Rauch, J. (1993). Drive-by Shootings in 1993. Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 9, 24 November.
Presenter: Janine Rauch
Janine Rauch is an independent consultant.
Date: 24 November 1993
Venue: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, South Africa
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Human Rights Committee and the South African Police (Springs) for providing data (fast) on drive-by shootings. I have discussed the problem of drive-by shootings and police investigations with a number of people in the SAP, the Peace structures, with detective trainers, lawyers, and colleagues in the violence research field. My colleagues in the Criminal Justice Programme provided much-needed last-minute research assistance. I am extremely grateful to all of these people for their time and contributions.
Drive-by Attacks: Guerrilla warfare or terrorism?
My interest in the subject of drive-by shootings was aroused when both police and civilian members of the Peace Accord structures in this region began describing the current violence in terms of "guerrilla warfare". A senior police officer suggested to me that the violence has changed, that it has developed into guerrilla warfare, which he characterised as resulting in more deaths than injuries, which implies a level of professionalism in the execution of violent acts. In a presentation to the Police Board in early November, Peter Harris of the Wits-Vaal Peace Secretariat described aspects of the violence in the region as "targeted urban guerrilla warfare".
It is probably more accurate to describe drive-by shootings as a form of "terrorism". Drive-by shootings, attacks on train commuters, customers at shebeens or participants in a night vigil appear to be terrorist tactics that have developed in the context of "self-help war". They are a highly effective, military type of attack. The perpetrators must have reasonable information at their disposal, as well as reasonable competence in planning and the use of firearms.
Terrorism is used to mean a strategy of political violence that involves systematic acts of destruction aimed at altering or maintaining power relations through spreading extreme fear.1
Terrorism is acts of intimidation, injuring unarmed, [and] presumably innocent, civilians.2
Drive-by shootings have a high toll in terms of both death and injury. If the police officer's definition of guerrilla warfare is correct, namely that it causes more death than injury, then drive-by's do not fall within that definition (see 5.1 below).
Following Rich (1984:70), Jacklyn Cock argues that guerrilla war is distinguishable from terrorism in that guerrilla warfare is premised on the assumption that the use of armed force is a logical extension of existing political objectives, and therefore exhibits a far greater degree of predictability and political morality than terrorism.3
… Terrorism is anarchic and devoid of moral content. It is the amorality and unpredictability of terrorism that distinguishes it from guerrilla warfare.4
In guerilla warfare, civil war, and certain types of crime, it reasonable to assume that the identity of the perpetrators can be deduced from the identity of the victims. However, in a terrorist incident, where victims are chosen at random, or at least homogenous characteristics of victims cannot be assumed, the identity of perpetrators is less clear.
An example could be made of taxi or train commuters. Simply because the commuters travel a certain route or congregate in a particular location does not mean that they all share the same political affiliations. Perpetrators from one side of a political conflict (see the political conflict explanation 7.1 below) run the risk of killing and injuring their own supporters when they pick such a target. Further, it is arguable whether drive-by shootings do actually deter taxi drivers from rival taxi factions from using particular routes (as in the "taxi war" theory – see 7.3 below), or whether their result is simply to terrorise commuters, which would not have specific benefits for either faction in a taxi conflict.
The notion of a "culture of violence" has gained credence in South Africa as an explanation for current rates of political and criminal conflict. However, with such a thoroughly militarised history, the notion of a "self-help war system" may be more appropriate in the South African context. This concept describes "a set of social and political relationships in which participants assume and expect that violence is likely to be used to settle conflicts with other groups, and among hostile factions in their midst".5 This use of violence in a variety of disputes is discussed below in an attempt to survey the range of possible "explanations" of drive-by shootings.
The Limitations and Objectives of this Paper
This is a preliminary investigation into drive-by shootings in 1993 and police investigations into them. It is based largely on secondary source data provided by the Human Rights Commission and the South African Police. Particular emphasis is placed on incidents of drive-by shootings in the East Rand townships outside Johannesburg, insofar as they exemplify or contradict trends elsewhere. The features of drive-by shootings are examined cursorily, due to insufficient data. Possible "explanations" of, and themes in, drive-by shootings are examined. Problems with police investigations of the incidents are also analysed.
It must be stressed at the outset that this is merely a preliminary investigation of the topic. Perhaps the observations presented here will de-mythologise some of the popular perceptions about drive-by shootings and allow a more complex and interactive understanding of the problem. It is hoped that this paper will provide a foundation for more in-depth research in future, and that it will assist those who are tasked with "solving" the problem.
Methodological Issues:
Defining and recording drive-by shootings
For the purposes of this paper, a drive-by shooting is defined as an incident involving shots fired from a vehicle, which is moving, or which drives off immediately after the shooting.6 The objectives are to kill, injure, and/or terrify the victims. Damage to property is also likely to result.
