women are culturally acceptable in some cases and widespread. The long-drawn-out civil war has reinforced the culture of violence in El Salvador. Commonly used iron-fist policies that were designed to combat gangs in Central America have even provoked a rise in violence by and against youths and increased the prison population. Almost half of the homicides committed by young people in El Salvador affect those aged 15 to 24 (Arévalo de León & Glenda Táger, 2016). Preventing youth violence at the local level requires different approaches to those used to prevent violence and organised crime by adults. The public policy programmes discussed in this paper recognise the peculiarity of youth violence and choose children and adolescents from vulnerable areas as their target group.

The main elements of violence prevention processes in El Salvador are community-based and integrative approaches. Both can be quite effective in violence prevention because young people's interests and environmental conditions are their starting point.

Prevenir's approach shows an understanding of youths in the communities. Growing up in a context of violence affects the health and development of children and adolescents. These conditions of vulnerability make this segment of the population the most victimised by violence and, at the same time, they generate the violence, resulting in them being both victims and perpetrators at the same time. In this context, criminality becomes a medium for generating resources and illegal activities. Violence essentially functions to preserve illegally generated resources. In addition, violence is a resource that guarantees control of and access to the media. Taking the integral development of a child into account is the main preventive element that *Prevenir* offers. It highlights that violence can only be fought by addressing all the actors that have a negative impact on child development. Unfortunately, the programme does not include El Salvadorian gang members, which in the end makes it less effective for violence prevention. Gang members claim that violence affects them heavily because their families are the ones that suffer most by losing their loved ones (Glenda Táger, 2016). This suggests that there is at least a certain willingness to reduce violence, evidenced through the truce between the *Mara Salvatrucha* and the *Barrio Dieciocho* gangs in 2012 and 2013. Including them in an integrative programme against violence would increase the chances of success and sustainability.

Projóvenes' main preventive element was the community-based solution to unemployment and violence, using a "methodology from below". Empowering social communities in terms of their political impact on human security issues within their communities is important, as it creates an element that many public policy programmes do not consider: trust and support from the target population. In order to prevent violence effectively, trust is a crucial factor as it assures the sustainability of the programme. Additionally, only grassroots projects can empower vulnerable groups, as they have the feeling of helping themselves. This leads to a necessary shift from a negative self-perception to a positive one, which makes it easier to find a job, solve conflicts and reject violence as a means of achieving goals.

To conclude, both programmes included violence prevention elements by focusing on the most vulnerable target group of violence in El Salvador. Both also attempted to tackle violence and unemployment through workshops and training. However, their approaches differed: *Prevenir's* multidimensional approach sensitised many actors around youths and young people themselves, while *Projóvenes* II followed a group empowering approach with individual scholarships connected to community work. Both approaches are crucial for effective and sustainable violence prevention processes.

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CHAPTER 8:
Emergency, Employment and Community Work: Argentina's Programme for Unemployed Heads of Households

Juliana Tappe Ortiz

Introduction

Argentina has always been an important regional power in Latin America. Its massive waves of European immigrants throughout the centuries shaped the country's culture and demography and gave it a special position in Latin America's international affairs. It is the third largest economy in Latin America and a regional pioneer in social policy (Tabbush, 2009). Due to its stability, market size and a growing high-tech sector, Argentina is classified as an upper-medium income economy. Its Human Development Index is very high, at 0.82, just behind Chile (Human Development Report, 2016), which is Latin America's most prosperous nation. Current stagflation and an inflation rate of about 40% may be a legacy of many years of gross economic mismanagement and corruption (OECD, 2017). However, the economy seems to be recovering slowly, with a positive GDP in 2017 (see OECD, 2017).

Historically, Argentinians have experienced extreme left- and right-wing movements, including a military dictatorship. From 1946 to 1955, Juan Domingo Perón created a political movement known as *peronismo*, which entailed nationalising private companies, full employment and better working conditions and wages. However, he isolated Argentina in matters of foreign affairs and his administration engaged in dictatorial rule and organised violence against opponents. The military government from 1976 to 1983 was responsible for the forced "disappearance" of at least 15 000–30 000 left-wing activists and militants, including trade unionists, students, journalists, Marxists, Peronist guerrillas and alleged sympathisers. After the military regime, the country experienced many years of very high inflation, with periodic fiscal and balance-of-payment crises, political instability and a wide variation in policies (from short-lived liberalisations to attempted restoration of interventionist–protectionist regimes), while the economy's competitiveness gradually deteriorated (Maletta, 2009). Mauricio Macri, elected in 2015, is the first democratically elected, non-radical or Peronist president since 1916. In April 2016, the Macri government introduced austerity measures intended to tackle inflation and public deficits.

Concerning violence, Argentina's homicide rates have remained stable since the 1990s. While certain subregions experienced sustained high levels of homicide during the past decade, countries such as Argentina have escaped from the spiral of violence. Even during the 2001/2002 economic collapse violence did not increase, and in 2005 a comparatively low 6.6 homicides per 100 000 inhabitants were registered (World Bank, 2017, a). However, Argentinians tend to feel very insecure. According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (2014), 33.7% of Argentinians rate citizen security as the biggest issue facing the country. This even fuelled a national debate aimed at lowering the age of criminal responsibility in Argentina. A special aspect of violence in Argentina is the growing number of femicides – gender-based violence against women. According to many Argentinian activists, every 30 hours a woman is murdered in Argentina, underlining the culture of violence that still exists in the country (Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, 2017). A movement called *Ni Una Menos* (Not One Less) raises awareness of femicide and asks the authorities to act to combat the country's high female murder rate (Fernandez, 2012).

In general, Argentina is an interesting case for the continent due to its complex history and market size. Its reduction of the unemployment rate from 18.3% in 2001 to 9.2% in 2017 can serve as an example to other countries suffering from economic crises, even though its youth unemployment rate (about 20%) is the highest in Latin America (World Bank, 2017, a). Additionally, Argentina's huge waves of social unrest are a phenomenon that a growing number of countries have to deal with.

Public employment programmes in Argentina

In Latin America, Argentina is still seen as a pioneer in developing social policy that has a universal impact. The government began to play a role as a provider of education in the late nineteenth century, when it created a major nationwide network of public schools. In the mid-1940s, the network extended to the health sector. The Ministry of Health was created and the state assumed a fundamental role not only in providing services, but also in regulating them. The 1940s and 1950s saw the consolidation of a pay-as-you-go pension regime based on intergenerational solidarity. In this context, Argentina has been cited as a paradigmatic example of a Latin American country that succeeded in expanding social protection institutions to a major degree, until the reforms of the 1990s shifted the regime toward the (neo)liberal end of the spectrum (Faur, 2008). This turn led to high levels of informality and Argentina soon became one of the International Monetary Fund's most successful examples of market liberalisation policies. This ended in 2001 when Argentina's financial crisis began. The government's statistics office estimated that the proportion of people living below the poverty line rose from 37% just prior to the crisis (October 2001) to 58% a year later (World Bank, 2003). Furthermore, widespread political and social instability ensued. As an emergency response to the increasing levels of poverty and unemployment, the Argentinian government implemented a public programme for female and male heads of household with no regular income.

Jefes y Jefas

The public programme for unemployed female and male heads of households (*Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados* – hereafter *Jefes y Jefas*) was an emergency massive income transfer implemented in 2002 after the financial collapse in Argentina. The aim of the programme was to provide basic employment and to help families with dependants whose head had become unemployed because of the crisis through direct income support. The programme envisioned guaranteeing the family the right to social inclusion, which meant that beneficiaries had to show that their children were attending school and that their physical condition was checked regularly. Furthermore, beneficiaries themselves were incorporated into community work, vocational or educational training or private companies (Galasso & Ravallion, 2004). The government of Argentina designed the programme with the support of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It was financed with a loan from the World Bank. According to the ILO, the experience revealed the necessity of foreseeing an adequate exit strategy for emergency cash transfer and employment programmes, mainly in countries of the Global South (Maletta, 2009), even though it is not clear if this was a programme of income transfers or employment (Decree 312/02).

Target populations for *Jefes y Jefas*

Jefes y Jefas was especially designed for female and male heads of unemployed households. Therefore, being unemployed was the first condition for eligibility for the programme, which could be attested to through a sworn statement. The second condition was to fulfil at least one of the following criteria: to have children under the age of 18 or disabled individuals of any age, to be pregnant or to have an expectant partner or to be over 60 years old and not receiving any welfare benefits. In the case of having children, applicants had to show proof of their children's school attendance and medical office visits (vaccination, etc.). The third condition was to engage in one of the following activities: a training programme, community work for up to 20 hours per week or work for a private company (Decree 565/2002). People who could not work at all for physical or other reasons were exempted from this condition. Another condition was that participants could not receive money from other state or municipal programmes or entities (Mirza, Lorenzelli & Bango, 2010). The programme targeted the entire Argentinian population, with no gender or origin preference, which meant that males and females from the countryside and the cities were equally eligible for the programme. Future beneficiaries had to register themselves, highlighting the fact that *Jefes y Jefas* was one of few programmes where participants were not chosen but rather encouraged to apply for the programme if they felt eligible.

Implementation

After gathering recommendations from a social dialogue, *Jefes y Jefas* was enacted in March 2002 through an Emergency Executive Decree. The social dialogue included consultative bodies, which were established in townships and cities to advise local authorities about the allocation of benefits to local

applicants. Governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as employers, unions, churches and other social institutions, participated in these consultative councils (Maletta, 2009). It is important to note that the aim of the programme was not to create job opportunities in the long run as it was an emergency programme to prevent extreme poverty in an economic crisis. Therefore, the programme was designed to run for a limited time. However, beneficiaries could stay in the programme until they became ineligible (e.g. by taking formal employment, getting a pension or participating in other public programmes). In early 2009, there were still 500 000 beneficiaries under *Jefes y Jefas,* despite the fact that the unemployment rate had decreased to about 7% (Maletta, 2009). In 2003, new beneficiaries entered the programme, illustrating the emergency characteristics of the programme. In general, the programme's goal was to link beneficiaries with employment programmes. Women, for example, were encouraged to participate in a plan that took into account only their status as mothers, eliminating the "unemployed" aspect considered under *Jefes y Jefas*. Furthermore, the programme promoted entry to the paid labour market (Faur, 2008).

Jefes y Jefas offered its beneficiaries an income transfer of 150 Argentinean pesos per month (US$45), which was three-quarters of the minimum wage at the time. For about 80% of participants, the cash transfer payment came with a work requirement of a total of 20 hours per week in either public or civil society organisations. Public organisations also included community projects, which ranged from local development to childcare and care for the elderly. Some examples are the creation of school kitchens, sewerage and irrigation schemes, and the production of consumable articles for the community. Some participants supported microenterprises such as housing maintenance, carpentry or small metal workshops. Instead of working, they could also invest the same amount of time in education, which could mean going back to school or participating in vocational training (Galasso & Ravallion, 2004). Additionally, beneficiaries had to regularly present certificates of school attendance and medical office visits for children and pregnant women living in the household.

Future beneficiaries had to take the initiative of filling out the paperwork in their administrative district before being chosen for the programme (Neffa, 2009). Eligible candidates who could work then received an assignment to engage in one of six categories: community work, private companies, school, vocational training, microenterprises, and administrative work at municipalities. At the local level, advisory councils assigned the work activities, which were organised by local organisations and municipal administrations (Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa & Maitrot, 2010). The work activities were managed by local governments, NGOs or grassroots organisations that submitted a list of beneficiaries to the Ministry of Labour in order to pay them. Advisory councils or local councils included community representatives, who strengthened civil society organisations' participation at the grassroots level. Furthermore, local councils were responsible for evaluating the proposals for new projects and activities, and helping train organisations and beneficiaries involved in the programme. They also registered irregularities (such as beneficiaries not attending, two or more registrants per household, etc.) and supported the local government's decisions around inclusions and exemptions from the programme (Kostzer, 2008).

The programme was implemented in both centralised and decentralised ways by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Social Security and by job centres at municipal level. The ministry was responsible for direct payments, but the projects were defined at the local level, as were the beneficiaries (Kostzer, 2008). In order to promote the effective implementation of the programme, the national government created the National Council of Administration and Control of the Head of Household Programme, which consisted of three members from each of the following: employers' organisations, worker's organisations, NGOs, religious organisations and the national government. This council had a political role rather than a concrete task and was often cited as the institution to guarantee transparency.

Evaluations of the *Jefes y Jefas* programme show that it was a massive intervention, benefiting 1.6 million households in Argentina. This means that it covered 16% of the overall country households, but regional differences are high. In some provinces, such as Formosa, Chaco and Jujuy, 40% of households were reached. However, the results highlight that

the eligibility criteria were not rigorously enforced because the administrators were not able to check whether an applicant was really a head of household or not. Consequently, 57% of the beneficiaries were married and not heads of households (Galasso & Ravallion, 2004).

According to 2005 data regarding age and skills, 18.2% of the beneficiaries were young people with medium-high educational levels and some work skills; 20.1% were young adults with medium-low educational levels and no work skills; 30.3% were older adults with low educational levels and no work skills; and 34.4% were economically inactive or over 60 years of age, mostly women (Faur, 2008).