Attempts were made to gather empirical data on the incidence of drive-by shootings during 1993. This does not constitute a thorough search; rather, it is a preliminary step in the longer-term project of compiling a complete data set. The data referred to in this paper serves merely to outline a larger picture, and incidents are used as examples to illustrate particular arguments or problems.
The South African Police (in the East Rand) provided statistics on shooting incidents and "taxi violence". There is, of course, a general debate about the reliability of official crime statistics, both in South Africa and elsewhere, and whether or not they should be used by social researchers.7
One of the arguments against the use of official statistics is that such statistics are not appropriately organised for sociological research because they are not collected by the application of a "sociologically relevant" definition.8 True enough, the SAP's lack of a definition or category for "drive-by shootings" raised an immediate problem for this research. The majority of these incidents fall under the SAP category of "taxi violence". However, some of this "taxi violence" involves other kinds of incidents than drive-by shootings, and some drive-by's are unrelated to taxi disputes. This definitional problem appears to exist at a number of levels, even within the police organisation, where the investigating units may have different understandings or definitions of this type of violence to that which is reflected in the statistics produced by the crime information services (CIS-MID). Another problem with the SAP data is that incidents are sometimes referred to by the police station area in which they occurred, rather than by the location of the incident. More detailed data would have to be obtained from the SAP in order to clarify this aspect.
Social researchers9 have also argued against the use of official statistics because "successive layers of error" make them unreliable. While this is undoubtedly true of the majority of official crime statistics in South Africa, it is less applicable to the statistics concerned with unnatural deaths, particularly murder. This is because deaths are among the most likely incidents to be reported to, and recorded by, the police; and because cross-referencing is possible with mortuary records and with death statistics published by the Central Statistical Services. There are, then, possible ways to improve the reliability of official murder statistics. However, because drive-by shootings also result in injury and damage to property, death statistics alone10 are not a sufficient source of data for violence research.
Because of the problems with SAP statistics on drive-by shootings, other sources were also used. The Human Rights Commission provided a print-out from their database, consisting of a list of incidents, with some detail for each incident, and further incidents were identified through newspaper searches.
The Human Rights Commission (HRC) data is sourced to the news media (largely newspapers) and peace monitors. In addition to the fact that newspapers do not report every such case, the exact number of dead and injured are not always available to the HRC through these sources.
The History of Drive-by Shootings
This paper only looks at drive-by shootings in 1993, and clearly an adequate explanation of these needs to be set in a proper historical context. A more detailed historical review of the incidence of drive-by shootings needs to be conducted. For the purposes of this paper, a brief (and rather Transvaal-centric) list of well-known drive-by incidents or patterns is included here.
During the 1970s and 80s, many anti-apartheid activists were shot at by covert agents of the apartheid state who then sped away. At that time, the phrase "drive-by's" had not been coined, but there were probably a large number of such cases which went unlabelled and unreported. David Webster, Wits academic and well-known white democrat, was assassinated in a drive-by shooting in 1990.
Even further back, drive-by shootings were recorded during the 1976 uprising:
One case cited was the death of two young blacks and the wounding of two others when shots were fired from a passing car. Another was the death of a young man who was standing in the yard of his house with his father and two friends when, again, bullets came from a passing car. More details of this tyranny of the mysterious cars were published in the Sunday Express. The paper was receiving 'startling reports from Soweto residents alleging indiscriminate police action – as well as emphatic denials from the police'.11
In Soweto in 1976, it was alleged that the police were responsible for the drive-by shootings:
Twenty year old Sipho Mthunzi, for example, said he was playing soccer with eight other youths outside his home in Orlando West on 21 August: 'I saw a white Valiant turn the corner. Three white men in camouflage were inside. Suddenly rifles appeared out of the windows and mowed up and down the block shooting.' His account was supported by Miriam Maile, whose son was among the players. She added 'After the shooting, the police used a radio in the car to call two ambulances'. Maile had written down the car's registration number, which the Express checked with the licensing authorities. It was a police car.12
The "Trojan Horse" killings by the police, in which shots were fired off the back of a moving lorry in Cape Town in 1985, certainly fall into the definition of drive-by shootings.
It appears that the police had a pioneering role in the development of this terrifying form of violence.
The collective memory of colleagues working in the violence monitoring field in Johannesburg indicates that drive-by shootings as we know them today began to occur in the Vaal Triangle in January 1991.13
Features of Drive-by Shootings
South Africans have become ever-more inventive in finding ways of killing and injuring one another. In the colourful spectrum of examples, however, drive-by killings stand out as particularly extreme. The definition of drive-by shootings (see 3 above) implies that perpetrators have access to both firearms and vehicles. The act is committed by groups of people more often than by individuals alone – obviously, it is more effective to have a driver as well as shooters.