The most interesting aspect of the results is in relation to gender – the proportion of female beneficiaries increased continuously and reached 72% in 2006 (Tabbush, 2009). Galasso and Ravallion (2004) concluded that the average participant was female, 36 years old, married, not a head of household and had eight years of schooling. This is particularly relevant considering that scholars have highlighted that unemployment in Argentina falls disproportionately on youth in general (both sexes) and on women (all ages) (Rabi, 2011). However, the difference between male and female participation may be attributed to cultural facts, such as stigmatisation of males who claim unemployment benefits. Furthermore, many men have occasional jobs in the informal sector which are better paid than the "wages" in the plan (Kostzer, 2008).

Concerning the work opportunities that beneficiaries engaged in, 60% worked in community projects and, only about 10% participated in educational or vocational training (Chakrabarti, 2012).

In terms of unemployment, the pre-crisis baseline survey for October 2001 shows that 43% of participants had been employed a year earlier, 38% were inactive and 19% were unemployed. In comparison, figures for October 2002 show that most participants engage in work opportunities through the programme (Chakrabarti, 2012). However, scholars argue that those results should not be overestimated because it cannot be assumed that all *Jefes y Jefas* beneficiaries would otherwise have been unemployed. Nonetheless, the programme reduced Argentina's unemployment rate by an estimated 2.5 percentage points, which is still an impressive number. *Jefes y Jefas* tended to have a positive opportunity cost for participants, consistent with the work requirement being binding for many participants. This means that the working costs and other requirements were not too high in relation to the benefits participants would receive.

The programme had a small effect on the overall poverty rate and a slightly larger impact on the incidence of extreme poverty. Beneficiary data show that the programme really did support the poor, as 93.3% of recipients were poor and 57.3% were indigent. In 94% of beneficiary households, there were children under 18 years of age, and in 25% there were at least four children under 18. Therefore, in terms of poverty, the programme helped an extra 2% of the population to afford the food component of Argentina's poverty line (Tcherneva & Wray, 2005). A degree of protection from extreme poverty was also achieved. Moreover, without the programme, an estimated 10% of the participants would have fallen below the food poverty line (Galasso & Ravallion, 2004).

In general, the Argentinean economy recovered significantly during the period 2002–2006. The three million unemployed in 2003 were reduced to 1.3 million in 2006. This was not only due to the implementation of the Jefes y Jefes model, however, but also through huge economic reforms (for further details concerning the economy, see Kostzer [2008]).

Benefits

Many of *Jefes y Jefas'* benefits became visible shortly after implementing the programme. First, paid community work increases community identification and civic participation. Furthermore, many activities (e.g. environmental clean-ups, childcare, soup kitchens) that are often not in the purview of profit-making enterprises are projects and services that communities need in order to improve their living conditions. Converting these activities into government-funded jobs is a huge benefit for many individuals in the communities and the beneficiaries themselves, as workplaces are close and often more flexible than in the private sector. Asking beneficiaries to work in their own environment proved to be a more viable strategy than requiring their participation

in the labour market – largely because insertion in the labour market requires access to childcare services. In the communities, many beneficiaries' children were in daycare, which was provided by other community members on a voluntary basis (Tcherneva & Wray, 2005). Additionally, many women already worked for their communities without being paid and could now "register" their work and support their families with the cash transfer. This may also explain the high number of women participating in the programme. Paid community work can apparently provoke a dynamic of caring for each other and sharing responsibilities and opportunities within the community.

Second, the *Jefes y Jefas* programme improved some aspects concerning access to work. Almost 30% of skilled workers who had lost their jobs were reintegrated into formal labour (Chakrabarti, 2012). Furthermore, the programme was particularly appealing to family members who wished to increase their labour supply but had few market opportunities. In this case, mothers often wanted to work, but due to their lack of work experience and their responsibilities at home, the market did not offer them many jobs. The programme also promoted entrepreneurship through its vocational training, which entailed a subprogramme facilitating and supporting the start of microbusinesses by beneficiaries, so allowing some to leave the programme and become microentrepreneurs (Maletta, 2009).

Third, the programme showed that implementation at the local level was possible, which was unprecedented in the history of public policy programmes in Argentina. The *Jefes y Jefas* programme was more transparent and efficient than many of the top-down approaches implemented by the government in recent years. It also improved citizens' opinions of the state – many Argentinians, mainly in the countryside, had been feeling neglected by politicians' decisions concerning the economy and policies (Repetto, Potenza Dal Masetto & Vilas, 2005). In general, the emergency programme helped many Argentinians to maintain their living conditions during a severe economic crisis, protecting them from extreme poverty. Some even improved their standard of living by finding a job in the private or public sector. An important factor is that the programme took into account that community work is a huge benefit for social cohesion in communities. Participation increases if this work is paid, which has the double effect of improving the environment of many persons living in poor conditions.

Limitations

Given its "emergency" nature, the *Jefes y Jefas* programme had many limitations. The programme's impact on the financial aspect of poverty was minor and its effect on structural unemployment is uncertain as it is not clear whether it really generated new jobs (Pi Alperin, 2007). Apparently, the programme did not tackle unemployment at its roots because it did not really help beneficiaries to find a job in the private or public sector. Many middle-aged Argentinians and/or those who had been in formal jobs before, perceived the projects within the programme as a temporary alternative and felt that the longer they were in the programme, the more difficult it would become for them to return to the kinds of jobs they had once held (Chakrabarti, 2012). The programme did not prepare the beneficiaries to leave the programme by educating or training them, and neither did it create new opportunities, vocational programmes or workplaces. This was exacerbated by the programme's gradual deactivation, which left many people back where they had started (Golbert, 2004). In order to be more effective, the programme should have included the private sector and encouraged private employers to hire beneficiaries (this would have translated into a continuance of the benefit as a wage subsidy, at least for a while). However, at the time of the programme's inception, the private sector was shedding workers and in no position to hire beneficiaries, which explains why only 30% of the beneficiaries found a job (Maletta, 2009).

Many beneficiaries were reluctant to leave the programme in order to engage in activities such as seasonal work, for example in the agricultural sector, given that this kind of work usually only lasts for a few weeks or a couple of months (Kostzer, 2008. In addition, seasonal work can generally be criticised for not protecting workers' rights.

Another problem concerned the target population, as many beneficiaries were apparently not really heads of households. In a country with a huge informal sector, criteria other than a simple sworn statement have to be used to verify unemployment. It is mainly

men who tend to work in the informal sector, which explains why their wives registered for the programme and seemed to be eligible (Galasso & Ravallion, 2004). Some scholars argue that the beneficiaries' ages and the number of children they had were not properly considered. According to them, families with more children should have received more money and very old people who were not considered by any public help should have been included in the *Jefes y Jefas* target group (Neffa, 2009; Mirza, Lorenzelli & Bango, 2010).

Additionally, the amount of money was not sufficient to cover the basic food needs of a family during a time of inflation. Thus, its impact, though representing an improvement for beneficiary households, was not decisive. It excluded a large proportion of poor and indigent households and those who did gain access to benefits did not benefit from a broad range of social protections but rather received only a monetary payment with no broader entitlements (Faur, 2008).

The gender bias was also a huge limitation of the programme, which was designed without considering gender as an important factor in relation to (un) employment. However, the participation of more women than men in the programme shows the need for such a gender perspective (Pautassi, 2003). The work performed by the female beneficiaries represented care responsibilities at the community level. Men worked primarily in construction or maintenance of local or community facilities, a division of labour that reinforced deeply rooted gender stereotypes. The programme did not encourage women to find jobs beyond their comfort zone. Additionally, it did not motivate women to participate in vocational training or education. In respect of the private employers, the programme did not raise gender awareness by tackling stereotypes through educating businessmen, and therefore the private sector continued to see women's work as unworthy of remuneration (Tcherneva & Wray, 2005). This means that women not only experienced difficulties in accessing formal work but even for those who did access paid work, close to 60% returned to the *Jefes y Jefas* programme within three months (Tabbush, 2009). Furthermore, women and families did not receive any type of childcare assistance or services. "None of the plan's provisions dealt with this problem, which the state must address if it is to help 'unemployed female heads of household', escape poverty" (Faur, 2008, 29). Moreover, no strategy was created to cover these needs through services that might be provided by other programme beneficiaries. Despite this, women automatically helped one another, for example, in terms of childcare, as noted earlier.

Elements for violence prevention processes

The *Jefes y Jefas* programme did not have a special focus on violence. However, it served as an appeasement programme, calming the massive wave of social unrest. Argentinians have a history of protest, but in 2001 the protests were particularly marked due to the economic crisis and the third year of recession. The predominantly middle-class uprising against the government demanded mainly government subsidies and other welfare measures. They blocked highways and withdrew millions of pesos and dollars from their accounts, which would eventually have resulted in the collapse of Argentina's entire banking system. During the protests, violence between the police and protesters increased. Therefore, the programme can be seen as a response to the violence of the protesters.

It is doubtful whether the programme actually prevents violence, and it did not use its regional potential to engage in educational opportunities. For example, considering the level of gender-based violence in Argentina, the programme could have offered workshops around stereotypes and gender hierarchies. In spite of the fact that it was a programme for male and female heads of households, it did not consider possible challenges faced by mothers, which typically differ from male experiences. Furthermore, it did not take into account that in order to improve female employment possibilities, a much-needed discussion with private entities about gender roles was necessary.

In general, protests and violent manifestations continue to be social phenomena with which Argentina's government struggles. In order to actively prevent violence, public policy programmes have to change social inequalities and disadvantages from the bottom. Concerning gender interventions, the *Jefes y Jefas* programme could have set a precedent in the country, and there is still need for improvement if the programme aims to tackle poverty and unemployment.

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CHAPTER 9:
The Public Employment Programme in Response to Greece's Debt Crisis

Buyisile Mncina

A Brief background of Greece

Greece is located in the south-eastern part of Europe. It covers an area of 132 049km2 and consists of 13 regions. The capital city is Athens. Greece has a growing population of 11 million people – 14% of the population is under the age of 15, with 66.2% being between the ages of 15 and 64 years (Statista, 2017).

Historically, Greece was one of the most developed European countries until its debt crisis in 2009 (Lyberaki & Tinios, 2014). Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund supported the Greek government to implement certain austerity measures, but despite this, its financial debt crisis continued (Lyberaki & Tinios, 2012). The persistent debt crisis led to job losses amongst both skilled and unskilled individuals and increased the rate of unemployment. The long-term unemployment rate in 2015 was 18.2%, and the unemployment rate for young people below 25 years of age was nearly 50% (Lieuw-Kie-Song, 2017).

Kinofelis

Due to the high rate of unemployment, the government of Greece formulated policies and measures aimed at tackling unemployment. One such public works programme is the Kinofelis job creation programme. According to Philip (2017) and Lieuw-Kie-Song(2017), the Kinofelis programme aims to achieve the following goals:

- creating short-term job opportunities for unemployed individuals;
- providing unemployed individuals with new marketable skills;
- integrating unemployed individuals into new job opportunities through the acquisition of new skills.

On the whole, short-term job opportunities are aimed at mitigating the negative impact of long-term unemployment.

Profile of participants

In total, 76 957 participants[3] have taken part in the programme (Philip, 2017). Kinofelis is different from other public employment programmes (PEPs), which tend to target people with no skills. The participants in the Kinofelis programme are individuals with high degree qualifications and many years of work experience. The participants work in various projects in the municipality. Municipalities identify possible projects that need to be undertaken and the skills required for such projects to be completed. Proposals for these projects are submitted to the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity, which uses its database to recruit unemployed people who possess the skills required for a specific project. The Ministry pays salaries[4] while municipalities are responsible for providing workers with the tools and materials needed to complete the work. The fact that highly skilled individuals get recruited has helped to improve the quality of services offered by the municipality. Individuals working in the projects are also able to transfer their skills to unskilled individuals working as assistants in some of the projects (Lieuw-Kie-Song, 2017; Philip, 2017).

Common projects undertaken in the Kinofelis

Many projects undertaken involve the upgrading of municipality services, such as fixing public places, parks and pavements, as well as social and health services, including mentoring and counselling services (Philip, 2017). All these services are provided by qualified and skilled individuals, such as civil engineers, technicians, social workers, psychologists and other professionals who lost their jobs due to the financial crisis (Philip, 2017). These professionals temporarily work in the PEP while looking for other, better-paying job opportunities. This ensures that there is no erosion of skills and that professionals use

3. No gender demographics regarding participants in the programme were available at the time of writing.
4. No information was available about the payment that participants receive.

their existing skills for the benefit of communities also affected by the financial crisis.

Strengths of the Kinofelis programme

Not much has yet been written about the Kinofelis programme, as it was only implemented in July 2016. Despite this, the programme has shown some benefits, according to Philip (2017). Unemployed individuals recruited are aligned with their existing skills. As a result, unemployed individuals are given the opportunity to work within their area of expertise. Prior work experience is recognised and acknowledged. This has helped to improve the quality of services provided (Philip, 2017).