(i) Casualties
According to the HRC data, 139 people died as a result of drive-by shootings between January and the end of October 1993. In the same period, the HRC lists 134 known injuries, with many reports incomplete in respect of the actual numbers injured. It is also not known in how many cases the injuries eventually led to death. It is therefore deduced that the real number of injuries exceeds that which the HRC describes. The number of people injured probably exceeds the number of deaths caused by drive-by shootings. In some drive-by attacks, notably in the Western Cape, neither deaths nor injuries were reported.
(ii) Characteristics of shooter/s
Although very little information is available on suspects, it can be generally assumed that the majority of perpetrators of these attacks are men, although in one case, two women were said to have been involved.
In many cases, the alleged perpetrators have been identified by witnesses as African men. There are a number of cases where the perpetrators were identified as being white men. For example, on 21 February, two white men fired on black pedestrians on the Hartebeespoort Dam-Scheerpoort road. On 15 May, two black passengers in a mini-bus were injured and one was killed when three white SADF conscripts opened fire on the vehicle. There are some cases where witnesses suspect that the perpetrators were whites "disguised" as black men. No details on age, occupation, ethnic or political affiliation of shooters are available.
(iii) Weapons used
There is no comprehensive information on the types of weapons used in these attacks. However, many reports list AK47s and handguns such as pistols as the weapons used. In some cases, the police have been able to obtain forensic evidence about the weapon used from forensic tests performed on spent cartridges. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of the weapons used are either unlicensed or stolen.
(iv) Characteristics of victims
Again, no systematic information exists on drive-by victims nationwide. However, from the data provided by the HRC, it appears that by far the majority of victims have been black South Africans, as most of the attacks occur in black residential areas. There is a public perception that this form of violence is targeted at black victims –
It does not really matter what form of transport you use or what class of society you fall into. What matters is the colour of your skin.14
However, there have also been attacks targeted at white victims. The most well-publicised case occurred near Eikenhof on 19 March, resulting in the death of a white woman and two children.
Although the majority of victims appear to have been adults (potential voters, as an ANC PWV region spokesperson pointed out), a number of children have also been victims. The majority of victims have been commuters, which suggests that they were economically active. There is no data on the ethnic origins or political affiliation of the victims in the majority of cases. However, particularly in Natal, there have been drive-by attacks on groups of people attending or travelling from political rallies.
In the Cape Province, the majority of drive-by attacks were aimed at the security forces.
(v) Relationship between victims and shooters
In almost all incidents, no reference is reported to any pre-existing relationship between shooters and victims. Not only is there no reference to perpetrators being known in local communities, but there are suggestions that drive-by killers may be "imported" into areas for the purposes of committing the attacks, and may then return to other parts of the country.
One police officer in the East Rand suggested that some of the drive-by attackers in that area were actually imported from Natal. Similarly, on the Natal North Coast, an incident was reported in which the perpetrators were said to have come from the Transvaal. Two members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)-affiliated Transport and General Workers Union were killed in KwaMbonambi in one of approximately six drive-by incidents which took place in the area on 4 September. According the Eshowe Peace Office, the attackers arrived from Johannesburg on the 31st of August and resided in the home of a well-known IFP leader in the area.15
In contrast to this general trend, victims of drive-by attacks in the Vaal Triangle in July did mention that they recognised some of the attackers. This was reported in the context of newspaper stories about Victor 'Khetisi' Kheswa, who was linked to several massacres in the Vaal area.
Many residents of Sebokeng are convinced that massacres in the Vaal Triangle township have been carried out by groups of local people hired by the right wing. A survivor of the latest massacre [in the Vaal], in which 14 people were killed and 16 injured, said one of the killers knew her. Relatives of some of this week's victims also said they recognised at least one of the attackers.16
(vi) Areas where attacks take place
An analysis of the HRC data on drive-by shootings shows that 60% of such attacks occurred in black residential areas, notably near taxi ranks, and nearly 30% occurred on open roads. More recently, a number of attacks have taken place in industrial areas (such as Wadeville on the East Rand) where commuters gather to find transport. It is worth noting that these are not only an urban form of violence -in Natal and the Cape, in particular, these attacks have taken place on roads in rural areas.