Limitations

Many people are struggling to exit the programme as the Greek economy has not yet recovered to reabsorb all the individuals who have lost their jobs (Ministry of Labour, 2014). Participants can only work in the programme for five to eight months, after which time they need to exit the programme. Kinofelis does provide some temporary relief, but long-term solutions need to be explored. The reskilling of participants is important in order to increase their employability in the wider labour market (Philip, 2017).

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CHAPTER 10:
Concluding remarks: Similarities, Differences, Strengths and Weaknesses of Public Employment Programmes

Vicky Talbot and Malose Langa

In their work, Lieuw-Kie-Song and Philip (2010) discuss the destructive effects of unemployment and underemployment on a social and human level. The impacts of unemployment are vast and harmful (Jacob, 2008; Karera, 2012; Shah & Mohanty, 2010). Some of the social impacts of unemployment include poverty and inequality, hunger, homelessness, substance abuse, gangster lifestyles, health impacts, domestic violence, unstructured daily life, alienation and exclusion, stress and depression (Philip, 2017).

Unemployment is not uncommon, and countries and people worldwide are suffering the consequences (Bozzoli, Brück & Wald, 2013; Breitkreuz, Pattison-Williams, King, Mishra & Swallow, 2017; Elima, 2015; Jacob, 2008). A primary strategy to manage high rates of unemployment involves both the private and the public sector creating jobs. However, this is not reliable, and marginalised areas are often the last to be reached through this strategy (Philip, 2017). As the chapters in this report have shown, it is those marginalised areas where unemployment severely damages the individual, the community and the broader social context. Public employment programmes (PEPs) offer a strategy in this regard, being implemented with the aim of reducing unemployment and its numerous and devastating effects.

Philip (2017) refers to unused labour as a "dead asset", and although labour may have no market value, it can certainly have both economic and social value, which is essential in communities where structural unemployment is a reality. PEPs can play a significant role in this respect. They move away from giving people the right to work when that work is available, instead offering jobs when work is needed. This is crucial when one considers that, globally, the number of people needing jobs exceeds the work that is available (Philip, 2017). Furthermore, this approach prioritises people's needs, thus addressing human rights (Philip, 2017).

PEPs are vast in their implementation, the projects undertaken as well as their impact at the level of both the individual and the community, as illustrated in the discussions in this volume. Across the various PEPs discussed in this report, similarities, differences, strengths and weaknesses can be found. Tables 1 and 2 highlight the similarities and differences across the PEPs, and the strengths and weaknesses, respectively, followed by brief explanatory discussions. Table 1 looks at the reason for each PEP's conception, the target populations,

Table 1: Similarities and differences across the PEPs discussed in this report

COLUMBIA

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT) **Young Rural Entrepreneurs Programme (JRE)**	▪ Violence ▪ Unemployment - Conflict - Drug trade	**PNCRT** ▪ Communities ▪ Municipalities with a low presence of state institutions, illicit economies and history of armed conflict **JRE** ▪ Individuals ▪ Unemployed youth (16–35 years of age) from low-income households ▪ Majority rural areas ▪ Impoverished, vulnerable people	**PNCRT** ▪ Eviction of non-state actors ▪ Eliminate illicit coca plants ▪ Infrastructure improve- ments ▪ State representation ▪ Policy improvement **JRE** ▪ Entrepreneurship programmes (agricultural, livestock, fisheries) ▪ Agro-forestry ▪ Rural trade and services ▪ Businesses and plans managed ▪ Skill gain	**PNCRT** ▪ Decreased financial support for armed actors ▪ Increased job creation **JRE** ▪ Increase of entrepreneurial activities in rural areas ▪ Low dropout rate ▪ Rural migration continues despite JRE goals

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Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
***Projóvenes* Programme II (Social Prevention of Violence Project with Youth Participation)** ***Prevenir* (Preventing)**	▪ Youth gang violence ▪ Unemployment	***Projóvenes* II** ▪ Children and young adults (10–35 years of age) ▪ 78 communities ▪ 14 vulnerable municipalities ▪ No gender preferences ***Prevenir*** ▪ Children and young adults (10–30 years of age) ▪ Children from vulnerable households ▪ Parents ▪ Community members ▪ Police officers ▪ Teachers ▪ Young females and girls	***Projóvenes* II** ▪ Vocational training for young, single mothers ▪ Sports and recreation ▪ Art and culture ▪ Health and environment (e.g. restore and clean public spaces) ▪ Construction of facilities ▪ Young people as community operators, youth facilitators and volunteers ▪ Youth scholarships and training ***Prevenir*** Municipal level: ▪ Youth employment ▪ Small entrepreneurship ▪ Capacity-building workshops ▪ Arts and cultural activities - Reconstructing public spaces ▪ Violence prevention education ▪ Digital platform offered Police level: ▪ Community-policing model 10-day training for officers - Violence - Community challenges	***Projóvenes* II** ▪ Benefited >100 000 young people ▪ Constructed facilities benefiting >650 000 children and young adults ▪ Implemented three times ***Prevenir*** ▪ Approximately 48 000 students benefited (equal number of males and females) ▪ 75% of police officers trained ▪ Over 1 800 teachers trained ▪ About 42 000 children and young adults educated (equal male/female split) ▪ Internships for young adults ▪ Large use of digital platform

ARGENTINA

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
Jefes y Jefas **(The public programme for unemployed female and male heads of households)**	▪ Poverty and unemployment post-2001 financial collapse	▪ Entire Argentinian population ▪ Female and male heads of unemployed households, meeting at least one set criterion	▪ Community work/projects - e.g. child and elderly care, school kitchens, irrigation schemes, ▪ Private companies ▪ Schools ▪ Vocational training ▪ Microenterprises - e.g. Carpentry and metal workshops	▪ 16% of the country covered ▪ 1.6 million households benefited ▪ Continuous increase of female beneficiaries ▪ Small effect on overall poverty ▪ Significant effect on extreme poverty ▪ 3 million unemployed (2003) ▪ 1.3 million unemployed (2006)

KENYA

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
Kazi Kwa Vijana **(KKV – Work for Youth)**	▪ Youth unemployment ▪ Poverty ▪ Hunger ▪ Post-2007 election violence	▪ Youth (18–35 years of age) ▪ Male and female ▪ Urban and rural communities	▪ Small-scale manual projects: ▪ Operating water kiosks ▪ Developing and implementing waste management systems ▪ Repairing and maintaining access roads ▪ Constructing small dams ▪ Desilting dams ▪ Rehabilitating and constructing water pans ▪ Clearing roads ▪ Building classrooms ▪ Rehabilitating irrigation systems ▪ Pipe laying and sanitation ▪ Block construction ▪ Garbage collection ▪ Cleaning clogged drains in the slums ▪ Establishing nurseries ▪ Planting seedlings ▪ Digging ponds ▪ Cleaning the Nairobi River - Constructing roads within the city	▪ Majority males ▪ Reduced youth unemployment ▪ Enduring impact through acquiring credit and small businesses ▪ Minimal benefit by youth in certain divisions ▪ High rate of youth unemployment endures

ETHIOPIA

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)	▪ Poverty ▪ Hunger and starvation ▪ Chronic food security crisis	▪ Eight principal regions ▪ Chronically food-insecure households ▪ Households with severe asset loss ▪ Landless people ▪ Female-headed house-holds ▪ Households with no family support	▪ Biophysical soil and water conservation ▪ Forestry ▪ Forage and pasture development ▪ Water projects ▪ Small-scale irrigation ▪ Community road construction and rehabilitation ▪ Social infrastructure rehabilitation ▪ Health, nutrition, hygiene, community behaviour change	▪ Largest social protection programme in sub-Saha-ran Africa ▪ 6.5 million beneficiaries ▪ Cash or an equivalent payment in food ▪ Provision of food ▪ Bridging the food gap ▪ Consumption support ▪ Participants largely from male-headed households

SOUTH AFRICA

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
Community Work Programme (CWP)	▪ Unemployment ▪ Skill development	▪ Unemployed South African citizens ▪ 18 years of age or older	▪ Care work: - The elderly, sick, and child-headed households ▪ Working in schools: - Cleaning schools - Assisting pupils - Dealing with issues of safety, violence and crime ▪ Assisting victims of violence ▪ Cleaning the environment: - Cutting long grass - Clearing drains - Planting trees - Cleaning streets ▪ Crime and violence reduction - Cutting grass - Fixing street lights - Patrols - Awareness campaigns for school pupils	▪ More than 240 000 participants ▪ 75% female, 25% male participants

INDIA

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)	▪ Unemployment in rural areas ▪ Poverty ▪ Overcrowding ▪ High crime rates ▪ Uphold the right to work	▪ Unemployed adults ▪ Live in a rural area ▪ Willing to do unskilled manual labour ▪ Aim to recruit more women than men	▪ Water and soil conservation ▪ Land development ▪ Water harvesting and water conservation - Digging new tanks and ponds ▪ Infrastructure development - Road construction - Paving - Drainage systems ▪ Farm work - Ploughing and harvesting	▪ Implemented across all states ▪ Work to 57.8 million adults (40% male, 60% female) ▪ Guaranteed 100 days of work per year ▪ Creation of durable assets ▪ Supplementing land and water resources

GREECE

Name of PEP	Reason for conception	Target population	Project description	Programme impact
Kinofelis **(Public benefit job creation programme)**	▪ Massive unemployment ▪ Poverty ▪ Income inequality following the financial crisis	▪ Skilled and unskilled individuals ▪ Gender differences unclear	▪ Upgrading municipality services - Fixing public places ▪ Social and health services - Mentoring - Counselling ▪ Environmental activities	▪ 45 225 beneficiaries ▪ Implemented in July 2016 - Impact to be seen ▪ Social impact

Multiple commonalities exist between the PEPs, across the four factors represented in Table 1. It is not surprising that the reasons for each PEP's conception overlap to a great extent. In particular, unemployment is a leading reason in all countries for the initiation of the programmes, and although the PSNP is guided by easing poverty, hunger and starvation, these elements cannot be dissociated from unemployment, as has been noted. Poverty similarly directs many of the PEPs, specifically *Jefes y Jefas*, KKV, PSNP, Kinofelis and MGNREGA, and where not stated explicitly, it is perhaps safe to assume that where unemployment is rife, poverty follows. Violence is a further motivation for PEPs, a specific focus for Columbia, El Salvador, Kenya and India. A focus on youth and skills development is an element of many PEPs (JRE, *Projóvenes* II, *Prevenir* and the CWP) whereas the movement towards achieving the fundamental right to work is central to that of the MGNREGA. The latter would be a valuable primary motivation across every PEP.

The target populations for each PEP can all be described as vulnerable in certain respects. Unemployed individuals are targeted, ranging from youth to middle-aged adults. In El Salvador, the two PEPs stand apart in their inclusion of children in their programmes. Rural areas are a key focus for a number of the PEPs. Although females and males are both targeted, for some PEPs, females are the primary focus given the complex inequality they face. Unemployed individuals targeted in Greece stand apart from those in the other PEPs in that many of them are highly skilled professionals and experts in their fields. As discussed, this offers a great benefit to the communities and to unemployed participants who are able to gain skills.

Although the projects implemented under each programme vary, there are many intersections across the work done. These include the rehabilitation and construction of diverse infrastructure, entrepreneurship programmes, and environmental work such as conservation, water management and forestry, which typically require manual labour. Interestingly, in *Prevenir* and CWP, projects aimed specifically at crime and violence prevention were implemented. Once again, certain projects implemented as part of the Kinofelis PEP differ significantly, where services could be offered on a professional basis (e.g. psychologists). This speaks to the position of Greek citizens prior to the country's debt crisis, with the majority seeming to be educated, skilled and employed. This stands in contrast to the position of beneficiaries in the other PEPs, for whom education, equality, skills development and employment opportunities have been limited, if at all present.

The PEPs had their own unique impacts across diverse areas but key similarities are certainly evident, particularly given the common impetus of high unemployment rates. Each PEP had a positive impact on unemployment but differed in the extent to which it achieved this. India's MGNREGA stands out in this regard, having benefited close to 60 million adults. However, it is necessary to take into consideration the duration of each PEP when comparing their respective impacts. Increased job creation is a significant impact, having far-reaching effects on many levels, as discussed in the respective chapters. Multiple examples are evident of the impact the PEPs had, or continue to have, other than increased job creation. The beneficiaries of these programmes experienced other gains on an individual and community level, with social and economic value being cultivated for them. For example, improved empowerment, self-sufficiency, dignity, purpose and social cohesion are a few of the broader effects of the PEPs. These impacts do not signal the eradication of poverty, unemployment and violence, which remain evident in the countries. However, they signal a change in the right direction. It is worth remembering that some of the PEPs are still in progress, and their impact is not yet conclusive.