Generating Fear
However, even more important than the actual casualties, is the effect that these shootings have in generating fear (terror) in the population. According to McKendrick and Hoffman, fear of violence not only erodes the fabric of interpersonal and intergroup relations, but can also lead to the disruption of social networks and the depletion of communities because people move away in order to escape the threat of violence.17 This disruption to the routine of daily life in the townships is clearly evidenced by the following excerpts:
The expedition to work, which used to take 15 minutes, takes two hours or more. Almost shouting, she says: 'The whole trip is nerve-wracking but we don't have a choice, we need to earn a living. Besides putting our lives on the line, we spend up to R20 a day to buy our way through'.18
'There is no longer a safe rank in the area. We always pray that we can get home safe. Any of us could be killed at any time'.19
Black commuters in this country are faced with a very difficult choice every morning they leave home for work, or travel from work to home. The choice is which death queue to pin their hopes on. Will it be safe to be on a train or will it be safe in a taxi today? … If you are in a taxi, you can die under a hail of gunfire from faceless attackers who are never caught by the police. … These days, you can die practically anywhere. It's just a matter of timing.20
The social impact of violent attacks such as drive-by shootings cannot be underestimated. The trauma experienced by people at the scene is multiplied in the effect that these incidents have of traumatising whole communities. The memory and the fear begin to shape people's lives – to determine decisions about where they live, where they work, how they commute and how they behave on the street. Given the random and "amoral" nature of these attacks, it is hard to take specific precautions. Instead, every act has to become a defensive or fearful one. It is this disempowerment which is the crucial outcome of drive-by shootings.
Explanations of Drive-by Shootings
(i) Political conflicts
Some of the drive-by incidents reported in the HRC data suggest a motive that is closely related to conflict between the ANC and the IFP, both in Natal and in the PWV.
In one case, an ANC member was killed and another injured in a drive-by shooting related in Thokoza in January. A funeral procession, consisting of mostly IFP members, was moving through the township. The incident occurred when two vehicles broke away from the procession and drove through the 'new' section of Thokoza opposite the Phola Park squatter camp.21
In Wembezi in the Natal Midlands in August, an IFP member was killed in a drive-by shooting at a taxi rank. A week previously, 2 people were killed and four injured in a shooting at the same taxi rank. A police spokesman said that the conflict is between ANC and IFP supporters. He said that the town is clearly divided into an ANC area and an IFP area. The taxi rank falls in the IFP area. According to the local ANC Secretary, the conflict began in December last year when ANC supporters were harassed at the taxi rank.22
The pattern in Wembezi repeated itself during September. On 4 September, five IFP supporters were killed and fourteen injured when a mini-bus owned by a well-known IFP member in the area was attacked with automatic rifles and handguns.23 The following week, an ANC-MK member opened fire from a moving vehicle on a group of IFP-supporting women who were waiting to be transported back to Wembezi after an IFP march.24
Although the political conflict between the ANC and the IFP (particularly in Natal) forms the backdrop for these incidents, and is undoubtedly part of the reason for them, it is unlikely that a one-dimensional explanation of the problem will suffice. It is far more likely that a range of economic, interpersonal and generational conflicts get played out against the political backdrop, resulting in violence, including drive-by attacks.
The urban conflicts of the 1990s are materially and ideologically rooted in apartheid, its deconstruction and the consequent breakdown of authority and social regulation. In part, the consequence of this is an intensified power struggle between the political interest groups, but the destructive might of these political conflicts can only be fully explained through a complex understanding of their articulation with the wider interests of an impoverished and oppressed urban population – on the trains and taxis, in the hostels, the squatter camps and the in the townships themselves.25
(ii) Hostel-related
During the course of this research, a number of interviewees alleged that drive-by attacks in the East Rand are perpetrated by IFP-supporting hostel-dwellers. The suggested "evidence" for this allegation varied – the view that the "Zulu tradition" is more militaristic and therefore that "the Zulus" perpetrate such attacks in a well-planned and organised manner; record of similar attacks having emanated from hostels in the past; or because of information supplied by informants in the hostels.
'The terror attacks and massacres almost always come from the hostels', [a senior police officer] said. His explanation is simple. The townships' noose is strangling them the hostels]. … And as the stalemate festers, the likelihood of another outrage increases.26
In the recent past, hostel dwellers have frequently been linked to attacks on trains, massacres, vigils and funerals.27 The convergence of the ethnic identities of migrant labourers in the Transvaal, with political identities as a result of their economic and social position in the townships has been discussed at length elsewhere.28 Conflicts around the hostels, particularly in the East Rand, have become intensely politicised.
(iii) Taxi-related
The conflict in [Thokoza and Katlehong] is closely related to attempts made by both ANC and the IFP supporters to obtain control over the taxi routes in the Katorus area. … No evidence is available to incriminate the ANC or the IFP as organisations directly in the violence. On the other hand, the impression is created that, in a number of cases, self-defence units, as well as IFP supporters involved in violence, operate under the banner of political parties and also rationalise their deeds on political grounds. It should also be borne in mind that ordinary criminal violence is not always distinguishable from political violence.29
The South African Police in October isolated taxi wars as one of the major causes of violence in South Africa.30 Like conflicts between hostel dwellers and other residents of townships, conflicts in the taxi industry have been politicised. The "taxi wars", which have erupted sporadically in many parts of the country, generally have at origin economic competition – competition between rival taxi groups for routes and passengers.