Table 2 Strengths, weaknesses and impact on violence prevention of each PEP

COLUMBIA

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
PNCRT ▪ Bottom-up approach ▪ Delivered public and private goods ▪ Improved infrastructure ▪ Investment ▪ Food security ▪ Job opportunities for many men ▪ Lowered human rights violations ▪ Increased security through military ▪ Economic development ▪ Empowerment	**PNCRT** ▪ Continued financial support for armed actors ▪ Ministries did not engage ▪ Military involvement remains high ▪ Increased risk of human rights violations by military ▪ Sense of exclusion provokes violence ▪ Individual municipality characteristics ignored	**PNCRT** ▪ Military provides security (however, conflicting perspectives) ▪ Minimisation of illicit trade might prevent violence ▪ Increased self-esteem can lessen violent behaviour ▪ Empowerment
JRE ▪ Participatory approach ▪ Increased entrepreneurship in rural areas ▪ Low dropout rate ▪ Flexibility ▪ Positive effect on graduates' income ▪ Successful job seeking for graduates ▪ Improved skills ▪ Improved self-esteem ▪ Networking ▪ Generational benefit ▪ Empowerment	**JRE** ▪ Rural migration still common ▪ No gender perspective ▪ Male-focused entrepreneurship ▪ Group identities ignored ▪ Links with private economies ignored	**JRE** ▪ Most vulnerable group addressed ▪ Work alternatives to illegal economies ▪ Increased self-esteem ▪ Empowerment

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Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
***Projóvenes* II** ▪ Bottom-up approach ▪ Social cohesion ▪ Community assuming responsibility ▪ Future preparation ▪ Sense of belonging ▪ Violence less likely ▪ A programme from youths for youths ▪ Pride and empowerment	***Projóvenes* II** ▪ Limits on job seeking ▪ Limited municipality engagement ▪ Lack of guidance from adults ▪ Potential for recruitment for youth gangs ▪ Continual reliance on external donations	***Projóvenes* II** ▪ Focus on most vulnerable target group of violence ▪ Workshops and training around violence ▪ Group empowering approach ▪ Gang members partaking in community work ▪ Potential of social cohesion to decrease violence ▪ Fostered trust and support help to prevent violence ▪ Rejection of violence to achieve goals given ▪ Self-sufficiency ▪ Conflict management
Prevenir ▪ Participatory ▪ Integrated approach across poverty, violence and the environment ▪ Unemployment as a structural problem ▪ Broadened conceptions of security and violence ▪ Decrease in distrust ▪ Decrease in school violence ▪ Improved teacher–student communication ▪ Learning and behavioural issues being resolved ▪ About 42 000 children and young adults educated ▪ Equal representation of males and females	***Prevenir*** ▪ Unclear about long-term decrease in youth unemployment rates ▪ Extremely brief 10-day workshop for police ▪ Unaddressed community suspicions of the police ▪ Limited government support - Community members feel neglected - Promotion of conflict - Vague approach to gang members - Neglects a significant crime factor	***Prevenir*** ▪ Focus given to most vulnerable target group of violence ▪ Workshops and training around violence ▪ Unclear as it is still a fairly new programme and will continue to run until 2018 ▪ Gang members excluded as a violence factor

ARGENTINA

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
▪ Maintenance of living conditions despite economic crises ▪ Social cohesion ▪ Participants encouraged to apply, not chosen ▪ Broad age range of beneficiaries ▪ Community identification and civic participation ▪ Improved living conditions ▪ Close and flexible workplaces ▪ Daycare for beneficiaries' children ▪ Unpaid work replaced with cash transfers ▪ Reintegration of skilled workers into formal labour ▪ Promotion of entrepreneurship ▪ Transparency and efficiency ▪ Continuous increase of female beneficiaries	▪ Eligibility criteria poorly enforced ▪ Minor impact on financial poverty ▪ Job creation questionable ▪ Unemployment not approached from its roots ▪ Considered a temporary alternative ▪ Difficult to re-enter past jobs ▪ No exit strategy ▪ No creation of new opportunities, vocational programmes or workplaces ▪ Gradual deactivation left many in the same position ▪ Beneficiaries reluctant to engage in seasonal work ▪ Families with more children did not receive more money ▪ The elderly not considered by public health were not included ▪ The exclusion of many poor and indigent households ▪ Gender bias - Gender not considered important in unemployment - Gender stereotypes reinforced by male-dominated activities - Women remained within their comfort zone regarding jobs - No gender awareness raised for private employers ▪ Small effect on overall poverty: Extra 2% could afford food component of poverty line	▪ Possible response to the violence of the protesters ▪ Prevention of violence doubtful ▪ No engagement with gender-based violence issues ▪ No consideration of challenges faced by mothers

KENYA

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
▪ Improvement in beneficiaries' lives ▪ Steady income (low) ▪ Capital gain ▪ New business creation, long-term impact ▪ Economic empowerment through credit facilities ▪ Increased employability through skill transfer ▪ Opportunities to enter the labour market ▪ Potential for permanent job creation	▪ Gender bias - No specific provision made for women, despite higher rates of unemployment in this cohort - Gender imbalance despite gender parity objective - Activities of KKV bar women from participation ▪ Inadequate wage rate ▪ Delayed payment of wages ▪ Government intentions were not achieved ▪ Implementation drawbacks - Ineffective planning - Top-down approach - Lack of community participation and sense of ownership - Passive participation ineffective in reducing poverty - Lack of empowerment - First come, first served agenda - Neglect of poor households - Corrupt recruitment - Perceived misappropriation of funds - Power dynamics ▪ Short-term focus of projects, ▪ Elimination of unemployment unlikely ▪ No exit strategies ▪ Employability beyond KKV difficult	▪ Higher crime rates prior to KKV acknowledged ▪ Improved livelihoods ▪ Reduction of crime within the slums ▪ Former militia and gang members planned involvement in KKV ▪ Male gendered expectations met and as a result, reduces their involvement in crime

ETHIOPIA

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
▪ Participatory, grassroots approach ▪ Male and female beneficiaries ▪ Household participation in the national economy through credit access ▪ Active participation of beneficiaries ▪ Continuity during agricultural slack season through continued income ▪ Children's welfare and rights upheld ▪ No interference with beneficiaries' education ▪ Female empowerment - Economic advancement - Power and agency ▪ Enhanced community-level infrastructure ▪ Environmental transformation ▪ Household benefit - Improved food security for families - Asset creation and protection - Education and health services - Improved agricultural productivity ▪ Approximately 2 million individuals able to meet food needs for one year and withstand moderate economic shock ▪ Graduation approach - Responsibility, self-reliance, participation, capability - Social benefits: - Children remain in school rather than labour - Female empowerment – equality - Male dignity fostered through providing in their homes	▪ Manual labour required ▪ Gender concerns - Workload - Managing domestic and childcare responsibilities with work ▪ Potential disincentive to engage in new income-generating activities ▪ Cash transfers - Delayed payments - No restriction of where money is redirected - Global and domestic markets which limit cash transfers (risk during famine or hiked food prices) ▪ Food transfers - Potentially unsuitable for consumption after shipping	▪ No specific focus on violence prevention ▪ Impact on crime hypothesised ▪ Decreased frustration limits violence ▪ Increased sense of security provided ▪ Obtaining an income through crime unnecessary ▪ Active participation by community members - Improved gender relations ▪ Participants largely from male-headed households