This is largely the result of the lack of regulation and dispute-resolution channels within the taxi industry. However, because some taxi owners live in hostels, and some in townships, and because they have a range of political affiliations, these economic conflicts have become intertwined with other dynamics, particularly the political conflict between the ANC and the IFP in Natal and the PWV.
In many cases, peace accord officials, police officers, or independent mediators have been successful in brokering deals between taxi groups and reducing violence.31
As much as taxi conflicts become interlinked with political conflicts, there is disturbing evidence that certain political interest groups may have a stake in fuelling taxi violence. One particular problem in this respect is the ownership of taxis by police officers or their families. This issue was a factor in the Cape Town taxi war of 1992, and has also been raised in relation to the taxi conflict in Pretoria and Brits. Related to this is the suggestion that "askaris" (ex-MK combatants turned police informers) are being used as professional hitmen in drive-by shootings.
A Sunday Nation investigation has revealed that Askaris were involved in several attacks on taxi commuters in the PWV area. Intensive investigations have established that people who attacked taxi commuters in Mamelodi recently were hired by the Brits-based Letlhabile Taxi Association. Some of these taxi members are Askaris. Police are looking for a certain Sam Seriti, who is related to one of the taxi owners and holds a senior position in the association. Seriti, according to police, has allegedly been involved in a number of attacks. They describe him as a hitman who 'avails' himself for any assassination job.32
The police interviewed in the East Rand suggested that there is a spiral of violence in taxi wars. The first phase involves damage to rival taxis, stonethrowing and so on. The second phase involves rival taxi-owners or drivers killing or injuring each other (generally with firearms). The third phase involves the use of hired "hitmen" by one or both parties to the dispute. At this stage, such cases obviously become much more difficult for the police to investigate.
(iv) Covert Right-Wing Operations
In addition to the overtly racist drive-by attacks perpetrated by white right-wingers (see below), there is popularly believed to be covert right-wing involvement in drive-by shootings and other township massacres. This differs from the right-wing attacks described below insofar as it is suggested that white right-wingers themselves do not necessarily carry out the attacks, but may instead hire surrogates from the townships.
Many residents of Sebokeng are convinced that massacres in the Vaal Triangle township have been carried out by groups of local people hired by the right wing.33
Although right-wing or "third force" involvement has not been conclusively "proved" in the legal sense, there are certainly cases were this appears to be plausible. In particular, the unmasking of Vaal gangster Victor Kheswa as a member of the World Apartheid Movement in July gave fuel to this theory. After his death in police custody, it was alleged that the police had killed him in order to prevent him implicating police officers in such covert right-wing attacks.
(v) Racist attacks
On 21 March, a black child was injured when a white driver attempted to run down black pedestrians and then opened fire on them. The "Wit Wolwe" secretary-general, a Mr Bosman, claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was in retaliation for the attack of white motorists on 19 March. Johan Hendrik Roelofse, who was found guilty of this murder, described himself as being involved in right-wing politics.34 White right-wingers also killed one black man in a drive-by incident in Vanderbijl Park during the Hani commemorations in April. On June 16, two black men were injured when they were shot at by three white men near Rustenburg. It is surely no coincidence that so many of these attacks took place on days commemorated by black South Africans because of their historical political significance.
A small proportion of the total number of drive-by attacks are perpetrated by supporters of the white right-wing on racially-selected victims. As this group generally has access to both firearms and motor vehicles, it is a particularly easy method of generating fear and heightening racial tension, which would serve the political interests of the white right. It remains an open question whether these incidents can be linked to any other drive-by attacks, and therefore whether the organised right-wing can be held responsible, in a grand conspiracy theory, for a larger proportion of all drive-by attacks.
(vi) Third Force/Destabilisation/Spoilers
Spokespeople of the ANC often refer to a third force in relation to drive-by killings of black victims.
ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus said last night he believed the massacre of commuters was linked to Tuesday night's breakthrough in negotiations regarding the Transitional Executive Council. 'The pattern seems to be well-established' he said. 'We believe there's a very clear pattern of third force activity stoking violence'.35
An ANC spokesman interviewed for this research suggested that drive-by attacks have two objectives – to derail the democratisation process, and to eliminate potential black voters. As we have argued elsewhere,36 this one-dimensional, "political" interpretation of the violence limits the ANC's ability to connect with, and empower, its grassroots supporters.
Clearly, however, there is a logic to the ANC's regular explanation. But it does appear that the negotiation process in South Africa has now reached the stage where it can remain untouched by even serious incidents of violence. The resolve of the major parties to seeing the process through means that violence is unlikely to jeopardise the continuation of negotiations. Violence may jeopardise the actual election process, and eliminate or scare off potential voters on all sides. The violence may also be a kind of low-intensity war, which is not, in fact aimed at derailing the national negotiation process, but rather at "emasculating the liberation struggle, in such a way as to destroy the capacity of liberation movements to translate their grassroots support into organised political support and ultimately into voter support at the ballot box".37
The "destabilisation"38 or "third force" theory has clearly had increasing impact in recent months. This is evidenced in the SAP's specific rebuttal of the theory in its latest briefing to the media:
Despite the outbreak of violence on the East Rand coinciding with important breakthroughs achieved in negotiations since May, and especially with regard to decisions on the implementation of transitional arrangements, no evidence exists at present that a so-called "third force" acts as instigators of this violence in order to derail or delay political progress.39
Earlier descriptions of the variety of drive-by attacks tends to suggest that the method is used in a range of contexts, by a range of different interest groups. It is therefore highly unlikely that there is one coherent, organised "third force" which is responsible for all these attacks. It is far more likely that "third force"-type activities are conducted by a range of groups who share an interest in creating havoc and terror, in certain places, at certain times.40 These groups can be collectively described as "spoilers". Peter Harris41 suggests that drive-by attacks are intended to inflame the situation and escalate conflict. He also points out that these incidents invariably set back local peace processes. Because of the nature of "terrorist" attacks, local peace structures are unable to prevent them. They fall outside, and yet succeed in undermining, fragile local peace processes.
(vii) "Disaggregating" the violence
The above examination of the various "explanations" for categories of drive-by shootings demonstrates that there is no one explanation or cause of these attacks.
[T]he search for mono-causal explanation is fruitless. The convenient terms in which the violence has been labelled, by politicians and the commercial media, often do more to disguise complex causation than to explain it. The violence has been variously labelled as ethnic conflict, conflict between hostel dwellers and squatters or township residents, conflict between ANC and IFP supporters, conflict between the police and the residents, between the poor and the very poor, conflict generated by the government or by a third force, etc. None of these descriptions is completely inaccurate. Yet, none, on its own, will properly explain this complex situation. It is only when we accept that we are dealing with a host of overlapping causal factors that we can begin to understand or address the problems constructively.42
It is equally important to "disaggregate" the phenomenon of drive-by shootings, to recognize the different contexts in which, and interests for which, the method has been used. The drive-by method has been used in a range of contexts – what criminologists term "copy-catting". The drive-by shooting method is not the sole preserve of one group of attackers – it has been used by black and white South Africans, by men and women, and by a range of social, economic and political interest groups.
The fact this method is not identifiable with any one party also means that it is open to exploitation by agents provocateurs or third force elements – the groups earlier referred to as "spoilers". The interests of such parties may best be served by the increased levels of conflict and fear which result.
When we have sufficient data to provide us with a detailed breakdown of the different categories of drive-by attacks, a more realistic approach to prevention and investigation can be developed. The levels of panic and fear which communities experience as a result of drive-by attacks appear to be reproduced in the key control agencies, such as the peace structures and the police, resulting in a downward spiral of despair and disempowerment which means that the problem is not being thoroughly addressed.
Police Investigative Capacity
The key agency here is the South African Police.43 The SAP have two units which could be mobilised to investigate drive-by shootings. The one is the Murder & Robbery Branch of the CID, and the other is the Unrest Investigation Units formed as a result of the National Peace Accord, "to investigate all crimes relating to political violence, which includes public violence".44
In areas such as the East Rand, the vast majority of drive-by shootings are investigated by the "unrest and violent crime unit". The investigation of the Wadeville massacre is a rare exception, as it is being conducted by the Murder and Robbery investigators. The managerial rationale for this was that the massacre occurred in a police area which is already overstretched by the levels of violence, and because it was a very high-profile case,45 which attracted much media attention.
The investigators on the unrest units carry anything between 20 and 120 cases at any one time. This figure is made up of old ("unsolved") cases as well as current investigations. In Katlehong, it is estimated that investigators carry between 50 and 80 cases each, whereas in Springs, they average 25-30. The caseload is determined by the number of reported incidents in the area, the investigative resources available, and the system of prioritising or allocating cases. The number of reported caseloads in Katlehong is very high. In the East Rand in general, senior officers in command of the investigation units do not feel that they are particularly disadvantaged in terms of resources. In fact, a large number of additional investigators have been brought into the area from other parts of the country.