SOUTH AFRICA

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
▪ Operates across the country ▪ Contributions to the public good, community goods or social services ▪ Participatory, grassroots approach ▪ Work takes place in participants' communities ▪ Women able to supplement their income ▪ Regular part-time work ▪ Working relationships between participants, local stakeholders and government d epartments ▪ Exit strategy: - Additional income-generating projects started ▪ Enhancement of social relations and social cohesion	▪ Lack of a clear exit strategy - Temporary nature of programme lost ▪ 75% female, 25% male participants - Many types of work considered feminine - Few men wanting to do this work - Real" work involves leaving the community to go to a place of work - Men doing CWP work not regarded highly (stigmatisation) - Payment considered inadequate to support families ▪ Payment considered adequate by women to support families ▪ Role of the Local Reference Committee, made up of multiple local stakeholders, in project implementation	▪ Potential for crime and violence prevention ▪ Underlying and direct causes of violence given attention ▪ Facilitates economic inclusion ▪ Projects aimed at reducing crime and violence - Evidence that these helped reduce crime - Public awareness raised through campaigns ▪ Social cohesion plays a role in violence prevention ▪ Programme provides a model to restore agency to the community - Address concerns - Act collectively to address violence

INDIA

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
▪ Largest PEP in the world ▪ Work is close to home ▪ Commuters' allowance provided for travel ▪ Participatory approach ▪ Work identified according to the economic, social and environmental benefits ▪ Targeted women - Financial independence - First-time workers, widows and the elderly were able to work - Actively participated - Heard and valued - Empowered - Increased education among children of working mothers ▪ Management of corruption ▪ Realisation of constitutional rights for rural citizens ▪ Transparency and accountability ▪ Cashless payment system, bank accounts used	▪ Varied female participation across states - Very few female beneficiaries in certain states - Higher participation in semi-rural in comparison to remote rural areas (patriarchal influence) - Discrepancies between income across states - Women considered inferior and too weak to perform tasks - Discouraged by family ▪ Discrimination against women partaking in masculine work ▪ Claimed corruption in management of programme - Misappropriated funds - Financial exploitation	▪ MGNREGA lowered IPV rates - Financial independence - Empowered - Assertive - Contribute to family well-being - Equality between men and women ▪ MGNREGA perpetuated rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) - Unemployed men feel emasculated - Use violence to assert power and authority - Restore sense of manhood ▪ Despite contradictory findings, MGNREGA is a protective factor for women against IPV - Challenged certain patriarchal and sexist attitudes

GREECE

Strengths	Weaknesses	Impact on violence prevention
▪ Temporary employment aligned with participants' existing skills ▪ Work experience is recognised and acknowledged - Improved quality of services ▪ Municipalities provide tools and materials ▪ High skill level improves quality of services provided ▪ Transfer of skills to unskilled participants ▪ Limited erosion of skills ▪ Skills used to benefit communities impacted by financial crisis ▪ Social impact - Enhanced inclusion and participation ▪ Innovative and creative	▪ Exiting the programme is difficult - Economy not recovered ▪ Exit after five to eight months - Necessary to consider long-term solutions ▪ Reskilling necessary to improve employability - Not solely use existing skills	▪ No driving force for Kinofelis related to violence or crime ▪ Potential for unemployment and poverty to impact crime - Evidence required

Each PEP possesses its individual strengths and weaknesses, but there are commonalities across all the programmes. A participatory approach is evident in most of the PEPs, with the target population and beneficiaries being in some way actively involved in the choice and implementation of the projects. They are tasked with assuming responsibility and contributing to the PEPs' functioning. In Greece, however, the municipality appears to take the leading role in this regard. Other recurring strengths are improved self-esteem, pride, empowerment and social cohesion, and community relationships. This may be partly due to the participatory nature of the PEPs, as well as to other impacts of the programmes. These include the far-reaching effects of being employed, being able to provide for one's family, having a common goal, and having one's human rights realised, although beneficiaries experience the latter differently and to varying degrees, if at all. A promising and growing asset of some of the PEPs is their focus on females, who are either equally represented or given greater attention than males. Given the severe inequality experienced by females worldwide, this is necessary and encouraging. The promotion of entrepreneurship, provision of an income, skill transfer and business creation are further widespread strengths. The potential of these latter gains to translate into long-term benefits is evident and could lead to structural unemployment being challenged and transformed.

A common weakness among many of the PEPs is gender bias and lack of provision for women. In certain PEPs, no room is made for a gendered perspective and the need for varied approaches to accommodate both females and males. The conditions that are unique to women are in many instances not given any thought, such as the type of work they require and their childcare responsibilities. Some exceptions are evident, such as the CWP and MGNREGA, where women constitute the majority of beneficiaries. In South Africa, however, this is not a distinct aim of the PEP, but rather a result of men's aversion to the kinds of jobs offered by the programme, as discussed elsewhere in this volume.

Furthermore, it appears that the aims of the programmes are often not met, or are only minimally realised, or that the initial plans have unexpected effects, such as the military involvement of the PNCRT and corruption at different levels of the programmes. Clear exit strategies also surface as a weakness, keeping beneficiaries in the programme indefinitely, or leaving them without continued employment after participation in the programme, thereby defeating a primary goal and keeping people stuck in the same conditions they were in prior to participating in the PEP.

Apart from Kinofelis, the PEPs have the potential for violence prevention, although more evidence is needed. Certain elements present as more influential in this regard than others. For example, some PEPs – CWP, *Prevenir* and *Projóvenes* II – include projects aimed at violence prevention. MGNREGA in India adopts a specific gender focus on violence prevention, and although contradictory findings are discussed, the PEP does appear to act as a protective factor against IPV. On the other hand, the impact of Argentina's PEP on violence prevention is negligible. It may be suggested, considering the points presented in Table 2, that there is an indirect link between PEPs and violence prevention, albeit to varying degrees. This impact is not yet clear and also not far-reaching enough to significantly minimise crime and violence. However, PEPs do seem to offer a possible tool for violence prevention, one that did not exist beforehand.

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