The administrative and managerial systems that pertain to crime investigations have clearly been problematic in the past, and continue to present problems in some areas. For example, the enormous backlog of unsolved cases suggests a problem with previous management. However, innovative practices are being tried in a number of police areas in the Reef.46 These need to be recognised, evaluated and encouraged where they begin to succeed.
There are approximately 11 000 investigators in the South African Police, constituting more-or-less 10% of the entire force. Of these investigators, 50-65%47 have never received formal training in investigative skills. This is largely due to the historical de-prioritization of training in the SAP, particularly in the Detective Branch. It means that there is an immense training need which is unlikely to be met in the short term. It also means that commanders and supervisors have to carry the burden of training in addition to overseeing investigations. At all levels, this means the investigation process is slower.
This lack of investigative skills is one of the key contributing factors to the widespread public perception that the police do not investigate cases of political violence satisfactorily, if at all.48
The training of investigators is not the only problem, however. There is also a problem with the way that other members of the force conduct themselves at the scenes of crime. In many cases, the ISU or the uniformed police are the first to arrive at the scene. How they handle the scene, and the precautions they take to identify witnesses and evidence is crucial to the success of the case. The way the initial scene is handled will determine the success or solvability of the case.49 The handling of scenes of crime needs to be addressed at all levels of training – it is certainly not only junior officers who cause subsequent problems for investigators.
Problems with Investigating Drive-by Shootings
All police officers should be trained in murder investigation, for no other criminal offence has the real and imagined impact of murder. Police agencies must be prepared to respond to such a crime with maximum investigative effort, for an entire community can be upset by an unsolved murder.50
Lack of training is not the only problem in respect of crime scenes. The current climate of violence also creates problems for investigators. They can often not enter crime scenes in "soft" vehicles, or without being accompanied by the Internal Stability Unit. They can also often not spend enough time at the scene to do a thorough preliminary investigation – again, because the police investigators may become targets.
The particular nature of drive-by shootings presents a range of problems for investigators – they are extremely quick, the perpetrators drive away immediately, and witnesses and victims are extremely traumatised.
A further problem mentioned by a number of interviewees is the attitude of the police. Two aspects of this problem emerge: Firstly, that police investigators are often primarily concerned with closing a case, and therefore do not give each case the detailed attention it deserves. There is, in some instances, a distinct lack of commitment, responsibility and initiative. Secondly, police officers who are not investigators often have other concerns at the scene of the crime, for example to prevent further incidents of violence, or to secure themselves. Their primary concern is therefore not with the solvability of the case at hand, and this attitude may impact on the success of the investigation or on relationships with members of the public present at the scene, including potentially important witnesses.
A real problem for police investigators in South Africa at present is the reluctance on the part of the community to come forward with information or to act as witnesses. The reasons for this include mistrust of the police and fear of intimidation or reprisals from the perpetrators or from within their own community.
Conclusion
The image of the police rests substantially on how the police handle cases – how they conduct themselves and how they treat suspects and witnesses. Successful crime investigation is therefore crucial to improving the image of the police agencies in South Africa.
It is clear that there is a vast need for practical, skills-oriented training in the field of criminal investigation, particularly for black investigators in the SAP. This must be preceded by a selection procedure which identifies creativity, sensitivity to social dynamics, commitment and rigour as key success factors for investigators. However, no matter how good the formal training, its impact can be lost if the occupational environment is not conducive to a more committed and creative style of investigation. The attitudes of the more experienced members of the investigation units will also have to change in order for trainees to be given the best opportunity to develop their potential.
A specialised team of skilled investigators needs to be created to investigate drive-by shootings in each area where these incidents occur, and national sharing of information should be structured. In order to make this happen, drive-by's need to be categorised as a particular type of shooting incident, especially where they appear to fall into the "destabilisation" mould, with no clear relation to other conflicts (such as taxi conflicts). In order to solve these cases, the police need to build a detailed dossier of modus operandi and facts related to each case. Outstanding cases may be connected to each other. There needs to be a strengthening of the system which already exists in many police areas, under which a specialised team of investigators handles all issues related to taxi conflicts, or, say, right-wing action.
The appropriate management of crime investigations is critical to their success. Innovations in this regard are being piloted in a number of police districts, and evaluation of various methods of management needs to be conducted regularly. The crime investigation organisation needs to develop maximum flexibility, so that it can respond appropriately and quickly to new cases. The managerial skills of senior officers need to be enhanced, and creative problem-solving rewarded.
Because most information about drive-by shootings rests in the community, the improvement of police-community relations must be a priority, especially for investigators. "Community policing" needs to be embraced by every sector of the police organisation. Specifically, acceptable practices for procuring information, handling informants and protecting witnesses need to be developed. Police policy on these issues needs to be transparent in order to secure the co-operation of members of the public.
Effective police investigation is only part of the solution to the problem of drive-by shootings. However, it will contribute significantly to the empowerment and social development of the affected communities.
Effective gun controls and enforcement thereof could limit availability of weapons to perpetrators of these attacks. "Existing gun controls are not working effectively to reduce death and injury resulting from firearms".51
"Spoiler violence" needs to be isolated. Political solutions at both national and local levels can remove or reduce the interests which such groups currently have in creating conflict and fear.
More generally, there is a need to depoliticise conflicts over material resources (such as hostel and taxi conflicts) and to create effective mechanisms for regulation and for dispute resolution.
As much it is necessary to de-politicise the violence which results from a variety of social conflicts, it is also necessary to recriminalise violence. The only way in which South African can escape the "self-help war" syndrome is to develop, through the democratic process, a set of censures and sanctions for violent behaviour.
Appendix One
Note: Incidents in bold type were not listed by the SAP or by the Human Rights Committee, but were reported in The Star.
|
EAST RAND 1993
|
|||
|
SAP DATA: TAXI VIOLENCE
|
HRC DATA: DRIVE-BY&s
|
||
| MONTH | DATE | ||
| JANUARY | 0 incidents | 23rd | Thokoza 1 dead |
| FEBRUARY | 2 incidents: Germiston Katlehong |
4th 4th 5th |
Tembisa 1 dead Kempton Park Thokoza |
| MARCH | 0 incidents | 21st 21st |
Katlehong Nigel |
| APRIL | 0 incidents | 2nd | Katlehong |
| MAY | 2 incidents: Tembisa Oakmore railway stn |
24th 24th 25th 25th 27th |
Katlehong Thokoza Thokoza Tembisa 2 dead Benoni |
| JUNE | 0 incidents | 0 incidents | |
| JULY | 1 incident Kempton Park 21 dead |
14th 25th |
Katlehong 2 dead Daveyton |
| AUGUST | 0 incidents | 2nd 5th 6th 6th |
Thokoza Katlehong Katlehong 2 dead Thokoza |
| SEPTEMBER | 5 incidents: 8th Wadeville 21 dead Katlehong 2 dead Heidelberg 19 dead Alrode 6 dead Thokoza |
8th 17th 8th |
Daveyton Katlehong 2 dead Leondale 2/3 dead |
| OCTOBER | 1 incident: Vosloorus 1 dead |
17th 18th 20th |
Katlehong 2 dead Katlehong Kliprivier 20 dead |
| NOVEMBER | 5th 9th 11th |
Germiston stn Germiston 1 dead Elsburg 1 dead |
|
Notes:
2 Said 1988:50 cited in Cock 1991:4
6 This excludes car hijackings, in which cars are stolen, but may include attempted or aborted hijackings which end up only as shooting incidents.
9 Merton op cit, Kitsuse & Cicorel 1963, Wiles 1975
10 See Simpson et al 1991 for a discussion of the limitations of using death statistics to analyse violence in South Africa.
13 At the night vigil for ANC member Christopher Nangalembe, 45 people were killed and over 50 wounded.
15 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) data cites various newspapers and the Eshowe Peace Office
17 Hoffman & McKendrick 1990:25
18 The Star 18 August 1991 p.13
19 Sunday Nation November 14 1993 p.11
21 HRC data cites various newspapers
22 HRC data obtained from newspaper reports, SAP, ANC and PACSA
23 HRC data cites various newspapers and SAPA
24 HRC data cites SAPA 17 September and IFP sources
26 Sunday Times September 12 1993 p.7
29 South African Police (SAP) Press Release 19 October 1993
30 Lt-Gen J Le Roux SAP Press Release 19-10-1993
31 See Sunday Times 14 November 1993 for example
32 Sunday Nation November 14 1993 p.3
34 The Citizen 20 November 1993
39 Lt-Gen Johan Le Roux, SAP Press Release 19 October
40 See Simpson & Rauch 1993:20 for an analysis of the "third force" theories.
43 Much of the information used in this section was provided by members of the SAP in the East Rand, who have been extremely co-operative.
44 National Peace Accord 1991:10
45 The sceptical observer will note that this case took place not in a township, but in an industrial area close to Germiston, and thus the interests of white-owned businesses were also affected.
46 for example in Soweto and in the East Rand
47 Discussion at International Training Committee, later followed up in interviews with SAP detective trainers.
48 This perception was noted at the national workshop on Police-Community Relations in July this year.
49 The Waddington report into the police investigation of the Massacre at Boipatong raised the same issues about police handling of scenes of crime.
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